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Intolerance, discourtesy and harshness… are taboo in all good society and are surely contrary  
to the spirit of democracy.  
Mahatma Ghandi 
 
I believe that nothing should be taboo – no theory or prejudice should close one ‘s mind to a discovery. 
Henry Moore 
 
All that is sacred and taboo in the world are meaningless. 
Anaïs Nin 
1. Introduction 
In the quotes above, taboos emerge as constitutive of democracy, as preventing knowledge pro-
duction but also as meaningless social conventions. But why are the understandings of taboos 
thus varied? What is the meaning of taboo – then and now? What is the analytical use of turning 
to such a concept and its counterpart, i.e. the transgression of taboo(s)? These are some of the 
questions we will address not only in this introduction but in the volume as a whole, as we will 
see what the upholding or breaking of taboos tells us about the power structure in a society, 
about the underlying ideologies as well as dominant discourses. 
In order to embed an otherwise rather theoretical and abstract discussion on taboo and trans-
gression in current political economic conditions, we will briefly turn to the example of the cur-
rent extreme right party Alternative für Deutschland (‘Alternative for Germany’ , henceforth AfD), 
which has gained nation-wide momentum since its foundation in 2013, becoming the third larg-
est party at this moment after the CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany, Christlich  
Demokratische Union Deutschlands) and the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany, Sozialdemo-
kratische Partei Deutschlands). ‘Taboos‘  emerge in the context of the rise of the AfD on several  
levels: First, and most importantly, as a result of the dismantling of the Nazi Third Reich (1933–
1945) under Adolf Hitler, it had been taboo in German politics to integrate extreme right wing 
ideology and narratives to official political discourse, which is exactly what representatives of the 
AfD have openly done (while the party‘s official political programme is hailing “democracy and 
core values”1). Secondly, at the onset of their ‘success story‘ , the AfD was a political taboo in its 
own, i.e. they were considered an enfant terrible and, thus, unsuitable for collaboration by the 
other two major parties – but as the development of many taboos attest, this has changed, which 
is due to their success in local elections.2 Thirdly, the AfD fashions itself as a ‘taboo breaker‘ , 
most importantly regarding the taboo of national pride, which, again, has been impossible to  
appropriate in Germany since World War II without a nationalist overtone.3 The AfD now reclaims 
such pride discourses, linking it to national identity with clear imageries of ‘us‘  in which the 
‘others‘  are the immigrants, Muslims, refugees, etc.4 In the end, such “claims to taboo” (German: 
Tabu-Anspruch, cf. von Lucke 2010) and the political staging of taboo breaking (cf. Schröder/
Mildenberg 2012) employed by the AfD (and other comparable political parties or movements) 
aim to reverse agency, i.e. to present one‘s own opinion and group as tabooed, as silenced and, 
finally, as victimised (cf. Hägi-Mead 2018), e.g. by agents of ‘political correctness‘ . This becomes 
evident in the official political programme of AfD, which celebrates conservative, nationalist, and 
chauvinist ideologies. The taboos in question here can thus be summarised as connected to  
narratives on World War II/Nazi Germany, on immigration and integration, on the ‘refugee  
welcome‘  culture promoted by German chancellor Angela Merkel, and related topics that have 
become inherent to the identity construction of a reunified, tolerant and open Germany. 
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It is important to note that there are many local grassroots initiatives and institutional efforts to 
counter the rise of the extreme right in the name of a tolerant Germany. Universities in particular 
have spearheaded such efforts, from launching anti-racist campaigns to fully-fledged research 
centres, of which the Centre for Integration Studies (Zentrum für Integrationsstudien, ZfI) is an 
example, located at the TU Dresden.5 It is not a coincidence that this centre was founded in  
Dresden, as this former East German town has gained notoriety as the hotbed of Pegida (short 
for Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes , Patriotic Europeans Against 
the Islamisation of the West, a forerunner of the AfD) and for a high voter turnout for the AfD. 
This new online publication series is to be read as another counter-narrative on the hotly debat-
ed topics of migration, integration and diversity, while adhering to critical thought and intellectual 
rigour.  
As is widely known, the shift to the right in political discourse is not restricted to Germany. Albeit 
the question of which taboos are ‘broken‘  depends on the political and historical context, right 
wing and authoritarian tendencies have dominated the media landscape and political scene all 
over Europe and North America over the last few years. While the societal and political discus-
sions about ‘fake news‘  (Lügenpresse in Germany) and ‘alternative facts‘  shed light on the negotia-
tions on the production of knowledge and on legitimate and authoritative news production that 
transgress an allegedly established consensus, political initiatives of the populist right have re-
sulted in the founding of successful political parties, separation movements or governments that 
constantly flirt with the breaking and transgression of taboos. 
In the light of these developments, it can be useful to go back to questions on the understanding, 
meaning, and analytical function of taboos that were raised at the beginning of this introduction. 
In the following, we will give a short summary of how to tackle the concept of ‘taboo‘  in an ana-
lytical way and how to relate it to transgression. In a second step, we will outline a programmatic 
approach to taboo and how to apply it in a functional perspective for the analysis of contempo-
rary society, which is increasingly marked by debates on migration, integration policies and nego-
tiations revolving around diversity and identity. In a final step, we will present an overview of the 
individual contributions. 
 
2. What‘s in a taboo? 
As the three quotes at the beginning of this introduction attest, taboos have different meanings 
in contemporary society. First, for Mahatma Gandhi (1883–1944), the famous leader of Indian in-
dependence from colonial Britain, taboos appear to be of functional value. In that sense, he relo-
cates the unspeakable and undoable into the realm of the taboo; in this instance, he describes 
“intolerance, discourtesy and harshness” as detrimental to the values of a recently installed and 
still vulnerable democracy. In contrast, the acclaimed British sculpture artist Henry Moore (1898–
1986) formulates the transgression of taboos as productive – necessary even – for personal and 
intellectual growth, which he sees as the fundamental basis for artist production. Finally, the con-
troversial French-American writer Anaïs Nin (1903–1977) dismantles “all that is sacred and taboo” 
in not attributing any meaning to them, herself pushing boundaries and struggling with a periph-
eral position in society and as an artist her entire life.  
Now, even in its brevity, this sketch illustrates different meanings and functions attributed to ta-
boos and their transgressions (from taboos as necessity, to transgressions as productive, to ta-
boos as superfluous), which are contingent on the historical and political economic background 
of a society, social transformations under way, or the position of an individual in a society. In the 
following, we want to outline – again, briefly – where ‘taboo‘  actually comes from and why it is of 
conceptual relevance for the study of contemporary society and societies. 
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As any dictionary or lexicon attests, the term ‘taboo‘  derives from Polynesian denomination of 
anything that is forbidden or prohibited for reasons of sanctity or danger (according to British 
Captain James Cook, who explored the Polynesian islands in the early 18th century).6 In this sense, 
it can be applied to any practice, food, language, place, etc., and can be read not only as a pre-
scriptive, but, more importantly so, as an instructive concept. In enforcing a certain taboo, first-
hand experiences of danger, risk or damage could be avoided, while transgressions thereof 
would engender such risks – for individuals (i.e. their bodies!), but also for groups or communi-
ties, which is why transgressions can (or have to) lead to negative sanctions or even to being ex-
pelled from a social group. In this capacity, taboos are an inherent component of guaranteeing 
group safety, instrumental for community cohesion and part of any socialisation process. In this 
vein, the sociologist Durkheim considered the taboo predominantly as a “symbol for group mem-
bership”, while Lévy-Strauss regarded it as a “symbolic system, which gives expression to the in-
terchange between nature, culture, animality and society” (Penguin Dictionary of Sociology 1988: 
251). In this system, transgressions between nature, culture, animality and society are inscribed 
in clear imaginations of the taboo. The psychoanalyst Freud extended the theoretical under-
standing of the taboo‘s functionalities from body and spirit to psyche, in introducing the subcon-
scious and its drives, which effectively might result in the willed transgression of a taboo, espe-
cially in the realm of sexuality (cf. Jervis 1999: 157–180), where its extreme culmination is the  
incest taboo.  
Today‘s theoretical and everyday use of taboo are no longer necessarily related to individual 
safety or danger, which has resulted in a semantic shift (or expansion) of the word. Still, a taboo 
remains a denominator of an imagined social order, with the function to safe-keep the nation‘s 
body, so to speak, as, e.g., the Encyclopaedia Britannica states: “There is broad agreement that 
the taboos current in any society tend to relate to objects and actions that are significant for the 
social order and that, as such, taboos belong to the general system of social control [emphasis 
added]”.7 In this, taboos are closely aligned to ‘norms‘  and ‘values‘ , two central sociological con-
cepts that lie at the core of the functioning of societies and also operate as unwritten laws. The 
idea that a certain set of norms, values and, in turn, taboos are socially valid and acceptable for 
everyone, presupposes a homogenous society, which e.g., political scientist Anderson (1993) has 
famously decried as imaginary. Yet, even if the idea of a community is imagined, the discursive 
construction of norms, values (including taboos) have retained a social force to reckon with. 
Therefore, even it is beyond the scope of this introduction to elaborate on the concrete relation-
ship between taboos, norms and values, we propose to think of them as different sides of the 
same coin, i.e. the “general system of social control”. Taboos control what one does (i.e. action), 
what one says (i.e. speaking) and what one (cannot) talk about (i.e. communication) in a given so-
ciety at a given moment in time (cf. Hägi-Mead 2018). In a nutshell, this means that, to this day, 
taboos constitute the socially acceptable limit of action, speaking, and communication (cf. Schrö-
der/Mildenberger 2012), and that transgressions of this limit are met with punishment, as the 
papers in this volume testify (cf. for further elaborations on the meanings of taboo Horlacher 
2010; Kraft 2004; Krajewski 2015). 
We can thus summarise that a taboo is a lens through which social processes of mainstreaming, 
policing, disciplining and othering become evident. This remains true for contemporary society 
often configured as postmodern, which has a celebratory focus on the performative (cf. Butler 
1990), fluid or liquid (cf. Bauman 2000), and hybrid (cf. Bhabha 1994), but retains the controlling 
and disciplining technologies of modernity (cf. Foucault 1975). Even if the transgression, decon-
struction, and iconoclasm of grand narratives (e.g. of the alleged clear gender binary or natural 
social hierarchies) appear to be a necessary consequence under these (seemingly) paradox con-
ditions, a focus on taboos highlights their residual effects and their sustainable power. Moreover, 
it has often been argued that it is exactly the dismantling of the grand narratives that results in 
Taboo and Transgression  
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backlashes of different sorts, more often than not voiced or enacted with violence, outrage, and 
contempt. In the introduction above, current political consequences (or rather: uptakes) of such 
backlash in (post-)migrant societies were outlined. It remains to be seen whether these societies 
manage to find common ground and develop an equitable pluralism of values (Wertepluralität, 
cf. Terkessidis 2018), which would take into account the values, norms, and taboos of different 
people, groups, and communities living in one society, or whether they will resort to the repro-
duction of assimilationist mechanism for the sake of social control. After all, it cannot be denied 
that most societies nowadays are postmigrant, i.e. societies in which migration affects and in-
spires all levels and domains as well as each and every individual living in that very society (cf. 
Terkessidis 2018: 111f.).  
 
3. A functional perspective on taboo and transgression 
Following from this, it is an analysis of the system of social control in the context of (post-)
migration and diversity that is the aim of this volume. After all, it could be argued that societies 
(even more so than groups or communities) rely on the social compass that is the taboo in order 
to maintain internal order. Literary studies scholar Horlacher writes in this respect that “taboos 
can be functionalized by a society to strengthen its identity (cf. the scapegoat)” (2010: 13). Thus, if 
the taboo had the function to strengthen community cohesion, this is even more so the case 
when a (seemingly cohesive and homogeneous) society is confronted with a different system of 
taboos, norms and values, as in contact situations resulting from migration. In such circumstanc-
es, the society (or rather: its population) is forced to re-evaluate (or actually verbalise) its own ta-
boos, norms and values which might result in social change or, contrarily, in the re-enforcing of 
its existing social order, i.e. in the re-inscribing of particular scapegoats into the tissue of social 
structure. In any case, social changes inevitably bring about qualitative changes on the level of 
taboos, norms and values (one only needs to think of the African-American Civil Rights Movement 
in the United States or of the Women‘s Liberation Movement in Western countries, both in the 
mid-20th century). Yet, while some of these changes occur on a legal or discursive level, other 
changes are slower to take hold or they actually manifest only on a surface level. Coming back to 
the example of the feminist movements in Western countries, it is now unthinkable (i.e. taboo) to 
officially refer to women as lesser human beings, as less intelligent or capable than men – but as 
becomes clear again and again, such opinions are still wide-spread and, thus, under certain con-
ditions (or in certain circles) still sayable. 
The question of when something is/becomes thinkable or even sayable can be approached with a 
Foucauldian perspective. In his oeuvre “The order of discourse” (L‘ordre du discours), published in 
1971, Foucault describes the regulative order of what is sayable or thinkable and, in that, rational. 
While the discursive order shifts and transforms over time, which manifests in changes with re-
gards to the sayable, these transformations have to be seen as invested with power, directly 
linked to the social order. Thus, what can be said at a certain moment in time is never coinci-
dental, innocent or random, but is indexical of what is considered legitimate (cf. for Foucauldian 
analyses of discourses of integration Flubacher 2016; Piñeiro/Bopp/Kreis 2009). Historicising the 
sayable and unsayable is thus primordial in understanding what is at stake for societies, individu-
als and their agency (cf. Duchêne 2008). 
Summarising, taboos can be conceptualised as what is unsayable, unspeakable and undoable – 
most often connected to acts of violence, sexuality or consumption. While some taboos are per-
ceptible on a linguistic surface level (e.g. swear words, cf. Jay 2009, or the explicit reference to 
death, cf. Hänggi/Diederich 2017, or euphemism in general, cf. Hägi-Mead 2018), others are locat-
ed at deeper levels of social structure. They can be either regarded as a protective social device 
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or as an exclusionary mechanism. Similarly, the transgression of taboos can be experienced as 
liberating or, contrarily, as damaging, depending on the aim or motivation underlying the act of 
transgression. 
 
4. The scope of the publication 
It is the ambivalent nature of taboos that is highlighted in the analyses presented in this volume 
and, more importantly, their effects on individuals who do not seem to fit in or cohere with the 
seemingly homogeneous social order. These effects can manifest themselves in feelings of 
shame or guilt, in being targeted as victims of aggression or in material consequences, resulting 
in discrimination practices or policies. For example, in allegedly monolingual societies, studies in 
Applied Linguistics have described the taboo for speakers of other languages to speak their first 
language, which can result in children feeling ashamed of their first language (cf. Hägi-Mead, in 
print). Another example, as provided by Critical Marketing research, has shown how advertise-
ment that consistently transgresses the taboo of violence against women has the effect of por-
traying women “as sexualised teases to be controlled and conquered” (Gurrieri/Brace-Govan/
Cherrier 2016: 1462). Gurrieri/Brace-Govan/Cherrier argue that such violent advertising can, in 
effect, “re-state ideas about gendered subjects and […] can produce or ‘fabricate‘  certain gender 
identities and subjectivities that eventually become standard and seen as ‘natural‘ ” (ibid.). Taboos 
and their transgression have thus real-life effects and consequences, as will be further illustrated 
in the individual contributions. In the following, we will provide a short overview of these contri-
butions and discuss how they relate to the scope of this volume, bringing together different re-
search traditions and disciplinary perspectives. 
Starting with a perspective from Cultural Studies, Katja Kanzler discusses which ideas about so-
cial order are imaginatively negotiated in society. In her contribution “(Meta-)Disparagement Hu-
mour: The Poetics and Politics of Mockery in the Sitcom Two Broke Girls”, Kanzler draws on an 
emblematic television sitcom from the United States in order to carefully unpack the several lay-
ers of irony, mockery and humour that are offered as recurrent narrative devices throughout the 
individual episodes of the show. She argues that, on the surface, mockery appears to be applied 
unabashedly and indiscriminately, transgressing sexual, racial and religious taboos. Yet, in doing 
so, it is especially traditional dominant discourses and ideals of femininity that are subverted in 
the process. As Kanzler teases out, the subversive potential of these transgressive mockeries ex-
hausts itself in that it stops short in the face of white privilege and the neoliberal dream epito-
mised in the narrative “from rags to riches” ubiquitous in the United States. In fact, the only ele-
ment which is never exposed to mockery or irony in the show is the effort of the “two broke girls” 
to save money for their own business. This particular perspective from Cultural Studies with a 
focus on popular culture helps us understand how and which social order is negotiated; in other 
words: what content, form and representation is considered to offer mass appeal, what is consid-
ered cutting edge or provocative, but also ‘who‘  and/or what is up for mockery and what is basi-
cally beyond mockery, i.e. untouchable. 
While the question of minority representation in cinema and television is heavily contested at the 
moment (one only has to think of current keywords such as ‘whitewashing‘  and ‘ inclusion rider‘  
or hashtags such as ‘OscarsSoWhite‘ ), the vulnerability and distortion of minorities in their repre-
sentation(s) is also an issue for societies, their media outlets and the political sphere. It is such a 
discussion that is at the centre of the second contribution. In their chapter entitled “Accredited 
Affects: Discourses and Taboos around Migration and Threat”, Paul Mecheril and Monica van der 
Haagen-Wulff highlight the stakes for a (post-)migrant society from a Pedagogy and Education 
Research background. They link racist practices (culminating in lynching) and hypersexualised 
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animalistic representations of African-American men (former slaves) in post-war Southern United 
States via racist depictions of ‘barbaric‘  and, again, hypersexualised, African-French soldiers sta-
tioned in German Rhineland, to contemporary German discourses on threat that are related to 
the immigration of Muslim men. The latter is exemplified by media reports on sexual assaults in 
Cologne on New Year‘s Eve 2015/2016. This brief contextualisation highlights not only the politi-
cal dimension of the practices of (visual and narrative) representations – in the media as well as 
in official political discourse –, but also their lack of historical backgrounding. Drawing on Ah-
med‘s (2014) concept of ‘stickiness‘  with regards to fear, Mecheril and van der Haagen-Wulff inte-
grate not only affect into their analysis, but also the body – in this case the body of the White 
woman that becomes a metonym for the national body. Through the staging of (imagined or at 
least highly exaggerated) scenarios of fear, the protection of a (particularly imagined) social body 
against (particularly imagined) ‘others‘  becomes sanctioned. 
The integration of foreign elements, i.e. of migrants and refugees, into the German national body 
has become an institutionalised practice in its own right. A critical analysis of course material of  
an ‘ integration course‘  is presented by Sara Hägi-Mead, a scholar in German as a foreign and sec-
ond language, in the chapter “Taboos and Integration: Welcome to Germany”. In these integra-
tion courses, migrants and refugees are instructed on the norms, values, and laws in Germany, 
whereby these social and legal norms are located at various levels of abstraction, e.g. from 
“taking out the trash” to “women are equal to men”, and presented irrespective of the linguistic 
level of competency of the course participants. This chapter offers an analysis of the norms and 
values taught in such courses, which teases out the taboos inherent in societal discourse and 
practice, the implicit anticipation of migrants and refugees as transgressors of these taboos as 
well as the related categorisation of migrants and refugees as both threatening but also infantile 
‘others‘ . Against this background, this chapter offers a model – in the form of a grid – on the basis 
of which topics, actions, statements, and language usage (in the course material, but also of any 
other material) can be assigned to the aspects of protection and abuse through taboos. Since 
questions of empowerment are always at stake in the context of integration, the grid represents 
a means of perceiving existing power relations in the discursive treatment of taboos. 
Closely related to the discussion on taboos in integration courses is the contribution by Laura 
Rind-Menzel: “Taboos and Transgressions as a Result of Insufficient Consideration of Didactic 
Principles in Orientation Course Materials”. In this chapter, while courses for migrants in Germa-
ny also provide the basis for analysis, the focus shifts to the specificity of the ‘orientation 
course‘  (which is part of the integration course curriculum). In the orientation course, newly ar-
rived migrants learn about the German political system, civil rights and duties, and norms and 
values. Anchored in the field of political education, Rind-Menzel presents selected examples from 
course material to address the empirical (and critical) question whether the principles of political 
education are applied, as they are meant to ensure an involvement with the political system and, 
hopefully, to lead to political participation. She argues that the erasure of learner diversity, of 
their life worlds and of their actual restricted access to political participation in the course materi-
al seems to point to a taboo in itself, thus representing a transgression in its own right. 
In contrast to these analyses of discursive transgressions in media and teaching material, it is vio-
lent forms of transgression that the chapter “Virtual Platforms, Real Racism: Online Hate Speech 
in Europe” is dealing with. As indicated in the title, these transgressions occur in the form of 
online hate speech, experienced by young people (116 participants between the ages of 14–30) in 
five European countries (Italy, France, Spain, Romania, and the United Kingdom). Recounting the 
narrated (direct or indirect) experiences of members of target groups of online hate speech as 
well as of ‘bystanders‘ , social anthropologists Olga Jubany and Rosa Lázaro Castellanos embed 
this particular phenomenon in a broader historical discussion of (post-)colonial racism. The au-
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thors conclude that for the young research participants, the racism encountered online appears 
to be an inevitable by-product of the Internet and has thus been normalised to a certain extent. 
Yet, in spite of the normalisation, they do take offense, but are unsure of how to counter these 
transgressions, feeling paralysed as a result. It is the normalisation of the experienced and wit-
nessed online hate speech that worries the authors, as in their eyes it speaks of wide-spread le-
gitimisation of enacting or verbalising prejudice, stigma and discrimination. As this normalisation 
appears to be deeply anchored in the modernist colonial categorisation internalised by society, 
hate speech online does not have to be but might very well be connected to offline behaviour. On 
the one hand, then, the constant and relentless transgressing of the taboo inherent to racism or 
racist slurs that happens online, be it in the guise of joke and mockery or in explicit hate speech, 
mirrors an internalisation of binary categories. On the other hand, the witnessing of hate speech 
online threateningly visualises to young people what happens to the transgressors of the ideal-
ised social order. 
Finally, a similar understanding of transgression in relation to hate crimes is informative of the 
last chapter by sociologist Amanda Haynes and Law scholar Jennifer Schweppe, entitled “Hate 
Crime: Violently Policing Transgressions of Perceived Parameters of Acceptability”. Rather than 
considering hate crimes themselves a transgression, these authors re-frame hate crime as a reac-
tion to transgressions, most importantly of hierarchically defined boundaries that relate to gen-
der, sexuality, race, or religion. Drawing on qualitative interviews with victims of hate crimes in 
Ireland as well as with their family members, Haynes and Schweppe detect a form of ‘policing‘  on 
the side of the offender and their imagined community – exactly in moments when their privilege 
appears to them to be at stake. In the end, it is not the individuality of the victim that is attacked 
but their embodiment of transgressing the social order, i.e. ‘presenting‘  a body that is indexical of 
‘other‘  religions (e.g., wearing a beard or a kippa), of transgressing gender boundaries (e.g., wear-
ing clothes allocated to the ‘other‘  gender) or simply of ‘other‘  visible physical features (e.g., hav-
ing a different skin colour). Taking on such a perspective, as they argue, allows for a broader soci-
etal discussion on hate crimes in their primary function as ‘message crimes‘  rather than individu-
alising acts of hate crime or pathologising individual offenders. In the end, as can be concluded, it 
is the responsibility of society as a whole to address hate crimes, as they are embedded in its so-
cial structure. 
 
5. Concluding thoughts 
To conclude, we want to come back to the quotes at the beginning of the introduction by Ghandi, 
Moore and Nin. These quotes illustrate varying interpretations of the nature of taboos (as neces-
sary, constraining, and meaningless). Yet, within their difference, they still portray taboos as in-
habiting a specific place within and for the social fabric in that they regulate action, speaking, and 
communication. However, what the short overview of the chapters has made clear, taboos are 
not only social ‘signposts‘ , but inherent social devices, which mark what is ‘normal‘  contrary to 
what is ‘deviant‘ . Transgressions, then, make visible the limits of the taboo, and provoke a reac-
tion that aims to reconfigure the apparently violated social order and to reclaim social control. 
The effects of that on individuals is clearly described in these contributions, as well as the price 
that these individuals and their social environment have to pay.  
Reading taboos and transgressions in such a critical light, the necessity emerges to ask ourselves 
as a society, but also as scholars and citizens, to find ways of dealing with the categories and pro-
cesses of categorisation embedded in the social structure that have residual and replicating 
effects of exclusion, discrimination, and hierarchisation. What has become clear in this effect is 
that violent transgressions as well as violent reactions to transgressions will not disappear (as 
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much as violence in itself might be a social taboo), as long as the modernist narrative, anchored 
in and fuelled by its colonial past, remains dominant, in spite of the diverse/diversified reality en-
countered in the national contexts. While we cannot dream of a one-fit-all solution at this point, it 
is nonetheless the aim of this volume to raise an interest in a critical reading of why certain ta-
boos remain intact, why others get transgressed or even broken, who profits from such trans-
gressions and who loses. As so often, these questions are linked to processes of power. And as 
ever so often, it is the already disenfranchised who have most to lose. 
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Abstract 
This paper attends to popular culture as a venue in which ideas about social order are imagina-
tively negotiated. Zooming in on the genre of televisual comedy – the sitcom – it specifically asks 
how mass-mediated practices of mockery resonate with and circulate ideas about social hierar-
chies. The paper approaches mass-mediated mockery from a Cultural Studies perspective, as a 
signifying practice with its own poetics and politics, whose operations revolve around the ambi-
guous play with taboo and transgression. Proceeding from a set of conceptual remarks, the pa-
per outlines a case study of the US-American sitcom Two Broke Girls, tracing how the show uses 
the humour of mockery in ways that critically challenge dominant discourses of femininity and 
class while reinforcing oppressive discourses of ‘race‘ . 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2015, well-known US-American comedian Jerry Seinfeld sparked a lively debate when he com-
plained, in an interview, that political correctness allegedly kills comedy.1 Seinfeld related how he 
had stopped playing college campuses because he was sure the allegedly pc-steeped audiences 
there would definitely find something in his shows that is offensive: “They just want to use these 
words. ‘That‘s racist. That‘s sexist. That‘s prejudice‘ . They don‘t even know what they‘re talking 
about” (Silman 2015: n.pg.). These remarks became a platform for heated discussions, which not 
only several other comedians joined but also representatives of what Seinfeld treats as ‘pc cul-
ture‘ . One of these is Anthony Berteaux, signing off as “a ‘Politically Correct‘  College Student” in 
an Open Letter published at Huffington Post, where he suggests that the problem with some 
comedy is not that it is offensive – in fact, he asserts that it is the very job of comedy to provoke – 
but that it is how and whom comedy offends that are contentious. Berteaux ends his Open Letter 
with a quote by another comedian, Todd Glass, who said, “You can be crass, you can be vulgar, 
and it‘s not about worrying about offending people. Fuck offending people. Offend the right fuck-
ing people” (2015: n.pg.).  
Seinfeld‘s statement and its debate highlight the eminently political quality of comedy – a quality 
Seinfeld may claim to be falsely projected onto comedy by ‘misguided‘  college students, yet 
which many debaters rightly point out to have always inhered in comedic practices. Comedy‘s 
politicality is closely tied to its reliance on mockery and ridicule – its propensity, that is, to offend 
by laughter. Comedy‘s laughter of mockery unfolds its cultural work at the very crossroads of ta-
boo and transgression: Designed to entertain by playfully transgressing a variety of norms, come-
dic mockery and ridicule are inevitably implicated in articulations of difference and hierarchy be-
tween those who laugh and those who are laughed at – an aspect of mockery addressed by the 
‘superiority theory‘  of humour I discuss below. This function has made the laughter of mockery a 
staple element of racist, sexist, and other discourses of discrimination, whose long shadows tend 
to travel with practices of comedic entertainment. Yet the Seinfeld-debate also illustrates that 
comedy‘s provocations do not necessarily have to serve extant discourses of discrimination, that, 
to the contrary, they can work against sedimented discursive practices. Their political valence de-
pends on the distribution of agency in the economy of laughers and laughees – and this economy 
is often more complicated and ambiguous than it may initially seem. Proceeding from a Cultural 
Studies perspective, I want to probe into contemporary comedy‘s complex poetics and politics of 
mockery, exploring how mass-mediated practices of mockery resonate with and circulate ideas 
about social hierarchies. To this end, I want to use as a case study an example of the arguably 
most popular comedic format: a sitcom.2 The sitcom I selected – Two Broke Girls3 – is particularly 
productive in this context, on the one hand, because it is formally a very conventional sitcom, fea-
turing, e.g., the laugh track that has been the genre‘s trademark, as well as the broader con-
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straints that come with airing on network TV.4 On the other hand, the show ‘s setting of contem-
porary New York City and its multicultural ensemble of characters has it immediately address is-
sues of social diversity and asymmetry – in ways that have sparked some controversy of their 
own: While several commentators charged the show with racism (cf., e.g., Ti 2012), others lauded 
its transgressive, raunchy humour – e.g., a review in The Washington Post applauded it for being 
“the filthiest show on network television” (Yahr 2017: n.pg.).5 To unpack this controversial politi-
cality, I want to focus on what I call the double liminality of sitcom laughter. This laughter, I will 
argue, is tied to discursive boundaries on two levels: to the boundaries of social distinction and 
asymmetry, in whose negotiation the laughter of mockery plays a key role; and to the boundary 
between the expression and the critique of hegemonic discourses about difference, which laugh-
ter notoriously straddles as it works to ambiguate meaning. My argument will be that it is at the 
intersection of these boundaries where the tensions and complexities that resonate in the de-
bate on Seinfeld‘s statement, and in the conflicting responses to Two Broke Girls, originate and 
where they are structured.  
 
2. The discursive ‘border operations‘  of (sitcom) laughter 
My discussion proceeds from the idea that the mockery-based laughter courted by sitcoms is tied 
to boundaries on two intersecting levels. First, laughter is deeply involved in the articulation of 
social difference. As a relational practice that involves (at least) one who laughs and one who is 
laughed at, the laughter of mockery and ridicule is implicated in the creation of a hierarchical 
difference between self and other: Mockery particularly resonates with what humour studies 
calls the ‘superiority theory‘  of humour (cf., e.g., Stott 2005; Billig 2005), which argues that laugh-
ter is a key mode in which distinctions are articulated and claims to superiority are staked. This 
theory is typically traced back to both classical and humanist thinkers, including Thomas Hobbes 
who famously suggested, in Human Nature (1650), that “[l]aughter is nothing else but a sudden 
glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with 
the infirmity of others” (cited in Stott 2005: 127). The type of laughter that Hobbes aims at realis-
es itself as self-glorification, generating a positive sense of self out of the disparagement of oth-
ers. Stott accordingly notes that, for superiority theorists, “laughter is always antagonistic and 
conflictual, establishing a hierarchy at the moment of pleasure” (ibid.).  
In mass-mediated venues of laughter like television sitcoms, such discursive work tends to go be-
yond the individual level on which Hobbes focused and to invoke culturally shared notions of so-
cial difference and inequality, tapping into well-established discourses of alterity like gender, 
‘race‘ , ethnicity, and class. Stereotypes are the main currency of mass-mediated mockery – in 
fact, mass-mediated mockery needs stereotypes as much as social practices of stereotyping de-
pend on mockery: This interrelationship between mockery and stereotyping has been particularly 
addressed in the concept of “disparagement humour” (Ford 2015), a concept primarily circulating 
in the social sciences. Disparagement humour, understood as “communication that is intended to 
elicit amusement through the denigration, derogation, or belittlement of a given target” (ibid.: 
163), is seen as a significant social force, shaping social relationships in a variety of ways. Follow-
ing William Martineau‘s (1972) influential model of humour‘s social functions, research has espe-
cially focused on how disparagement humour influences prejudice, with studies often arguing a 
positive correlation (cf. Ford 2015).6 
While it is largely uncontested that the humour of mockery addresses discourses of social distinc-
tion and hierarchy, and that it typically speaks in stereotypes, an argument that such humour 
necessarily creates and reinforces prejudice stands on shaky ground from my Cultural Studies 
perspective – which brings me to the second boundary that informs sitcom laughter: Humour 
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notoriously works as an agent of ambiguation, opening up the possibility of a substantial differ-
ence between what is said and what is meant – in other words, humour carries with it the possi-
bility of irony. A recent study in the tradition of disparagement theory throws into relief how such 
an ambiguity is woven into the very fabric of humour. Communication studies scholar Caitlin 
Brown coins the term ‘meta-disparagement humour‘  to conceptualise humour that “explicitly tar-
get[s] a marginalized group while implicitly ridiculing those who would laugh at such jokes. […] 
Taken at face value, these jokes are offensive perpetuations of stereotypes” (2012: 2) which, how-
ever, invite the audience to laugh at the stereotyper rather than the stereotyped. For Brown, dis-
paragement humour becomes ‘meta‘  when comedic communication re-directs its mockery from 
stereotyped social groups to those who engage in stereotyping. Her discussion offers compelling 
examples of how a humour of mockery is used to expose and ridicule prevailing practices of ste-
reotyping and to thus challenge hegemonic discourses of social difference, e.g., when she talks 
about the routines of African-American comedians like David Chapelle or the early Eddie Murphy 
that hyperbolically mock racist humour. Less compelling, however, are her efforts to demarcate 
disparagement- and meta-disparagement humour as two clearly distinguishable phenomena. 
Meta-disparagement humour, she claims, is marked by a hyperbolic quality, yet this is very much 
a relative, context- and recipient-dependent property. Elsewhere, her own discussion concedes 
this when she notes how meta-disparagement jokes carry the potential of being ‘misunderstood‘  
as disparagement: “[W]hile meta-disparagement humor purports to undermine stereotypes, it 
may in fact reinforce and perpetuate them. […] [M]eta-disparagement humour is a double-edged 
phenomenon, indulging in stereotypes to ridicule them” (ibid.: xi). Recent discussions of ‘hipster 
racism‘  add another dimension to the (alleged) misunderstanding of (allegedly) meta-
disparagement humour. As blogger Lindy West, e.g., points out, irony has become a significant 
technique of 21st-century ‘post-racial‘  racism: “[R]acism went underground. Sure, you can‘t say 
racist things anymore, but you can pretend to say them” (2012: n.pg., original emphasis). What 
Brown terms meta-disparagement always piggybacks disparagement, and vice versa; the social 
meaning-making of mockery humour is always a “double-edged phenomenon” (2012: xi). 
This fundamental ambiguity takes on a new quality when we move from jokes, which are Brown‘s 
immediate objects of inquiry, to more complex communicative structures like sitcoms. There, the 
roles of agents and targets of mockery tend to be even less clearly allocated – and, as noted 
above, the distribution of agency in humour is key to its politics. The laugh-track of classic sit-
coms may seem to mark the targets of mockery, but as Two Broke Girls illustrates, it brings only 
little clarity to the question whether the stereotyped or the stereotyper are to be highlighted as 
objects of laughter. Things get even more diffuse when considering the agent(s) of mockery: The 
agency behind sitcom-mockery can be both figural and authorial – it can be distributed among 
several characters in its storyworld, who hand out ridicule to each other, and/or it can also disap-
pear behind the apparatus of the medium, when the mis-en-scène and storytelling perform the 
mockery. In addition, an extensive text like a sitcom is prone to rotate the roles of mocker and 
mockee – in the course of a sitcom‘s run, even in the course of a single episode, every social iden-
tification represented in the storyworld may become the target of ridicule. This dispersal and po-
tential obfuscation of agents and targets ambiguate the social meaning-making of mockery hu-
mour even more. What I want to suggest, then, is that a dichotomy of disparagement versus me-
ta-disparagement does not get us very far because a mainstream sitcom like Two Broke Girls no-
toriously blurs the line between them. For an exploration of the show ‘s politics, it is more pro-
ductive to ask how its humour of mockery is structured; where and how it evokes our social reali-
ty; and how it engages with the role that distinction and denigration play in the formation and 
transformation of our social order. 
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3. The poetics and politics of mockery in Two Broke Girls 
Two Broke Girls thrives on mockery. (Almost) everybody mocks (almost) everybody else in the series. Its 
storytelling revolves around moments of mockery, ridicule, and embarrassment, which fuel the 
laughter to which its laugh-track so explicitly invites its audience. Most centrally, however, its 
character- and plot-design are based on a poetics of mockery: Major as well as minor characters 
are conceived as social types, caricatures even, whose characterisations mock the respective so-
cial identification, especially by tapping into well-established stereotypes. This ubiquity of mock-
ery in the sitcom‘s composition projects a storyworld marked by social differences and asymme-
tries – differences and asymmetries that evoke our contemporary social reality not only through 
their geographic and historical references, but also by the way in which social boundaries in the 
storyworld are in flux. The sitcom‘s narrative throws together two white female characters in 
their mid-20s who, in their lives prior to the onset of the plot, had been divided by class: the 
working-class Max and the upper-class Caroline, who suddenly finds herself without money when 
her father is indicted for financial fraud and loses his fortune. The two end up working together 
in a diner, where they jointly pursue the dream of saving enough money to open a business of 
their own. Next to Caroline‘s downward and the two protagonists‘  dream of upward social mobil-
ity, also geographic mobility unsettles social boundaries in the sitcom‘s storyworld. It is set in an 
acutely gentrifying neighbourhood, whose original immigrant, working-class population, repre-
sented primarily by the diner ‘s employees, is getting displaced by more affluent white newcom-
ers, who chiefly figure as the diner‘s customers. 
Like all characters, these newcomers are depicted as social types – namely as ‘hipsters‘ , whose 
representation draws on existing hipster-clichés.7 Hipsters are the most consensual targets of 
mockery in the show: The sitcom‘s own character-design and mis-en-scène already ridicule them, 
and then characters in the storyworld additionally mock them on a regular basis. In the show ‘s 
first season, episodes often open with a teaser that organises around hipster-bashing, typically 
by Max who derides one or several of her customers. The opening of the pilot may serve as an 
example: 
Hipster Customer I [snapping his fingers]: Excuse me. Waitress? Dude?  
Max: Hi, what can I get you? [Snaps her fingers in his face while speaking]. Is that annoying? Is that 
obnoxious and rude? Would you find it distracting if someone did that to you while you were work-
ing? Oh, you don‘t have a job. Sorry.  
Hipster Customer II: Damn, dude, she burned you.  
Max: Oh, no, hipster. No. Do not think we‘re on the same team. We have nothing in common. I wear 
knit hats when it‘s cold out. You wear knit hats because of Coldplay. You have tattoos to piss off your 
dad. My dad doesn‘t know he‘s my dad. And finally, you think [snapping her fingers] this is the sound 
that gets you service. I think [snapping] this is the sound that dries up my vagina. (Pilot 2011) 
In the show ‘s depiction of the hipster-customers, authorial and figural mockery are closely inter-
twined – the ridicule voiced by characters like Max resonates with the hipsters‘  already clichéd 
depiction (they all feature vintage clothes, knit hats, and a labouredly alternative style), contrib-
uting to their construction as caricatures of a particular social identification. 
The same holds true for the show ‘s recurrent characters. They, too, regularly mock each other in 
ways that resonate with the already stereotyped conception of their characters. There is Han, the 
Asian-born owner of the diner where the protagonists work, who is conceived as a sexless, effem-
inate man with a heavy, and heavily clichéd, Asian accent. Remarks by other characters – marked 
by the laugh-track as humorous – often address his Asianness, playing on well-worn stereotypes. 
For example, in season one‘s second episode, Max interrupts Caroline telling Han that the 
spelling of her name on her name-tag is incorrect: “You can‘t tell an Asian he made a mistake. 
He‘ ll go in back and throw himself on a sword” (And the break-up scene 2011). Or in another epi-
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sode, Oleg, the diner‘s cook, responds to an instruction by his boss saying, “Don‘t tell me what to 
do. I was working here when you were still a dumpling on your father‘s chopstick” (And the pop-
up sale 2011). In later seasons, figural mockery of Han chiefly focuses on his height. Along simi-
larly caricaturistic lines, the show features as minor characters an elderly, street-wise African-
American, Earl, working as the diner‘s cashier, whose jive-talking remarks accentuate a past as 
Jazz musician and drug user; and there is sex-obsessed Eastern-European cook Oleg, who primar-
ily harasses the female characters around him with unregenerate sexism (“Max, you look like a 
lady. Tonight when I dream of having sex with you, as always, this time I will ask you to stay” [And 
hoarder culture 2011]), but who also voices the occasional racist slur.  
The two main protagonists are no less built on stereotypes, and the fact that one is a blond and 
the other a brunette woman is only the beginning. The working-class Max is conceived as promis-
cuous and financially illiterate, and she is furnished with the backstory of a difficult upbringing in 
a single-parent household. In addition to the obvious authorial mockery entailed in her caricatur-
istic character-design, Max is also regularly positioned as an object of figural mockery, namely by 
herself. The self-deprecating humour staged around Max especially targets the character‘s prom-
iscuity (e.g., in a fight with their boss Han, Caroline quips: “I‘m not as easy as Max”, to which Max 
responds: “Said every girl in my seventh-grade class” [And the soft opening 2013]). The character 
of upper-class Caroline, in turn, is constructed as spoiled yet well-meaning and kind, and as 
equipped with an inborn sense of business. Figural mockery of Caroline is frequently voiced by 
Max, targeting the former‘s (partially lost) privilege, which is often metonymised as her white-
ness. For example, when Caroline shows off her knowledge of Spanish, Max retorts: “You‘re the 
only person I know who seems whiter speaking Spanish” (And a loan for Christmas 2014). Or in 
the following exchange at a Jewish customer‘s house: 
Caroline [to the customer]: I‘m so happy to be in your warm and wonderful home. I was very close to 
my neighbours, the Kleins. In fact, they called me their honorary Jew. 
Max [to Caroline]: Stop now. This is like when you tell Earl you‘re practically black. (And the kosher 
cupcakes 2012) 
Socially framed mockery thus permeates the show ‘s humour. First of all, this mockery is marked 
by hyperbole. There is nothing subtle about the show ‘s use of stereotypes – they are exaggerat-
ed to the effect of flaunting their own stereotypicality. Second, the mockery is multi-directional. 
There is no unified agency behind it, no social position that holds the discursive privilege of hand-
ing out mockery without being mocked back. While the character of Max holds a privileged posi-
tion as the most frequent dispenser of ridicule, every character, and every social group they are 
framed to represent, stand at the receiving end. Together, these two properties work toward am-
biguating the politics of the show ‘s humour. Its audiences can equally feel invited to indulge in 
the stereotypes invoked, to take pleasure at their iteration and laugh with them at particular so-
cial or ethnic groups, or they can feel invited to laugh at the practices of stereotyping that the 
show represents in such exaggerated, rapid-fire fashion, to laugh at stereotype-driven ways of 
looking at the world and the logic behind them. As a pop-cultural artefact that aims to please the 
largest possible audience, the show seems designed to keep open both possibilities. 
While this ambiguity has varying political potentials – it can work to affirm or to challenge hege-
monic discourses about social difference – its structure, I suggest, ultimately does more for rein-
forcing hegemonic discourses of difference and discrimination than for challenging them. For 
one, the multi-directional quality of the show‘s humour puts on the same level stereotypes and 
practices of mockery that are actually attached to very different contexts – stereotypes of work-
ingclass people or of immigrant groups come out of histories and power-relations that are funda-
mentally different from hipster memes: disparagement, also and especially through mockery, is, 
of course, deeply written into the histories of oppression against marginalized groups. In smooth-
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ing down these differences – claiming that all instances of mockery are created equal – the show 
deflects attention from the political constellations in which practices of mockery take place and 
assume social meaning. In so doing, the show depoliticises its own humour, thus not aiding the 
discussion of social justice – as progressive meta-disparagement humour does – but actually 
making it more difficult. 
In addition, the show ‘s economy of humour navigates the landscape of social inequality – in 
which several forces of discrimination coexist and intersect – in a problematic, tendentious way. 
Its narratives clearly prioritize an engagement with discourses and experiences of class and of 
gender. In the context of this priority, the show does use humour to unfold interesting, uncon-
ventional narratives. It is one of the very few pieces of US-American popular culture, past and 
present, that talks about poverty, celebrating the resilience of poor characters to make it 
through. And it offers a still rare, unconventional depiction of women, especially in the character 
of Max – a heroine who is self-reliant, dirty-mouthed, and unapologetically sexual. As Emily Nuss-
baum put it in her review for The New Yorker, Two Broke Girls stands out by featuring “a deep fe-
male friendship, raw humor about class, and a show that puts young women‘s sexuality dead 
center, rather than using it as visual spice, as in some cable series about bad-boy antihe-
roes” (2011: n.pg.). Yet the show reduces its engagement with poverty and femininity to the con-
text of whiteness, ignoring the extent to which class and gender are always also mediated by oth-
er categories of social difference. While this reduction may be understandable – after all, even a 
television series can have only so many protagonists – the show specifically enlists its 
(impressively) diverse cast of minor characters as screen and foil for a narrative of emphatically 
white femininity and poverty: The resilience in poverty of its two protagonists is, to a significant 
extent, dramatized through practices of mockery directed at ethnic others. The staging of their 
self-reliant and refreshingly ungenteel femininity similarly relies on ethnically marked characters 
as discursive sparring partners. The show ‘s narrative builds its protagonists‘  self-making as so-
cially mobile, self-confident, white women on the mocking denigration – yes, of white hipsters – 
but also of immigrants and people of colour. 
A final aspect that marks the politics of the show ‘s humour concerns a blind spot in the multi-
directionality of its mockery. While its narratives heavily rotate the role of mockee among its cast 
of characters, there is one social position that never is laughed at in the sitcom – the position of 
the upwardly mobile. The two main protagonists‘  dream of climbing the social ladder by starting 
a business is never mocked: The pursuit of this dream may bring them into situations where the 
narratives ridicule them – in fact, much of the embarrassment that is so central to sitcoms is 
staged in contexts where they try to develop their cupcake-business – but the dream itself is not 
mocked. The show makes a point in dramatizing this subject position of the upwardly mobile as 
an ongoing journey and desire, using its serial form to forever defer fulfilment of that desire and 
its protagonists‘  arrival in the middle class: All episodes end with an image that shows the tally of 
the money that the two protagonists currently have. Over the course of the show ‘s six seasons, 
this number is going up but also down, and the show ends its (yet) final episode with a tally of 
zero, the same number with which Two Broke Girls started. The show ‘s sincere celebration of 
this perpetual effort toward upward mobility – something the show accentuates by exempting it 
from its otherwise ubiquitous poetics of mockery – deeply resonates with the discourse of neolib-
eralism. It advertises a perspective on social order in which the “individual is ‘responsibilized‘  as a  
self-sufficient moral agent and social problems become failures of the individual” (England/Ward 
2016: 57), denying the role that structural and collective factors play in the creation, maintenance, 
and remedying of social asymmetries. In a narrative set in the economic crisis of the early 2000s 
and concerned with experiences of poverty, this neoliberal ethos of individual responsibilization 
places severe limitations on what can be narratively explored. 
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4. Conclusion 
Mass-mediated popular culture is a key venue where ideas about social order are negotiated, 
broadly circulated, and made evident by being tied to the experiences of pleasure that mark 
them as entertainment. In the United States – with its long history of immigration, of slavery and 
its aftermath, and of hemispheric colonialism – pop-cultural negotiations of social order have al-
ways centrally revolved around notions of difference, be they framed as racial, ethnic, or reli-
gious. These negotiations are not necessarily and only invested in stabilising the hegemonic sta-
tus quo, as a Frankfurt-School critique of the ‘culture industry‘  would have it. Scholarship in the 
tradition of Cultural Studies insists that the popular, as a cultural register primarily tied to the 
non-elite, also has the potential to unsettle hegemonic discourses, to try out other narrative in-
terpretations of the world, to make different social arrangements imaginable.8 In a Cultural  
Studies approach, what is in order is a thorough unpacking of the – typically complex – politics of 
pop-cultural artefacts, thus encouraging literacy in the politicality of seemingly unpolitical enter-
tainment.  
It was such an unpacking that I tried to offer in this essay. I focused on the politics of comedy in 
an exemplary contemporary sitcom – a genre whose political valence is often overlooked. This 
political valence chiefly revolves around the humour of mockery that sitcoms employ.  
I structured my discussion around the multiple liminality of sitcom laughter revolving around 
transgression and taboo: its work to negotiate boundaries of social difference, its articulation of 
these boundaries through the provocation of various norms and taboos – of polite speech, of ap-
propriate media content, and of ‘political correctness‘  – and the political ambiguity woven into 
these articulations. I traced this boundary-work in the sitcom Two Broke Girls. The show, I ar-
gued, uses a humour of mockery for a narrative that, to some extent, disturbs dominant dis-
courses of femininity and of class, yet that, at the same time, privileges whiteness and a neoliber-
al view of society. 
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Notes 
1 Seinfeld is, of course, not alone in wielding the phrase ‘political correctness‘  as an indictment. 
Over the last one or two decades, ‘political correctness‘  has developed into a significant rallying 
cry of American neoconservatives, used to attack and de-authorize a culture and policies dedicat-
ed to the remedying of histories of discrimination and oppression by portraying them as censor-
ship. For a discussion of this phenomenon, in the light of Donald Trump‘s use of this tactic, cf. 
Weigel 2016. 
2 In a United States context, the sitcom is one of the earliest genres that took root in the medium 
of television. Sitcoms distinguish themselves – or rather, they used to distinguish themselves, as 
this is changing – by a comedic orientation, a strictly episodic structure with half-hour episodes, 
and a shooting style that either involves a live audience or a laugh-track (cf. Mills 2009).  
3 The program ran for six seasons, from 2011 to 2017, on the American television-network CBS. 
4 These constraints include, e.g., a ban on ‘offensive‘  content enforced by the United States Fed-
eral Communications Commission. In facing such constraints, Two Broke Girls differs from many 
of the comedies aired on cable TV and streaming platforms that make a point in being unconven-
tional and transgressive, in terms of form as well as content, such as Veep (HBO), Girls (HBO),  
Orange Is the New Black (Netflix), or Dear White People (Netflix). For the concept of ‘transgressive tele-
vision‘ , cf. Däwes/Ganser/Poppenhagen (2015). 
5 Yahr (2017), in fact, also critiques the show ‘s reliance on racist jokes, especially in its first sea-
sons, but her review makes a point in also identifying redeeming qualities.  
6 Especially empirical work in the field of social psychology has found that exposure to disparage-
ment humor can encourage racist, sexist and other discriminatory forms of prejudice (cf., e.g., 
Janes/James 2000; Ford 2000).  
7 ‘Hipster‘  has emerged as a derogatory designation for a particular type of urban, white, middle-
class people, typically young, with visible investments in fashion and style, who often function as 
spearheads of gentrification (cf., e.g., Greif/Ross/Tortorici 2010).  
8 One of the key scholars in the Cultural-Studies tradition of Television Studies is John Fiske. Cf. 
his classic publication Television culture (1987). 
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Abstract 
Racist actions, representations, and speech have become widespread and socially acceptable in 
twenty-first century Europe. Affects and ways of speaking in the European public sphere that are 
tied to racist differentiations between a national, ethnic, racial and/or culturally coded ‘us‘  and 
the dangerous, backward ‘them‘  (not-us), which furthermore serve to strengthen this differentia-
tion, can be described and understood as a practice of Othering/Selfing with recourse to staged 
threat scenarios and scenes. In this paper we argue that societal and cultural (de)privileging 
mechanisms require a twofold process. Firstly, for the dominant society a process of active disso-
ciation, aphasing and making a taboo of exactly those feelings of fear and threat as experienced 
by the marginal other (migrant, asylum seeker, phenotypically marked other), needs to take 
place. Secondly, any historical references or memories of racial oppression and violence must 
become the subject of taboo and thus colonially aphased. Using this affective mechanism or 
structure we aim to show, using the example of New Year ‘s Eve in Cologne 2015, how fear slides 
between bodies sticking to some and not to others and how the different bodies in whom fear 
has taken residence transform and why. 
 
1. Introduction  
Fear read as a societal phenomenon means not only understanding its creation and genealogy 
but also understanding the role that fear plays as an articulating agent in positions of entitle-
ment, dignity, dominance and superiority. This from the perspective of societal contexts founded 
on migration means asking: Whose bodies are being privileged with the capacity to articulate 
fear? Whose bodies are being represented publicly as human bodies that are valuable, emotion-
al, sensitive, and vulnerable, in need of protection with rights considered worthy of defending? 
Whose bodies are being represented publicly as bodies that threaten humanity? Whose fear is 
heard, translated into threat and acted upon? Whose bodies are not considered worth protecting 
and what about their feelings of fear, threat and human rights? How do those bodies that mark 
themselves as superior manage to stage and defend their fear and emotional sensibilities as 
something cultured, precious and worth consideration? What are the productive mechanisms 
that make this kind of self-aggrandisement possible? What does it produce?  
Using this line of questioning and borrowing from Sara Ahmed (2014: 62–80), who argues that 
fear is viscous, mobile and sticky, we aim to show in this paper, referring to the example of New 
Year ‘s Eve in Cologne 2015/2016, how fear slides between bodies sticking to some and not to 
others and how the different bodies in whom fear has taken residence transform and why. Be-
fore we address the contemporary Cologne events, let us first go back in history.  
 
2. Racist representations in the present and their historical contexts  
2.1 History of sexualised racism 
The practice of lynching first became a socially condoned, frequently practiced terrorizing strate-
gy in America‘s Reconstruction-era postwar South between 1880 until 1930 and became a com-
monly accepted strategy of terror whereby over 3000 African Americans were lynched, often  
after having had to endure the most horrendous torture (cf. Ketelsen 2000; Nagel 2003). During 
this time free black men, former slaves, could for the first time profit economically from their 
own labour as well as entering the political realm. This new economic competition and political 
participation from freedmen was perceived as a social threat to the previously unchallenged 
white hegemonic power constellations. Also, the fear, particularly of whites from the south, that 
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freed slaves would seek revenge for the sexual violence against and exploitation of black women 
during slavery, intensified the feeling of threat (cf. Gunning 1996). Although rape of white women 
and murder (of mostly white women) was the officially documented justification for lynching of 
black men, in more cases than not the crimes were economically and politically motivated.  
In the case of the Ku Klux Klan‘s castration and threatened lynching in 1870 of Henry Lowther, a 
married former slave, it was his political involvement in the Republican Party and having estab-
lished a successful grocery business that was seen as a reversal of the natural order and the 
threat to white dominance. The justification for the crime carried out by the Ku Klux Klan was 
Henry Lowther‘s supposed “sexual disrespect for and illicit relations with white women” (Nagel 
2003: 113). Joanne Nagel points out that “[t]his bugaboo of the white female vulnerability to black 
male sexuality provided cover for white efforts to stop economic competition between whites 
and blacks, and served as a convenient excuse for white men to reassert their control over black 
men” (ibid.: 112). The sex of the other was staged and consequently experienced (this not posing 
a contradiction) as particularly dangerous (cf. Manderson/Jolly 1997), when the other, although 
not yet equal, had become a potential competitor or at least threatened to do so. In the time be-
fore the Civil War, Afro-American slaves were perceived as “overabundant” (Nagel 2003: 109), 
equipped with a brimming physicality rather than imagined as sexually dangerous. Sex between 
white women and black men at the time was labelled and dismissed by white men as a sign of 
these women‘s lower class status and moral decadency: “[W]hite ideology about lower-class fe-
male sexuality [could] overshadow ideas about the dangers of black male sexuality” (Hodes 1993: 
60). As becomes clear, it is the socio-historical contexts that influence how the bodies of Afro-
American men and the bodies of white women who engage with them become furnished with 
meaning and affects. The accusation of rape by black men of white women after the Civil War de-
veloped into a central argument used by the white perpetrators. Lynching for rape turned out to 
be a particularly effective means of social control, not only of African Americans but simultane-
ously of white women (cf. Ketelsen 2000). At the same time it was a spectacle: Towards the end of 
the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, public lynching became widely publi-
cised, massively attended, voyeuristic consumer spectacles of maintaining hegemonic patriarchal 
white social control that stabilised hegemonic, racist power constructions (cf. Nagel 2003).  
If it is the case that sex between white women and non-white men is reduced to expressions of 
violence by colonised men directed at white women, then the case is made to control, punish and 
ultimately eliminate the threat and, thus, those persons marked as threatening. Bringing the de-
liberations of Nagel (2003), Stoler (1997), McClintock (1995), and many others to mind, and the 
many historical examples they provide to support their hypotheses, it becomes clear that in colo-
nial times it was this possibility of losing the racial sexual contest that was at the heart of the 
white male anxiety around female sexual agency and miscegenation between white women and 
colonised men. If native men rape, rather than freely engaging in consensual sexual relations, 
then white men have a reason to eliminate the threat of the other by exterminating him under 
the noble guise of protecting ‘pure-white women‘  from ‘savage native men‘ . In this imagined bat-
tle, the white woman‘s body becomes the battlefield, and the sexual penetrative possession of 
her body the trophy of conquest. Colonial white men had a vested interest in winning this battle 
in order to maintain credibility and power as the superior race which meant control of and access 
to all colonised bodies, male and female, including those of white women. Women exhibiting any 
form of sexual agency represented a grave threat to the colonial male because she could con-
sciously undermine him (cf. McClintock 1995; Stoler 1997; Ware 1996). For a white woman to 
freely choose a non-white man was to reject empire and negate the foundation of its discursive 
message (cf. Dietrich 2007; Grosse 2003; Kundrus 2003; Wildenthal 2001). Women without sexual 
agency were more easily managed in this sexualised battle. Thus, everything in colonial men‘s 
Paul Mecheril & Monica van der Haagen-Wulff  
 27 
 
power was invested in keeping alive the ideal of the sexually submissive, pure, European woman, 
victim in need of colonial male protection. Making her the squeaky-clean upholder of empire was 
one of many ploys to subjugate and control her (cf. McClintock 1995; Stoler 1997). 
The sexualising of others and the attribution of threat that emanates from their sexuality, in par-
ticular in reference to ‘our women‘ , is a practice that is not exclusive, albeit a characteristic com-
ponent of such societal contexts that are undisguisedly racist, as they were in the USA roughly 
one hundred years ago. The staging of sexualised threats is however also a hallmark for such 
contexts that are structured by a racist tradition, which continues to be productive even when 
postracism is the official societal position. In summary, a logic of affect entails three important 
moments: firstly the dominant willingness to sexualise the other, secondly to phantasize the sex-
uality of the other as powerful and violent, in effect causing it to be experienced as a threat and, 
thirdly, to take the phantasized dangerous sexuality of the other, not only as reason and justifica-
tion to explain the affect and outburst of one‘s own anger, but much more so as evidence for the 
necessity of a disciplinary sanctioning intervention and control of the others. 
This affect-logic or structure is not only found in the AfD-milieu2 but also in anti-AfD-milieus, wit-
nessed across the board in the concerned speaking of parents and partners (cf. here the results 
of the so called Mitte-Studie by Decker/Kiess/Brähler 2016). Our argument at this point is that only by 
historically contextualising this affect-logic, in other words, exposing its origins and genealogy, 
the condition of possibility is granted to position one‘s own affective responses in a meaningful, 
self-reflexive relation to the culturally dominant meaning of this historically inscribed affective 
paradigm. In so doing, the possibility of seeing the world a little more clearly is opened – this in-
terrogation includes directing the critical lens at the sexual violence in socially declassified milieus 
(in which statistically more non-whites are to be found) as well as the sexual violence of the eco-
nomically better placed milieus (in which there are statistically more non-racially discreditable 
persons to be found).3 
Certainly, the open articulation of racist images and expressions in societal contexts that present 
themselves as ‘post-racial‘  becomes a subject of taboo and is considerably more complicated. 
Knowing that the utterance of racially discriminating thoughts and opinions will be responded to 
with social sanctions and critique, the speech acts require well thought through preventative fol-
low up measures or clauses such as “I‘m not a racist but I do think that …”. This parallel strategy 
of both articulating racist utterances while simultaneously cloaking the utterance to avoid social 
sanctions and disapproval is time consuming and invariably impacts, decreases, constrains and 
dilutes the pleasure that literally sticks to racist articulations. Excuses, denials, singling out, mak-
ing a case out of context, are all probate means of a systematic discursive covering up. An effec-
tive way of perfoming this denial is to rely on visual imagery. On pictures, that which can (no 
longer) be said, for example, that the black man, based on his innate bodily nature, represents a 
grave sexual threat to ‘our women‘ , can be communicated visually without censorship (cf. Said 
1978; Hall 2013; Torgovnick 1990; Wiggers 2007). By applying this veiled strategy, the pleasure of 
the taboo can be experienced by the perpetrator/voyeur while simultaneously denying any per-
sonal accountability in the violence of its articulation. A small heteronormative privilege in this 
visual strategy is the secret consumption of the near pornographic representation of the white 
woman and the pleasure gained from speaking about the projected sexuality and criminality of 
the phantasized oriental other (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the historically tabooed, and in patri-
archally structured fields of contemporary society, still relatively unspoken topic of (white) wom-
en‘s sexual agency and self-determined sexuality, in which she chooses sexual partners due to 
her own particular desires, gets lost and goes un-reflected in the over-representation of the sex-
ual threat of the black man of (North)-African, Arabic, Middle Eastern appearance, and so forth. 
The linguistic and cultural rule that produces this sequencing, this ‘and so forth‘ , this ‘et cetera‘ , 
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is a racist rule, because in this imagined sequence of the ‘etc.‘ , we will not find white persons as 
perpetrators, which is astonishing, given that in Germany most cases of sexual attacks are perpe-
trated by white men. 
 
2.2 Racist representations in Germany today 
Racist representations and speech have become socially acceptable in 21st century Post National 
Socialist Germany. One example: The title page of Focus magazine from the January 8, 2016 (Figure 1). 
Here we are dealing with a thoroughly sexualised representation of a woman. We see the body of 
a naked, white, presumably younger, perhaps 28-year-old, blond woman, whose breasts are cov-
ered with her left arm and a red beam that runs diagonally across her body. Her own right hand 
in contrast coyly shields her pubic area from view. Her eyes are cut out of the frame, but her 
mouth is in view and slightly open. On her body are visible five paw-like imprints of male hands 
that mark and simultaneously declare her as possession. They are not coloured blue or green but 
black: both oily and dirty at once. The title page asks: “After the sex-attacks of migrants: Are we 
still tolerant or already blind?”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This depiction of the Focus magazine is racist because of the lurid, obtrusive and emotionally ma-
nipulative way migrants, with the help of sexualised representations, are demonised and yet in 
the very same breath an ‘us‘  (“Are we still tolerant or already blind?”) is constructed, that is white. 
The title page thus plays the black and white game. The others are black, violent, faceless, brazen, 
dangerous and dirty. We on the other hand are white, pure, vulnerable, civilised, chaste and ex-
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alted. The ‘us‘  that asks itself if it is tolerant or already blind, and whom the Focus magazine is 
addressing, consists of white women, who are groped by black migrant hands, and white men, 
that have to protect ‘our women‘ . 
The media representation and public commentary of the Cologne New Year ‘s Eve 2015/20164 
events point to a deeply entrenched historical amnesia in relation to the racist reality. The subjec-
tifying and disciplining discursive practice, in which sexuality is linked and melded into national, 
ethnic and culturally coded positions, is by no means new. The racist speech acts, declarations 
and actions, targeting racially othered persons in recent times, that are uttered without any refer-
ence or memory of Germany‘s racist history, are indicative of a time-tested affect-logic contained 
in the processes of colonial aphasia (cf. Stoler 2016). As we will see in the following historical ref-
erence, Germany is well experienced in sexualising nationally, ethnically and culturally coded oth-
ers and in the process producing the sexualised black subject (cf. Nagel 2003).  
 
2.3 Historical background 
To recall the historical memory of this we can stay right here in the geographic locality of Cologne 
in Germany‘s Rhineland and need only to travel back in time to the Post World War I French occu-
pation of the Rhineland. Of the roughly 85.000 French soldiers 30.000–40.000 were from French 
colonies of North and West Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Senegal together with Madagascar 
and several others). Here, much like in Cologne New Year ‘s Eve 2015, it was a single event that 
tipped the tide of social tolerance when a French Moroccan soldier fired into a group of civilians 
with his machine gun and in the process killed several German nationals (cf. Wigger 2007). 
The repercussions of this single event were enduring, state-wide coordinated protest campaigns 
that had widespread international support against the presence of non-white soldiers in the 
Rhineland. In the national parliament, all parties except the USPD5 and the KPD6 declared these 
soldiers and men as 
[…] a pack of black brutes driven by excessive sexual instincts, that would pollute the purity of the 
German people. […] The ‘wild beasts‘  were supposed to be ‘a shocking danger‘  for women and chil-
dren, who were presumed to rape members of the white race en masse and with this threaten the 
entire Western cultural sphere. (Translated by the authors from Wigger 2007: 11)7 
They were described as eine unauslöschliche Schmach (“an ineradicable humiliation”), ein 
schwarzer Schrecken (“a black horror”) and eine schwarze Schande (“a black disgrace”). Many politi-
cians, including Friedrich Ebert and Adolf Köster, tried to rally support from die weisse Welt (“the 
white world”) in the fight to eliminate the schwarze Schmach (“black humiliation”) from the Rhine-
land. Their justification was that “the use of coloured troupes of the most inferior culture to 
guard a population of high mental capabilities and economic significance such the Rhinelander‘s” 
would seriously undermine and wound “the laws of European civilisation” (ibid.).8 
Beginning in 1920, protest campaigns took place across Europe and the USA. The US-American 
eugenicist and defender of white supremacy, Ray Beveridge, who was working in close collabora-
tion with professor August Ritter, director of the German-US American organised Steuben Socie-
ty, during a public lecture in the Löwenbrӓu Cellar in Munich passionately appealed to the German 
people to introduce lynching laws, as practiced in the USA, to keep the black population under 
control (cf. Wigger 2007; 2017). In the public propaganda campaign against the colonial French 
soldiers in the Rhineland, societal indignation erupted in what was perceived as the threat posed 
by the unrestrained, lecherous bodies of an inferior cultural order. Propagandistic representa-
tions in popular magazines, newspapers, flyers, posters, postcards, stamps as well as artfully 
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crafted and mass-produced copper medallions upon which black men were depicted as sex 
offenders, sexually driven, libidinously uncontrolled, polluters of the pure white race and rapists 
of white women, were sold en masse and intensively consumed during this period. In these rep-
resentations, black soldiers already scarred by a history of French colonialism in Africa, recent 
and precarious French citizens, were once again in an act of colonially inspired thinking and an 
attempt to maintain and justify white supremacy in Germany, once again violently stripped of all 
humanity, agency and human dignity. 
When placing the media representations of the contemporary Cologne New Year ‘s Eve events 
side by side with historic pictures of the schwarze Schmach vom Rhein (“black humiliation of the 
Rhine”) even without referencing lynch practices in North America, one cannot help but notice 
the similarity of patterns, justification strategies, symbolic orders and racist representations. In 
Germany, however, the historic connections are not remembered and not brought into discur-
sive articulation with the contemporary Cologne events. We are dealing here with an institution-
alised form of historical amnesia, or, as Ann Laura Stoler (2011) would more accurately conceptu-
alise it, “colonial aphasia”. 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The propagandistic pictures of barbaric, uncivilised, ohrenabschneidenden schwarzen Soldaten
(“ear-severing black soldiers”) (cf. Koller 2001: 208) were first propagated by the French but then 
taken up and disseminated by the outraged German public, who felt themselves humiliated un-
der French occupation (cf. ibid.). It was the representation of white bodies in racist de-
monising campaigns that served to mobilize the negative sentiments against Afro-French sol-
diers. 
In order to secure the morally outraged support for and readiness to engage in the fight, wom-
en‘s bodies, in a classic strategy, are discursively staged as on the one hand oppressed and en-
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slaved and on the other as honourable, chaste and pure, the innocent guardians of the German 
nation and in need of its patriarchal protection. The mediation of racial concepts and racialized 
thinking about sexualised images and discourses about sex has a (racist) tradition (cf. McClintock 
1995; Ware/Back 1992), and, furthermore, sexuality is defined and constructed through concepts 
of race, nationality and class: “Just as ethnicity is sexualized, sex is itself racialized, ethicized and 
nationalized” (Nagel 2003: 55). 
Contemporary sex-discourses are coupled with violent structures of debasement and denigra-
tion, of subjugation and dehumanisation. Men are attributed labels such as ‘of North African ap-
pearance‘ , ‘black‘ , ‘migrant‘ , and thus produced and fixed as a commonly recognised public 
threat. Non-white women, their desires and their (negative) experiences with white or non-white 
men, as well as non-heterosexual practices are almost non-existent in these discourses. The rec-
ognizable strategy of social control and violent subordination depends in this case on the contin-
ued production, justification and defence of an imagined, repetitively invoked, white European 
superiority with heteronormative, Northern European, white, Christian, enlightened men and im-
mediately following them similarly marked women, inhabiting the highest positions of power in 
society. 
 
3. The performativity of fear in threat scenarios 
We read fear on the one hand as an emotion or affect – and on the other as an articulation of a 
cultural privilege, i.e. the privilege of being able to articulate fear, as an affect that turns its back 
on the subjects reduced to object/bodies, because they are associated with danger and are thus 
threatening. The cultural meaning of this association or articulation (the articulation of affect – 
danger – body) becomes apparent through a process of historiography, which for our purposes 
here means: referencing racist colonially inspired affects, tropes and stereotypes to do with dan-
ger and the body. Our questions are as follows: Who, based on what conditions counts as physi-
cally and morally dangerous (although it needs to be stressed that ‘who‘-subjects do not just ex-
ist but are produced by means of those precise historical associations)? Furthermore, we ask: 
Who, based on what social conditions is attributed the privilege of expressing their personal fear 
(in the public sphere) as an absolute fear? 
These questions that we place centre stage attempt to look at the societal conditions of possibil-
ity that make the articulation of affects, fear, for instance, possible. The difficulty of speaking 
about racism in Germany and in many other national contexts, is virulent, thus making it difficult 
for those people affected negatively by racism to talk about their anger, their shame, but also 
their fear (for instance the fear that something bad could happen to their own non-white chil-
dren). This kind of internalised, violently inscribed constraint on the possibility of articulating 
one‘s own affects, for instance fear, is intrinsic to the mechanism and continuity of power rela-
tions.  
Currently this can be seen in reactions adamantly rejecting any suggestion of structural or institu-
tional racism, as became apparent in the criminal investigation of the NSU murders (cf. 
Schmincke/Siri 2013).10 In these debates, as it transpired, where there was any suggestion that 
public institutions and players may have been involved in racist incidents, any claims were quick-
ly, at times automatically, dismissed. As a direct response to the history of National Socialism in 
Germany, a defensive way of dealing with current racist appellations and the analysis of racial 
violence, in the present, as racial violence, has established itself. Put more simply and poignantly 
this means: that which cannot be, namely racism, may not be.  
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In situations where the possibility to analyse, deconstruct and make sense of the continuities of 
racist images and distinctions of speech are excluded per se, contexts arise within which experi-
ences of racial discrimination are made, yet by the very nature of the structural subject-erasure 
of racism, cannot be articulated, made a topic of and thus by default not heard. As a result, expe-
riences of racial discrimination are not only denied, and its victims accused of being over-
sensitive; but also, and even more to the point, because racism is not addressed, its efficacy and 
potency are preserved. This barrier put in the way of articulating experiences of discrimination 
and racism represents a violation against human dignity that can be described as a secondary 
form of racism (cf. Çiçek/Heinemann/Mecheril 2015).  
Revisiting the injurious speech acts in the three red bars criss-crossing the naked body of the 
manhandled, besmeared white woman in Figure 1 (Women Accuse – “After the sex-attacks of Mi-
grants – Are we still tolerant or already blind”?), it is the ‘sex attacking migrant‘  or more specifical-
ly according to Alice Schwarzer (2016) from her recently released book Der Schock (“The Schock”) 
based on the Cologne New Year ‘s Eve 2015 events, it is the ‘North African, Arab, Muslim potential 
terrorist other‘  who has become the object, who embodies and signifies the qualities that are 
threatening and fearful. White women, particularly young blonde white women, as Schwarzer 
(ibid.) points out repeatedly, are presented as the precious, vulnerable, valuable bodies inhabited 
by fear, in need of protection. Their fathers, mothers, boyfriends and husbands in other words 
their families and as an extension the wider community, that mark themselves as white and Eu-
ropean, claim that fear for themselves and declare their status as under threat. The public outcry 
and collective declaration of threat resulting from the Cologne event, which seemed to grow in 
magnitude as the media spread around the world, was productive in several ways: firstly in that it 
located and inscribed the threat in the historically ‘sticky‘  bodies of the North African, Arab, Mus-
lim other and secondly in that it redrew a border that demarcates who belongs to the bodies 
sanctified to feel fear, and mark themselves as under threat: namely Northern Europeans versus 
those other bodies who do not belong, the aforementioned, monstrous, non-European ones 
whose fear is not considered worth mentioning thus disabling a dialogic resonance and potential 
outlet (cf. Ahmed 2014). 
For the fear-complex (affect-danger-body) to work, the origin and historical dimension that pro-
duced it in the first place must be forgotten and historically aphased, tabooed, and thus  
de-thematised, so that the fear can be presented as absolute and concrete. In the first part of the 
paper, by providing historical examples of the dangerous black bodies of the French occupying 
forces in the Rhineland during WWI exemplified in the “Schwarze Schmach – Black Humiliation” 
and the dangerous bodies of freed slaves and lynching victims in the US, we outlined how racist 
historical tropes and stereotypes of ‘sex offending, monstrous others‘  become stuck to the bod-
ies of those interpolated as of ‘North African or Arabic‘  appearance, in the present.11 Judith Butler 
(1997) refers to the formal structure of this recycling of historical stereotypes in her book Excita-
ble Speech, in which she describes racist speech as a form of ‘ institutional sedimentation‘  in a  
similar way that Sara Ahmed in her book Cultural Politics of Emotions uses the notion of sticki-
ness, namely how the “objects of fear become substituted for each other over time” (Ahmed 
2014: 67). In these processes, the derogatory image or racist utterance is reduced to its form as 
image or utterance in the present without locating its historical referents, thus making it seem 
absolute, because it is not read and understood within a historical context. In other words,  
an absolute fear is conditioned by the absolute danger, present, but historically aphased in the 
bodies of the other.12 
Sara Ahmed (ibid.) describes this form of violence as a kind of shrinkage of social agency and 
space by citing the well-known scene from Frantz Fanon‘s book Black Skin, White Masks ([1952]
1986), in which the young white boy fearing the cannibalistic consumption by the black man 
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seeks protection in the arms of his mother and is saved. It is Fanon, the subject in question, how-
ever, who “fears the white child‘s fear, who is crushed by that fear, by being sealed into a body 
that tightens up, and takes up less space” (Ahmed 2014: 69). Although, by quoting this example 
here, there is a danger of casting the ‘feared other‘  in the role of victim within an oversimplified 
victim-perpetrator dichotomy. It is nevertheless apparent that the ability to express fear and be 
heard is not attributed to everybody equally and for some, the experience of “fear works to re-
strict some bodies through the movement and expansion of others” (ibid.).  
In her essay Violence, Nonviolence: Sartre on Fanon, Judith Butler takes this argument one step 
further and discusses Sartre‘s reading of Fanon‘s Black Skin, White Masks by focusing on the re-
fusal of the coloniser to address the colonised with ‘you‘ , as an equal, in effect robbing them of 
the status as a human being:  
The face-to-face address of ‘you‘  has the capacity to confer a certain acknowledgement to include 
the other in a potentially reciprocal exchange of speech; without that acknowledgement and possibil-
ity for reciprocal address, no human may emerge. In the place of the human, a spectre takes form, 
what Sartre refers to as the ‘Zombie‘ , the Shadow figure who is never quite human and never quite 
not. (Butler 2015: 175)  
The refusal to address the other as “you“ as well as refusing to hear the fear, vulnerability and 
anger of the other, is what Butler  describes as a “deconstituting ontology and orchestrating a 
nonlivable life” (ibid.: 177). Together with Orlando Patterson this can also be understood as a 
“social death” (ibid.), or, in Achille Mbembe‘s words, the “living dead” (2003: 40). The death of the 
others creates the condition of possibility for the dominant class to live out their individually and 
collectively experienced affects which in turn continue to kill, silence and prevent the voices of 
others to be articulated in public space, thus condemning them to the realm of the demonic and 
monstrous. 
The racist affect and racist speech acts in the German public today can thus be understood as 
practices of othering in the form of staged threat-scenarios. We are dealing here with two issues 
that we identify as the imagination of the other and the safeguarding of resources and claims to 
power. The affect that we are currently experiencing, the intensity with which a group is imagined 
and is condemned as a whole can only be explained if we are clear that we are dealing with the 
struggle for privilege and domination and that this fight requires pictures, beliefs and imagina-
tions of the others.  
 
4. Instead of a conclusion 
Heteronormative racist orders of power and desire are affectively stabilised by continuously in-
voking the other as a potential threat. Contemporary staged threat scenarios are linked to histor-
ical precursors that continue to be productive, become modified and re-inscribed in the present. 
Our assumption at this point is that the current threat-scenarios ultimately gain their potency 
and energy from their historical trajectory and that a considerable part of the dark-diffuse, murky 
experience of threat also has to do with the fact that this historical connection is not thematised 
nor addressed and thus remains collectively unconscious. A kind of taboo so to speak. 
The sexual potency, licentiousness and uncontrolled sexual drive of the other is staged against 
the backdrop of the chastity and innocence of ‘our women‘  as the upholders of the superior Ger-
man and Western culture. In this constellation, the sex of the other is constructed as a prominent 
type of sexuality that manifests, generates and stages threat scenarios by its very being. This 
threatening other is furthermore empirically speaking not always clearly differentiated from the 
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threatening other as terrorist. What happens in the case of actual or alleged sexual or terrorist 
violence by racially marked others? How is the intensity of the affective reaction in response to 
the severity of the threat, the magnitude of fear felt, and the resoluteness of anger expressed, to 
be interpreted? How can the de-escalation and neutralisation of these affects be understood 
when in contrast the sexual or terrorist violence is carried out by non-racially marked perpetra-
tors?13 
Power relationships become apparent and reproduce themselves precisely because not every 
affect can be articulated in equal measure as a matter of course, and the legitimacy, or illegitima-
cy of articulating affect becomes inscribed in the bodies involved. One example of this is that in 
Germany in various constellations, relationships and situations, the restrictions to address issues 
of racism are and can be understood as indicative of a kind of taboo. German speaking public 
discourses reference racism predominantly in connection to national socialism and thus it is 
marked by a refusal to recognise contemporary forms of racism as racism (cf. Scherschel 2006; 
Rommelspacher 2009; Messerschmidt 2010) as outlined above (cf. also introduction to this vol-
ume). In this paper, we argue that societal and cultural privileging mechanisms, which are logical-
ly and empirically at the same time de-privileging mechanisms, consist of two parts. The first part 
is yet again twofold. On the one hand, particular feelings and performances of feelings are itera-
tively produced as scripts of acceptable affects, such as fear and threat experienced by those 
who inhabit symbolically privileged positions. On the other hand, phenomenologically similar 
feelings of fear and threat, experienced by the marginal other (migrants, asylum seekers, pheno-
typically or phenoculturally marked others) need to be made a taboo of. In the framework of this 
articulation and de-articulation strategy, the unchallenged voice of the ‘acceptable‘  (in other 
words, dominant) affect scripts of threat and fear become audible and acted upon. The second 
part of this mechanism is that any historical refences or memories of racial oppression and vio-
lence, such as demonstrated in the history of imperial expansion, colonisation and slavery must 
become the subject of taboo and thus colonially aphased. This double strategy of silencing serves 
to maintain the hegemonic structures of privilege and dominance and paves the way for histori-
cally inspired violence to continue in the present. An un-veiling of these mechanisms and the abil-
ity to recognise their historical logic is thus of crucial importance, particularly with regard to polit-
ical projects that aim to reduce the symbolic and physical violence exercised and made possible 
by concepts of race, nationality, or ‘our culture‘ . 
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Notes 
1 This paper is closely aligned with the following published German text by Mecheril, Paul/van der 
Haagen-Wulff, Monica (2017): Bedroht, angstvoll, wütend. Affektlogik der Migrationsgesellschaft. 
In: Mecheril, Paul/Do Mar Castro Varela, Maria (eds.): Die Dämonisierung der Anderen. Rassis-
muskritik der Gegenwart. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 119–143. This English version is made 
available to a different reading audience. For the purposes of this publication, the elements of 
taboo and transgression have been further developed and analysed within the overall context of 
the original German paper.  
2 AfD – Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) is a far right wing, also described as 
a nationalistic, right wing populist, Eurocentric political party that was founded in April 2013. The 
AfD has close affiliations to the German based political movement Pegida – Patriotic Europeans 
Against the Islamisation of the West (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abend-
landes) (cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_for_Germany  (29.07. 2018) and introduction to 
this volume).  
3 According to a study carried out by the National Ministry of Families (Bundes-
Familienministerium) in 2004, 58% of all women in Germany from the age of 16 onwards have been 
sexually harassed at one time or another (cf. The National Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women 
and Youth – Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2014). Equivalent results for 
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Germany 2014 can be observed in the study of the European Human Rights Agency (Europäische 
Grundrechteagentur) examining the extent of violence against women in Europe. The main and most 
often sited place of sexual harassment, molestation and violence against women was within their 
own four walls and by their own (mostly male) family members, much less outside on the streets 
and even less by strangers. The racist representation of the ‘dangerous sexuality of the other‘  
distracts from this reality and is one of its main (cultural) functions.  
4 On New Year ‘s Eve 2015/2016 in the area around Cologne Central Station and the Cologne Ca-
thedral, a large number of sexual assaults against women by groups of young men phenotypical-
ly marked as North-African and Arabic were reported. In the days after the event, as many as 
1054 criminal charges and complaints were recorded by the police, 454 of these were of sexual 
assaults and three among them of rape. Other charges made were of property theft and bodily 
assault. In the wake, the police was accused of not having had the situation under control and of 
trying to underplay the events. The result was a world-wide media outcry condemning the events 
and calling for a united front protecting women from men described as North-African or Middle 
Eastern asylum seekers considered to be sexually and physically dangerous. Countering these 
accusations were many local and international media reports critical of the racist, anti-Islamic, 
and blatantly demonising coverage of the event (cf. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexuelle_%C3%
9Cbergriffe_in_der_Silvesternacht_2015/16 (31.01.2018)).  
5 The USPD, the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (Unabhängige Sozialdemo-
kratische Partei Deutschlands), was a political party active during the German Empire and the 
Weimar Republic. As an off-shoot of the SPD (Social Democratic Party) its focus was on colonial 
revisionism, a Marxist-centrist position together with bolshevism. In 1931, the USPD merged with 
the Socialist Workers Party of Germany (SAPD) (Cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Independent_Social_Democratic_Party_of_Germany (23.09.2018)). 
6 The KPD, Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands),  was a large po-
litical party in Germany from the years 1918 to 1933 and remained as a small party in post WWII 
West Germany until it was banned in 1956. During the Weimar Republic, the KDP held up to 15 % 
of the vote in the Reichstag and the state parliament (cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Communist_Party_of_Germany (23.09.2018)). 
7 German original: “eine von exzessiven sexuellen Instinkten gesteuerte schwarze Brut, die das 
deutsche Volk rassisch verseuche. […] Die ‘Wilden‘  sollten ‘eine schauerliche Gefahr‘  für Frauen 
und Kinder darstellen, im besetzten Gebiet massenhaft Mitglieder der weißen Rasse 
vergewaltigen und somit den gesamten abendländischen Kulturkreis bedrohen” (Wigger 2007: 
11). 
8 German original: “‘die Verwendung farbiger Truppen niederster Kultur als Aufseher über eine 
Bevölkerung von der hohen und geistigen und wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung der Rheinländer die 
Gesetze europäischer Zivilisation‘  verletzen würde” (Wigger 2007: 11).  
9 Ann Laura Stoler‘s concept of ‘colonial aphasia‘  is more than a simple forgetting or amnesia ra-
ther it is: “an occlusion of knowledge […] a dismembering, a difficulty speaking, a difficulty gener-
ating a vocabulary that associates appropriate words and concepts with appropriate things”. It 
draws attention to both a “loss of access and active dissociation”. “Aphasia in its many forms de-
scribes a difficulty retrieving both conceptual and lexical vocabularies and, most important, a 
difficulty comprehending what is spoken” (2011: 125).  
10 “The National Socialist Underground murders (German: NSU-Mordserie) were a series of xeno-
phobic murders by the German Neo-Nazi group National Socialist Underground 
(Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, abbreviated NSU). The NSU perpetrated the attacks between 2000 
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and 2007 throughout Germany, leaving ten people dead and one wounded. The primary targets 
were ethnic Turks but also Kurds, though the victims also included one ethnic Greek and one 
German policewoman” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Socialist_Underground_murders 
(31.07.2018)).  
11 Sara Ahmed borrows from Satre‘s concept of ‘stickiness‘  as “[t]he sideways movement of fear 
(where we have a metonymic and sticky relation between signs) is also a backward movement: 
objects of fear become substituted for each other over time. This displacement of objects also 
involves the passing by of the object from which the subject seems to flee. Fear creates the very 
effect of ‘that which I am not‘ , through running away from an object, which nevertheless threat-
ens as it passes by or is displaced. To this extent, fear does not involve the defence of borders 
that already exist; rather fear makes those borders, by establishing objects from which the sub-
ject, in fearing can flee. Through fear not only is the very border between self and other affected, 
but the relation between the subject and its objects that are feared (rather than simply the rela-
tion between the subject and its objects) is shaped by histories that ‘stick‘ , making some objects 
more than others seem fearsome.” (2014: 67). 
12 In Butler‘s own words: “The elaborate institutional structure of racism as well as sexism are 
suddenly reduced to the scene of utterance, and utterance, no longer the sedimentation of prior 
institution and use, is invested with the power to establish and maintain the subordination of the 
group addressed.” (1997: 79f.). 
13 The following quote taken from a Berlin Newspaper report illustrates this point. Using the cap-
tion “The Summer Hole of Ignorance” (Das Sommerloch der Ignoranz), Anetta Khana comments in 
the Berlin newspaper on the 31st July 2016 not on the crime committed in Munich, by which nine 
people died but rather she focused on the discursive resonances of the crime: “One thing, how-
ever, is surprising: the terrible crime in Munich, the terrorist attack of young people, has com-
pletely disappeared in the midst of the flurry and agitation resulting from the attacks in Würz-
burg and Ansbach. Only hours after Munich had become a besieged city, calculating hysterics put 
in their demands of the State of Law, because an Islamic terrorist attack was suspected. These 
demands however quickly dissipated when it was discovered that the perpetrator turned out not 
to be an Islamic terrorist. As such, this crime was no longer useful within the discourse of the ter-
ror-complex […]. It shows what happens when an event does not fit into the societally acceptable 
normative construction of feelings. Terror and mental illness do not eliminate one another. If the 
murderer were an Islamist, his mental state would presumably be of little public interest […]. The 
perpetrator was a fan of Breivik, who five years ago killed 77 people and who was proud of his 
racism. The perpetrator killed immigrants and his room was full of right wing extremist propa-
ganda and weapons. He touted his hate against Turks and Arabs and included himself as a mem-
ber of the Aryan human race. In other words: The murderer in Munich was a terrorist after all, in 
fact in exactly the same way as if he had been driven by Islamist motives! The silencing of this 
politics is unsettling and dangerous.” (www.berliner-zeitung.de/politik/meinung/kommentar-das-
sommerloch-der-ignoranz-24483364 (01.08.2016). Translation by Monica van der Haagen-Wulff). 
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Abstract 
The following contribution is a theoretically sound didactic for dealing with taboos in integration 
courses, making normative statements and substantiating them. A grid is presented, with which, 
on the one hand, topics, actions, statements, and language usage can be assigned to the aspects 
of protection and abuse through taboos. On the other hand, taboo-breaks show both positive 
and negative consequences for the individual in the social context, and thus opportunities for 
social development. Since questions of empowerment are always at stake in the context of inte-
gration, the grid represents a means of perceiving existing power relations, recognizing strategies 
against attributions and the discursive exercise of power, and deriving options for action from 
them. The central statements are illustrated by examples from teaching materials.  
 
On the subject of integration [...] – precisely because it is so emotional in many respects – we can  
only make progress if we treat it with a cool head, a differentiated attitude and without taboos.  
Mansour (2018: 9)2 
 
1. Taboos and their social relevance: an introduction 
For migrants, coming to Germany means leaving a familiar space, entering new social terrain, be-
ing confronted with new rules of the game. Taboos play an essential role in this: they are part of 
these rules of the game, which must be understood so that scope for empowerment can be ex-
plored. The explicit examination of taboos (cf. Flubacher/Hägi-Mead, this volume) is therefore 
necessary when it comes to dealing constructively with social changes such as those caused by 
migration in Germany. For taboos as unwritten laws, together with written and readable laws, 
regulate every community life (cf. Kaltenbrunner 1978; Schröder 2005: 297). Where people with 
different experiences in education and society now come into contact, different taboos may also 
come into contact, since these are not universal but dependent on society (cf. Hägi-Mead 2017: 
30). In order to integrate into a new community, it is therefore necessary to observe not only laws 
but also taboos. For this, they must first be made visible. This is not an easy task, since taboos are 
usually subconscious and defined by the fact that there is no justification and questioning, that 
something is not said (language taboo), not addressed (communication taboo) or not done 
(action taboo) (cf. Schröder 2005: 295; Hägi-Mead 2017: 28). A second reason for dealing with ta-
boos is that it is explicit transgressions or the breaking of taboos that make social change possi-
ble.3 In other words, if social changes in the sense of integration are desired, then, as Mansour 
(2018) puts it, unpleasant and sensitive issues must be addressed as well as taboos uncovered. In 
both cases, we understand an explicit and differentiated examination of taboos – i.e. according to 
their way of respecting or breaking them – as an awareness of socially relevant power relations 
and as a basis for self-empowering teaching. 
Under the premise that such a debate is conducive to integration processes, this contribution 
assumes that it also takes place and should take place in the context of integration courses. The 
initial question is therefore how this debate can be perceived in concrete terms. For this purpose, 
a grid is presented below (Section 2), which can be used to classify taboos and transgressions or 
taboo breaks. This makes them concrete, visible, and, finally, debatable. A look at the conception 
of integration courses (Section 3) and the materials approved by the Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge: BAMF) for orientation courses and the 
test “Living in Germany” illustrates the contribution that teaching materials and examination pa-
pers (do not) make to a constructive handling of taboos in the migration society (Section 4). The 
contribution ends with a corresponding conclusion (Section 5). 
Taboos and Integration: Welcome to Germany1 
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2. Taboos and the breaking of taboos: classification and visualization  
Dealing with taboos in the context of integration means, above all, becoming aware of their func-
tion (cf. Section 1). The following questions prove to be central to this:  
a. What does a taboo stand for? 
b. Who or what is protected by a taboo?  
c. What is the use of breaking a taboo – and for whom? 
d. How do the answers from b. and c. relate to the Basic Law? 
It is therefore necessary, on the one hand, to emphasize the protective character of taboos (cf. 
Tab. 1, Quadrant I), and, on the other, to recognize where taboos do not protect, where silence 
violates the dignity (on the concept cf. Marks 2017) of an individual and thus a fundamental value 
of a democratic society (cf. Tab. 1, Quadrant II), because “[t]he dignity of man is inviolable. To re-
spect and protect them is an obligation of all state power” (German Basic Law, Article 1, para-
graph 1).  
Tab. 1: Grid for classifying taboos (cf. Hägi-Mead 2018)  
 
The idea of participation is linked to the space of dignity (cf. Tab. 1, Quadrants I and III): Participa-
tion is possible if the basic needs for recognition, protection, belonging, and integrity (cf. Marks 
2017: 58) are guaranteed. In contrast, the Quadrants II and IV violate basic needs for recognition, 
protection, belonging and integrity, thus denying an individual the right to have a say or partici-
pate in society. Both Quadrants (II and IV) are characterized by the breaking of taboos. 
The intermediate lines of the quadrants are deliberately erased, since the boundaries are partly 
fluid, and assignments of individual examples can also be made and negotiated differently. The 
four quadrants are described in more detail below, and characteristic examples are given for 
each of them in terms of action, language, and communication taboos. In this way, they clearly 
demonstrate the relevance for integration (courses).  
 
2.1 Quadrant 1: taboo as protection  
Essential rules of action for the protection of an individual are also protected by law in Germany, 
so that, for example, the physical integrity, the secrecy of correspondence or the inviolability of 
    Social level 
    Taboo: Yes Taboo: Removed 
In
d
ivid
u
a
l le
ve
l  
sp
a
ce
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f  
d
ig
n
ity  
I 
Taboo for protection:  
Respect for intimacy and privacy 
e.g. confidentiality of correspon-
dence 
III 
Positive taboo break  
Enlightenment and tolerance 
e.g. “meeting homophobia”4 
d
e
g
ra
d
a
tio
n
 
II 
Taboo abuse:  
Maintenance and abuse of 
power 
e.g. (sexual) assaults and not ma-
king it the subject of  
discussion 
IV 
Negative taboo break:  
group-related misanthropy5 
e.g. misogynist/sexist, racist, or ho-
mophobic statements or actions 
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the home are preserved. In the context of language taboos, there are expressions that should be 
avoided or not used for reasons of shame, courtesy and political correctness. These can be, for 
example, terms for groups of people who (in a discriminatory manner) refer to skin colour, dis-
eases or weight or terms for (physical) concerns and curses that are taboo in society and the pub-
lic. There are numerous euphemisms as socially compatible alternatives, such as words that use 
the same sound syllable (“oh gosh” instead of “oh god”), metaphors (“she has gone” instead of 
“she died”), metonymy (“powdering one‘s nose” instead of “going to the toilet”), or vagueness 
(“they are seeing each other” instead of “they have sex with each other”).  
With regard to communication taboos, the following applies: an adult person should be allowed 
to decide for themselves what can be talked about and when, how much personal and private 
things they want to reveal about themselves. It goes without saying that, depending on the com-
munication context and familiarity of the interlocutors, such decisions will vary.  
 
2.2 Quadrant II: taboo abuse 
Even in the second Quadrant, there are themes that are not addressed because they are incon-
siderate, unpleasant, or delicate. In contrast to the first Quadrant, however, it is not the intimate 
or private sphere of a person that is protected, but rather the individual victim, while the perpe-
trator is not attackable, but actually protected by the (communication) taboo. The action and 
communication taboos that belong in these quadrants include sexual offences against minors by 
teachers or representatives of the Catholic Church, violence in the family6 or addiction, as well as 
other diseases. Paternalism or censorship also belong in these quadrants, as do everyday racism, 
othering and other forms of discrimination, which do not have to be intended as such, but can 
also be traced back to a lack of reflection and non-questioning of “normality” and the “familiar”, 
which inadvertedly still degrades an individual. 
 
2.3 Quadrant III: positive taboo break 
The “Taboo: Removed” that heads Quadrant III often results from a “No-More-Taboo”, a broken 
taboo. The examples from Quadrant II clearly show where changes are urgently needed to pro-
tect individuals and human rights, so that the basic needs for recognition, protection, belonging, 
and integrity are safeguarded, and social participation becomes possible. In order to bring about 
corresponding changes, silence must be broken, the unheard must be brought up, enlightened, 
and integrated into the existing and tolerated. But for this to succeed, the one who breaks the 
silence also needs a voice that is heard in the sense of a legitimate language (cf. Dirim/Mecheril 
2010), and a space in which one is heard (cf. Salgado 2008). This is exactly where the work of the 
Federal Agency for Civic Education is to be found: the information films on sexism, racism, an-
tiziganism and homophobia in the Begegnen series7 are representative and exemplary of a very 
extensive work that can be assigned to Quadrant III in the context of democracy and the Basic 
Law. The action against injustices, the commitment to human dignity (also in the form of civil 
courage) is usually preceded by questioning and critical thinking (cf. Kruse 2017), which plays a 
central role in Quadrant III: Critical thinking is a prerequisite for being able to name, and for 
breaking a taboo that protects an individual in society. 
Critical thinking is not only important in education, but it is also the basis for political debate, sustain-
able economic activity and individual life. Only in democracies is critical thinking ultimately a desira-
ble educational goal. (ibid.: 10) 
And yet, according to Kruse (2017: 10), ‘critical‘  stands less for exercising criticism than for critical-
ly dealing with knowledge about the world – and that is above all the knowledge one is currently 
acquiring. Thus, in this quadrant (as in Quadrant I), the legacy of the Enlightenment and human 
rights can be found as a critical benchmark (Hormel/Scherr 2004: 130, cited in Messerschmidt 
2018: 426), but which cannot be assumed a consensus:  
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Human rights should not be understood as a given indisputable ‘moral code‘  [...], but rather against 
the background of the social struggles for equal rights that continue to this day. Their validity is not 
assured and requires commitment, which must be related to the social context in which human 
rights are violated. (ibid.) 
 
2.4 Quadrant IV: negative taboo break 
The following applies to Quadrant IV: No one is dicing their words, their own views are formulat-
ed unembellished and clear and translated into actions, even though these violate the dignity of 
others. (Respect) limits are exceeded. Scientifically proven facts play less of a role than chauvin-
ism, populism, and racism. Often, a right is accepted and a necessity is suggested, in the sense of 
“one will still be allowed to say that”, to have to break an (apparently) existing taboo in the sense 
of Enlightenment, a claim to Quadrant III (cf. also von Lucke 2010). This entitlement to the role of 
victim on the part of the majority society, however, means twofold discrimination, firstly because 
actual discrimination against others is denied or played down, and secondly because it suggests 
discrimination of oneself, which cannot exist in the majority society, since discrimination is al-
ways structural. 
 
3. Integration courses in Germany: an overview 
In order to recognise, name, tease out, and – in the sense of a desired change – also shift bound-
aries, it is first and foremost necessary to offer reflection. The question arises, if (and to what ex-
tent) this space is given within the framework of integration courses, in general, and orientation 
courses, in particular. Are tasks in teaching materials suitable and teachers trained to create 
spaces for reflection and to support course participants in meeting their opinions, stances, atti-
tudes, experiences, insights, values, and feelings (Kruse 2017: 73)? In a first step, it is helpful to be 
able to classify integration courses in Germany in order to analyse tasks in teaching materials (cf. 
Section 4). 
Crossing the border to Germany with the aim of staying, one encounters a residence law that has 
regulated participation in an integration course since 2005. The objective of the Integration 
Course Ordinance (IntV) states: 
Newcomers from third countries who are permanently resident in Germany and late repatriates are 
entitled to take part in an integration course. Eligible foreigners who do not have a basic knowledge 
of the German language are also obliged to participate. This integration offer is supplemented by the 
possibility of admission to courses for foreigners and Union citizens already living in Germany. (IntV 
2004: 1) 
The aim of the integration course is to introduce learners to the language, legal system, culture 
and history of Germany and thus to create the basic prerequisites for social participation. The 
acquisition of the necessary linguistic and social skills should take place in a German course (600 
or 900 teaching units [TU] of 45 minutes each) and a subsequent orientation course (100 TU of 45 
minutes each). This contribution concentrates on the latter due to the framework available here. 
The two courses must, however, be thought together (cf. Goethe Institut 2016: 6). While the over-
all goal of the German course is the CEFR (Common European Framework of Reference for Lan-
guages) language level B1, the overall goals of the orientation course are:  
 Raising awareness for the German political system 
 Developing positive assessment of the German state 
 Imparting knowledge of rights and duties as a resident and a citizen 
 Developing the ability to orientate oneself further (methodological competence) 
 Acquiring intercultural competence (BAMF 2015: 29f.) 
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The orientation course is ascribed a high social significance, which is reflected, among other 
things, in the steady increase of the planned TU: The original 30 TU were initially increased to 45 
(2007), then to 60 (2012), and finally to 100 TU (2016). The most recent increase in the number of 
TU means a revision of the curriculum, and thus a stronger orientation towards the following 
guidelines:  
 Systematic emphasis on the importance of constitutional principles, fundamental 
rights, and values for constructive social interaction at all relevant points of the  
curriculum. 
 Continuous orientation towards value-based political education, and promotion of 
social participation. 
 Consistent reference and confrontation with one‘s own life reality and with German 
society. 
 Fundamental rights and democratic principles as a yardstick and framework for the 
independent assessment and individual positioning of the participants. (cf. BAMF 
2017: 9) 
The language course is successfully certified with the language test “Deutsch-Test für Zuwander-
er” (DTZ), and the orientation course with the scaled test “Leben in Deutschland” (LID). If both 
parts are passed, the course participant receives the “Certificate Integration Course” (cf. Table 2).8 
 
Tab. 2: Overview integration course 
Taboos and Integration 
Integration course 
  
Duration Content Language 
level 
Certificate 
L
a
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e
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o
u
rse
 
600 or 
900 TU 
Communication in the 
fields of action of offices 
and authorities, work, work 
search, education and trai-
ning, banking and insurance, 
care and training of children, 
shopping, health, media use, 
mobility, education, hou-
sing.9 
A1-B1 Language test 
“Deutsch-Test 
für Zuwande-
rer” 
(DTZ) 
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O
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100 TU Introduction (3 TU) 
Module I: Politics in De-
mocracy (35 TU) 
Module II: History and 
Responsibility (20 TU) 
Module III: People and 
Society (38 TU) 
Course completion (4 TU) 
A2/B1 Scaled final  
test “Leben in 
Deutsch-
land” (LiD)10 
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The possible examination questions of the test “Leben in Deutschland” can be assigned to the 
three modules Politics in Democracy (Module I), History and Responsibility (Module II), and  
People and Society (Module III).11 The following table (Tab. 3) also lists the number of hours as-
signed in the curriculum:  
Tab. 3: Module assignment to TU, questions, and topics of the test “Leben in Deutschland”  
This list already shows that the division between the number of TU of the individual modules and 
the number of possible test questions is imbalanced. While 89 questions related to the module 
“History and Responsibility” (about 30%) are covered in only 20 TU, 38 TU are dedicated to the 
module “People and Society”, which, in effect, concerns a mere 6.5% of the questions. In relation 
to that, the module “Politics and Democracy” has 3 TU less, but contributing 64% of the test ques-
tions. With regard to the orientation course test, it can therefore be criticised that the require-
ments lie above all in the area of knowledge of structures and institutions, and do not satisfy the 
quality characteristics of political education (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung 2007: 4), that 
the language level of the learners seems incompatible with the very complex learning content 
and the high density of (political) specialist vocabulary (cf. Liedke 2018: 106), and that the content 
of the questions has little to do with the everyday reality of the orientation course participants 
(cf. Niedermüller 2013).  
 
4. Taboos in test(preparation) and teaching materials  
In the following, I will analyse examples from test preparation and teaching materials using the 
grid for classifying taboos (cf. Table 1). The underlying question is whether and how asymmetric 
power relations are (or can be) addressed. In the sense of self-empowering teaching, it is desira-
ble that taboo breaks, as they take place in Quadrants II (taboo abuse) and IV (negative taboo 
break), are made visible, and that process movements in Quadrant I (protection by taboo) and 
above all in Quadrant III (positive taboo break) are pointed out as options for action. 
 
4.1 Ideal vs. real image of Germany  
What should [emphasis added] you do, if you are treated badly by your contact person in a German 
authority? 
 There‘s nothing I can do. 
 I have to put up with this treatment. 
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Module TU Number of 
questions 
Topics (number of questions) 
  
Politics in De-
mocracy 
35 192 Constitutional bodies (31); Constitutional principles 
(22); Federalism (8); Social system (8); Fundamental 
rights (22); Elections and participation (30); Parties 
(7); State responsibilities (4); Obligations (8); State 
symbols (6); Municipality (10); Law and everyday life 
(36) 
History and 
Responsibility 
20 89 Nationalism and its consequences (20); Important 
stations after 1945 (33); Reunification (15); Germany 
in Europe (21) 
People and 
Society 
38 19 Religious diversity (5); Education (7); History of mig-
ration (4); Intercultural coexistence (3) 
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 Threaten that person. 
 I can [emphasis added] complain to the head of the authority.  
(Feil/Hesse 2017b: Question 276) 
Based on this example, a fundamental dilemma will be discussed in which the orientation course 
and the concluding test “Leben in Deutschland” are situated. These are the various objectives of 
teaching materials, which, on the one hand, prepare students for the test “Leben in Deutschland”, 
convey the legal foundations of a democracy, and, at the same time, explicitly contribute to a 
positive image of Germany. On the other hand, there is the demand to prepare for a real and, 
thus, very complex everyday life in Germany. The goal of social participation with corresponding 
scope for action falls within this context.  
In the question above (276), the modal verbs should (“What should you do if you are treated bad-
ly”) and can (“There‘s nothing I can do”, “I can complain to the head of authority”) indicate that a 
complaint is legally possible, but not necessary. Moreover, the question actually implies that a 
person can be treated badly by German authority. In this instance, this possibility is thus not 
treated as a taboo, but as reality that is further addressed in the course materials:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation: “Yesterday, the annual report of the Complaints Office for Discrimination was presented. 
Last year, for example, there was one complaint almost every day, half of which were due to discrimi-
nation. Most people felt discriminated against because of their origin. Most discrimination took place 
in the workplace or at municipal offices.” 
The rights, which an individual has in the Federal Republic of Germany and which can and should 
be claimed, can be checked with an examination question as quoted above. At this point, neither 
explicit experiences of discrimination are spelled out nor what the concrete claim of the right to 
complain means or can mean for orientation course participants. This is, because a scene as de-
scribed in question 276, although the correct answer d) shows a claim according to Quadrant III 
(“I can complain to the head of the authority”), will certainly take place in practice in the sense of 
answers a and b in Quadrant II (“I can‘t do anything” or “I have to put up with this treatment”). 
The following questions thus arise in and for practice:  
 What unwritten laws apply to a complaint?  
 Who can (not) complain when?  
 Which complaint is (not) heard by whom and when?  
 What are the consequences of a complaint for whom?  
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The example of the complaint has an illustrative function here. A discrepancy between the ideal 
and the real image of Germany emerges also in other areas in which taboos play a role, such as 
in the context of religion, homosexuality, undeclared work (‘moonlighting‘), or a conflict of inter-
est in a domestic community. This fact is certainly taken up in teaching materials, already in 
headings such as “Theory and Reality”, under which e.g. the topic of equal rights (Buchwald-
Wargenau 2018: 78) is dealt with, or in tasks that ask: “In which situations are fundamental rights 
violated? Discuss in class” (Schote 2018: 13). “Also interesting!” is another section that draws at-
tention to such discrepancies and invites learners to share their own observations. In this catego-
ry, for example, the following entry can be found:  
The laws form the framework for living together in society. Tolerance and respect are important for 
living together in everyday life. The boundary of freedom of expression is where you violate the 
rights of another. The General Equal Treatment Act (AGG) prohibits discrimination and regulates the 
equal treatment of all citizens among themselves. In everyday life there is sometimes a difference 
between law and reality [emphasis added]. 
(Buchwald-Wargenau 2018: 21) 
Interviews with textbook authors and editors in publishing houses show that specific limits are 
necessarily maintained in teaching materials and that certain topics, descriptions, and expres-
sions are taboo (cf. Hägi-Mead 2017). In the classroom itself, the discursive space is somewhat 
safer, and thus, the possibility may be given to address or even transgress taboos or to thematise 
taboo words. The following examples show that teaching materials can also help to shape such a 
framework. While moonlighting is not endorsed in Fig. 2, it is explicitly thematised: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation: Hello, Jule, how are you? You told me the other day about a craftsman you were so im-
pressed with. Can you send me the phone number? We had a craftsman for the bathroom yesterday. 
And can you believe it: He asked me if we could do this without a bill!!!! Black! Without taxes! If every-
one would do that, man ... Best regards, Ina 
Another example for a safe space is the info box on “How to argue better”. While it explicitly dis-
courages from swearing, it is embedded in a framework that makes it possible to explicitly name 
and get to know common expressions, such as “ass”, which are usually taboo in teaching materi-
als: 
Don‘t use swear words: idiot, ass, jackass, jerk, ... (Feil/Hesse 2017a: 185)  
The dots in the example above refer to this space exactly, where further taboo words may be ad-
dressed in the teaching context.  
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4.2 Limits 
You intentionally [emphasis added] opened a letter in Germany addressed to another person. What didn‘t 
you [emphasis added] pay attention to? 
 The right to silence 
 The secrecy of correspondence 
 Confidentiality 
 Freedom of expression  
(Feil/Hesse 2017b: Question 274) 
 
The teaching of (action) taboos, such as the secrecy of correspondence, which protect the privacy 
of an individual (cf. Tab. 1, Quadrant I), and are, at the same time, enshrined in law, is explicitly 
demanded in the curriculum for orientation courses (cf. BAMF 2017: 29). Quadrant I, however, 
also includes limits that must be adhered to beyond this, and which can be particularly relevant 
in teaching situations, or are frequently exceeded in teaching situations. At first glance, these can 
be quite irrelevant questions, such as “What did you do yesterday/last weekend?”, “Why are you 
in Germany?”, or “Describe your apartment”. In the documentary Zertifikat Deutsch (Jurschik 
2008), this becomes particularly obvious: A course participant, whose very simple furnishing of a 
one-room apartment is shown, has to describe his living situation in detail to the other students 
due to a corresponding task in the course book. Another scene shows a student cleaning rooms 
in a hotel on weekends under inhumane working conditions. The discrepancy of the (work and 
living) reality in the course book and the life of the course participants is blatant, while the 
(certainly not intended) embarrassment caused by the unreflectingly performed tasks and nicely 
meant questions becomes obvious.  
Tasks with the addition And now you! encourage learners to express their own opinions and relate to 
their own lives. (Buchwald-Wargenau 2018: 3) 
Such tasks are only to be considered suitable, if the participants have the choice of whether they 
want to communicate, cf. for example:  
What would you like to tell about yourself and learn from the others? Collect in class. (ibid.: 6) 
In the sense of the private sphere in Quadrant 1, tasks such as the following should be critically 
questioned:  
Who does what work in your family? Tell me. (Butler et al. 2017: 97) 
 
And now you! What religion do the participants have in your course? Do a survey and present the 
results in the course. (Buchwald-Wargenau 2018: 98)  
The question quoted at the beginning of this section (“What didn‘t you pay attention to?”) should 
also be scrutinized: It implies the assumption of intentionally having opened a letter addressed to 
another person. With regard to Quadrant I and to the target group of orientation courses, such 
an assumption is relevant. Against the background of experiences that can be assigned to Quad-
rant II, it is necessary to ask which assumptions are made why and how, which conceptions of 
participants or which understanding of integration are produced in orientation courses. Still, oth-
ering and stereotypical characterisations are not always as explicit and obvious as in the follow-
ing example:  
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Translation: More and more people are coming to Germany. Germany is an immigration society. 
This is a positive thing and an opportunity for Germany. Today, we know that we will not lose our-
selves if we accept diversity. We want this diverse “we”. We do not want to fear it.  
There are also many problems associated with the immigration society: Ghetto formation, juvenile 
delinquency, patriarchal worldviews, or homophobia, abuse of the social welfare system, or truants. 
For some groups, religion plays an overriding role and leads to separation from the majority society. 
Yes, there are also immigrants who bring anti-Semitism with them. And there are also families who 
disregard the rights of women and girls.  
Within the framework of our Basic Law and the laws, everyone has the freedom to be as they please. 
Our society lets others be different.  
It endures different opinions and ways of life. And it is open to change, if it is in accordance with 
democratic principles. That is its great strength.  
In an immigration society, we have to negotiate many things, we have to discuss and talk about many 
things. This is normal and will happen more and more often – but not because integration is getting 
worse and worse, but on the contrary because it is getting better and better.  
I would like to see an everyday life in which we respect what is our own – and, of course, give room to 
others.  
In this speech, problems such as patriarchal worldviews, homophobia, or truants are addressed 
and brought into a direct and one-sided causal connection with migration. Although an integrat-
ed “multifaceted we” is intended at first glance (line 6), a “we” (not originally affected by the prob-
lems mentioned) and a “none-we” (the problem-makers) are presented (cf. line 14f.). It is certainly 
no coincidence that this speech was given at a naturalisation ceremony, and – even if not explicit-
ly mentioned – that integration is understood and addressed as an achievement of assimilation. 
This “currently dominant [...] use of ‘ integration‘” (Mecheril 2011: 50f., cited in Knappik/Mecheril 
2018: 169f.) tabooes the fact that problems such as patriarchal worldviews, homophobia, or 
school truants naturally also exist in the majority society:  
Here, ‘ integration‘  is a more or less one-sided adaptation effort, which persons regarded as 
‘migrants‘  have to make. ‘ Integration‘  is at the same time a system of sanctions, since symbolic and 
economic punishments are possible, if ‘ integration‘  is not achieved. ‘ Integration‘  confirms the at-
tribution of strangeness, since the vocabulary is used almost exclusively by us. To talk about so-called 
people with a migrant background [...] The question of ‘ integration‘ , for example, will not be  
answered with reference to the white-collar criminal biographies of people who are taken for granted 
and unquestionably understood as Germans. Nor is it posed [...] when we are dealing with a lack of 
moral sense in the face of the situation of others. (ibid.: 170) 
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An examination of taboos also means questioning prevailing representations and constructions 
of groups (Schweiger et al. 2015: 9). Thus, the 7th edition of Zur Orientierung (Gaidosch/Müller 
2017: 74) also contains the particularly striking discriminatory and deficit-oriented presentation 
of a migrant (Fig. 4). These instances clearly call for empowerment in the context of integration, in 
the sense that spaces are needed in which people are taught and learn to perceive and analyse 
existing power relations, in which it is also possible to develop strategies against othering and the 
discursive reproduction of power (cf. Schweiger et al. 2015: 9). 
 
Translation: 
Everything you do is wrong! 
[Picture 1] Foreigner‘s office; Parking bicycles forbidden 
[Picture 2] Oh, excuse me. Paper, Glass, Residual waste. 
[Picture 3] You‘re too late. Your visa expired yesterday // Yes, but I had to take my mother to the hos-
pital. Here you go – as an apology. 
[Picture 4] No thanks, I can‘ t and I don‘t want to accept that. And your visa – my boss has to decide 
that. 
[Picture 5] Here is your visa. But this is an exception. Please call whenever you can‘t come. // Yes, I 
will. Thank you. 
[Picture 6] Parking bicycles forbidden // I do everything wrong. 
 
Taboos and Integration 
Fig. 4: Everything you 
do is wrong! (Zur Orien-
tierung, Gaidosch/
Müller 2017:74) 
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4.3 Room for reflection 
Reflection always refers to an object, but the focus is on what one thinks about the object, one‘s own 
opinions, positions, attitudes, experiences, insights, values, and feelings. (Kruse 2017: 73) 
Indicators of a positive response to the question above (cf. 4.2) would be questions and tasks 
that ask to invite reflection, allow time for reflection, provide a safe space for course participants, 
and provide opportunities for identification. An increase of the initial 30 units for the orientation 
course to now 100 units (cf. section 3) seems to offer a suitable framework. Another productive 
starting point is the option to determine course-specific and thematic foci in class, all the while 
using the course material provided: 
In the orientation course, you are not able to address all pages of “living together”. We made the 
book “thicker”, so you can select what interests you most for the course.  
(Feil/Hesse 2017a: 4) 
However, the overall analysis of the course materials approved by the BAMF for orientation 
courses shows that very general, vague, out of context, and abbreviated descriptions are availa-
ble, which do not do justice to the complexity of, e.g., experiences of discrimination, nor allow 
identification with what is going on. The following scenario examples, for which the task is 
“Discuss in class” or “Read and discuss the following situations” (Schote 2018: 13, 89) should clari-
fy this point: 
Mr Kästner has recently moved into an apartment with his partner. That‘s how it‘s come to be known 
he‘s homosexual. The board of the sports club in which Mr. Kästner has been active for three years, 
would therefore like to exclude him. (ibid.: 13) 
An employer prohibits an employee from praying during working hours. (ibid.: 89) 
A student has to take part in swimming lessons, although she does not want this for religious rea-
sons. (ibid.) 
It can be assumed that it is commonplaces as well as abstract or perhaps also socially desirable 
scenarios that are offered for discussion rather than opening up spaces of genuine and reflected 
discussion on orders of difference. This could only take place, if more context was offered, ta-
boos were named in their complexity, discrimination was presented in its relevance in everyday 
life, and power structures were revealed, as is actually the case in the following two examples: 
 
Translation:  
personal – perfect – gay – married 
I trained to be a mechanic. At the moment, I am looking for a job vacancy. A few weeks ago, I had an 
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interview with a great company. The job was ________ [perfect]! In the beginning, the interview was 
really good. But then the boss asked me more and more ________ [personal] questions. “Do you have 
a relationship? Are you ________ [married]?” At some point, he laughed and asked, “But you‘re hope-
fully not ________ [gay], are you?” I didn‘t even know what to say. Of course, I‘m gay. But I really want-
ed this job. I don‘t want to lie either.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation:  
This is what Hatice Özmul (33) thinks about freedom and tolerance:  
People who explain the world to me annoy me. Mostly they don‘t explain the world, but how they see 
it. They want me to see the world the same way they do. And that things have the same meaning for 
me as for them. For example the headscarf.  
Many of my friends have different reasons why they wear a headscarf or they associate different 
things with it. But there are always people who explain to us what our headscarf really means. These 
people want to cover us with their truth like a coat. Is that tolerant? 
And then there are people who tell me that I have to be interested in German art and literature. Do I 
really have to? 
Taboos and Integration 
Fig. 6: Hatice Ozmul on 
Freedom and Tolerance 
(miteinander leben, Feil/
Hesse 2017a: 20) 
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I am in favour of fundamental rights in Germany and I like to live in Germany. That‘s enough! 
//Two friends on a shopping trip in Munich// 
Tasks and activities.  
1. What could be the difference between the lives of the two young women in the photo? 
2. Why can the two women be friends?  
3. Do you think that there can be problems in the friendship between the two women? 
4. What does Hatice think about freedom and tolerance? Discuss it in the course. If you feel like it, 
you can also write us a letter for our homepage  
Fig. 5 is taken from the supplementary material Vielfalt leben (Büchsel 2018), a workbook created 
on the initiative of the Berlin adult education centres that breaks new ground in two respects:  
On the one hand the topic: Up to now, our German textbooks have lacked the diversity of roles and 
identities that shape our everyday lives in Germany. We search in vain for the gay protagonist, rarely 
a single mother appears. If something of this social diversity does appear in the textbooks, it is in 
higher course levels for people who have been learning German for some time. In this way, diversity 
is, as it were, addressed in the follow-up to the language course. This creates the impression that 
diversity only has a place on the fringes of our society. “Vielfalt leben” – this is the second novelty – is 
thus also the first material that places social topics such as gender justice and various family and life 
models at the centre of learning from the outset, and already deals with them at language levels A1 
and A2. (ibid.: 3) 
Fig. 6 from miteinander leben (Feil/Hesse 2017a) is a positive example of how participants are 
addressed directly and on an equal footing, and how learning goals are implemented that ad-
dress the areas of interest and curiosity (“[…] I want to know which rights I have and which rules 
apply to all people in Germany [... ].”), openness and courage (“I approach other people and ex-
plain to them what is important to me. I tell others what I like and what bothers me. I interfere 
when something is important to me.”), or understanding and tolerance (“Anything that is im-
portant for others, I don‘t disregard. What‘s good for me doesn‘t have to be better for others. I 
can talk to others about differences and similarities”) (Feil/Hesse 2017a: 3). These are areas in 
which (one‘s own) boundaries and ideas of what goes and what does not, play a major role, i.e. 
areas that can be captured using the grid for classifying taboos (cf. Table 1).  
It becomes clear that also topics on tolerance and coexistence are narrowed down and taken up 
one-sidedly in a section entitled “Intercultural Conflicts” (cf. Feil/Hesse 2017a: 186f.), and that 
headings such as “German Culture/German Cultures”, “Cultural Differences” or “Typically Ger-
man?” (Buchwald-Wargenau 2018) basically essentialize cultures. The comparisons with the home 
country that are repeatedly called for must continue to be questioned, especially if it is implied 
that the participants‘  background of knowledge and experience can be classified in Quadrant II 
(taboo abuse), while aspects of ‘the target culture‘  are located in Quadrant III (positive taboo 
break). More appropriate seem to be references to the (involvement of) majority society, which 
go to show that there are enough examples that must (still) be located in Quadrant II, i.e. topics 
and processes that should be disclosed and discussed in Quadrant III: 
Some time ago, my female colleague commented on a Bundesliga football match on television. After 
that, there were many hostile e-mails and comments on the Internet. Isn‘t it incredible that only men 
are allowed to comment on football? (Butler et al. 2017: 101) 
It surprised me that women in Germany have only been allowed to work without their husbands‘  
consent since 1977. (Buchwald-Wargenau 2018: 77) 
Thus, it seems worthwhile to raise the question of the current relevance for the majority society 
with regard to the individual topics that are put up for discussion in orientation courses. For ex-
ample, as successfully implemented in miteinander leben, the question is raised “What does civil 
courage mean?” (Feil/Hesse 2017a: 107f.) while discussing National Socialism in the module His-
tory and Responsibility: 
Civil courage is the contribution of citizens, so that the basic rights are not only respected in the Basic 
Law, but also in everyday life. Our example from everyday life is a teacher pulling a student‘s hair. 
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You might think now that this is rare and an exception. You‘re right, but civil courage is almost always 
about exceptions and special situations. (ibid.: 107) 
5. Conclusion: the challenges 
The grid for the classification and visualization of taboos (Section 2), the location of integration 
courses (Section 3), and an exemplary analysis of the orientation course material (Section 4) show 
that taboos in relation to integration processes are indeed a relevant category. For Quadrant I 
(Protection by Taboos), it can be stated with regard to the protection of intimacy and privacy that 
course participants must always be treated with respect just as their personal boundaries must 
be respected. Conversely, course participants should be encouraged and empowered (cf. Wild-
halm 2018) to demand a safe space for themselves. In practice, this calls for a reflection on the 
side of the teachers and a review of teaching materials in relation to potentially inherent othering 
of participants. For the participants it means, among other things, an examination of the dichoto-
my public vs. private, which can be seen in the answers to the questions: “What do I want to 
share about myself?”, or “What do I (not) have to share about myself?”. 
With regard to Quadrant II (taboo abuse), a powerful instantiation of the integration course mani-
fests itself. Such a reflection forms a fundamental starting point for Quadrant III (positive taboo 
break) and, thus, the competence to behave as teachers and learners in relation to the conditions 
in order not to reproduce them (Mineva/Salgado 2015: 257). This relates to the following ideal:  
to reflect with learners on a meta-level on society‘s relations, to locate them historically, and to devel-
op and open up actions by speculation that could lead to a change in conditions. (ibid.) 
Quadrant III (positive taboo break) also addresses the question of how the dichotomy between 
teachers and participants can be overcome (cf. Wildhalm 2019). Among other things, the social 
conditions under which integration courses take place must be questioned, as must the individu-
als‘  positions in the classroom as a political space (cf. ibid.). The objectives of the integration 
course made transparent in the framework curriculum are primarily to be found in Quadrant III 
with regard to democracy and human rights. Scenarios that take place in Quadrant II (taboo 
abuse) and IV (negative taboo break) (cf. examples in Section 4) must be addressed appropriately, 
disclosed, and assigned to Quadrant III. The previous analysis of the tasks in teaching materials 
shows that reflection is ostensible in order to achieve thematic sensitisation and increased 
awareness. Yet, the reflections suggested go in-depth to a varying degree, but actually often re-
main on a general level and, thus, on the surface. The main exceptions are the course material 
miteinander leben (Feil/Hesse 2017a) and the supplementary material Vielfalt leben (Büchsel 2018). 
Here, in relation to taboo topics, perspectives for action are actually designed and opened up – at 
least to some extent.  
Due to the fact that the grid for classifying and making taboos visible focuses on the reference 
variables of society and the individual, the relevance for the entire migration society and each 
individual becomes evident, as it is not reduced to country-specific or cultural references. This 
discussion is therefore also a proposal to break down a distinction between Germans and mi-
grants that is still myopic, essentialising, and counter-productive in the context of integration pro-
cesses as well as to assume responsibility for integration in the migration society beyond integra-
tion courses. For this, however, the breaking of taboos will continue to be necessary. 
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and valuable suggestions. A special thanks goes to Melinda Hägi-Mead, who translated this article 
written originally in German, and again to Mi-Cha Flubacher, who dedicated herself to its perfec-
tion. 
2 All quotes are originally in German and were translated by the author. 
3 Thus, taboos always change with society. Examples of this in Western Europe are trousers for 
women that are no longer taboo today, or conversely smoking in films, which is no longer a posi-
tive stylistic device but is now regarded as a taboo (cf. Deutsches Filminstitut 2014). 
4 http://www.bpb.de/mediathek/197284/homophobie-begegnen (30.09.2018). 
5 The term was coined by Wilhelm Heitmeyer, for an overview cf. Küpper/Zick 2015. 
6 Cf. here the violent and sexual offences in German families mentioned in Mecheril/van der  
Haagen Wulff (this volume) or during the Oktoberfest. 
7 An overview can be found on the following page: https://www.bpb.de/mediathek/213242/-
begegnen (30.12.2018). 
8 For detailed information cf.: http://www.bamf.de/DE/Willkommen/DeutschLernen/
Integrationskurse/integrationskurse-node.html (30.09.2018).  
9 The framework curriculum also identifies communication learning objectives that span fields of 
action (cf. Goethe Institut 2016: 29–70). 
10 The test “Leben in Deutschland” consists of 33 multiple-choice questions, which are passed 
with at least 15 correct answers. With at least 17 correct answers, the test is regarded as proof of 
the required knowledge for the naturalisation test, the questions of which are identical to the test 
questions of "Leben in Deutschland". 
11 The assignment of the topic areas to the questions (the number of questions is in brackets be-
hind the individual topic) is taken from Feil/Hesse 2017b: Cover page front. 
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Abstract 
The following contribution discusses taboos and transgressions in relation to didactics from the 
perspective of political education. In a first step, participation and inclusion are presented as 
goals of political education. The orientation course and its structures, goals, and contents form 
the field of action, which is presented in concrete terms with reference to the Beutelsbacher Con-
sensus and didactic principles. In the case of questions and possibilities of implementation, a 
first, exemplary look at orientation course materials is informative: it shows that essentially only 
one single didactic principle – the orientation towards research – is fully represented. On the oth-
er hand, the analysis of the examples reveals a lack of subject orientation, action orientation, and 
controversy, and uncovers didactically relevant taboos and transgressions. From a political-
didactic perspective, it is therefore desirable that orientation courses and their materials increas-
ingly focus on options for action and participatory orientation. 
 
1. Introduction 
Taboos and transgressions are encountered in integration courses in several respects and at 
different levels. Above all, they arise on the expectation level against the background of different 
learning situations and interests of the course participants among themselves, but also between 
participants and course instructors as well as in the context of the curriculum, which is imple-
mented in teaching materials (cf. Hägi-Mead, this volume). Taboos are defined here as something 
that is not said, addressed, or done unconsciously and/or unquestioningly. In addition, taboos 
not only manifest in silence, but also in words and images (cf. Schmidt 1999: 4). Also, the taboo 
functions primarily as a lens through which social processes of mainstreaming, disciplining, and/
or discrimination become visible (cf. Flubacher/Hägi-Mead, this volume), which are, as it were, 
means of demarcation. A transgression towards someone can be considered as such when this 
person is made invisible, misleadingly depicted, alienated, and/or not addressed at all, when the 
person is present in some form and part of an event without getting a voice. This article aims to 
elaborate these mechanisms in relation to orientation course materials. 
From a politically educational perspective, it will be discussed to what extent orientation courses 
in the Federal Republic of Germany – as part of integration courses – also contain taboos and 
transgressions of a didactic nature across the country. In particular, the way, in which the teach-
ing and learning objects of the orientation course materials are taught, is put to the test. In this 
respect, the concrete question arises as to whether these textbooks (and related orientation 
course questions) in particular appear suitable for promoting the social participation of course 
participants by means of their didactic preparation. One assumption, on which this study is 
based, is that certain didactic decisions are not conducive to participation and can represent 
transgressions. In concrete terms, it is assumed that learner diversity is neglected, which in turn 
has a tabooing and also transgressive effect, since the claims, competences, desires and rights of 
individuals are ignored and/or marginalised. Thus, taboos and transgressions contribute to peo-
ple not being able to participate according to their needs or being restricted in this respect. Con-
sequently, they are often expressions of (social) exclusion, i.e. the opposite of social participation. 
These assumptions are referred to in more detail in the concluding chapter of this article. First, I 
will briefly explain what is meant by participation in the social sciences. 
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2. Participation and inclusion as objectives of political education 
Participation is fundamentally the yardstick for social justice within the German society (cf. 
Göhring-Lange 2011: 8). Justice is made possible if all people are given room for manoeuvre in 
order to realise a way of life that they individually desire and is, equally, socially customary (cf. 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2005). Each person should have the opportunity to 
bring their interests or needs into society in order to help shape it. In this context, co-
determination refers to actions and decisions that can affect both the life of the individual as well 
as the nature of a community. Consequently, it is always a question of a mediating relationship 
between the individual human being and their environment (cf. Gerhardt 2007: 14). From a di-
dactic point of view, every teaching-learning setting also represents such a mediating relation-
ship. In such offers, participation can be promoted above all if planning is carried out from the 
subject level, so that the needs and experiences of the addressees are included in the creation of 
a teaching-learning setting. 
The question of possible taboos and transgressions in orientation courses at the subject-didactic 
level arises, among other things, from the current target group debates within inclusive political 
education, which is primarily concerned with participation and barriers to participation in political 
learning (cf. Dönges/Hilpert/Zurstrassen 2015). In exploring these aspects from an inclusive per-
spective, the focus is not on the individuals‘  lack of resources and their (supposed) characteris-
tics, but on structural deficits that bar them from participation. Inclusion is defined as a process 
of change that takes place in a network in all areas of society and aims to enable every person to 
access, participate and self-determine in all areas of society on the basis of their individual needs 
(Besand/Jugel 2015b: 52f.). 
One thesis that is advocated in inclusive political education by Anja Besand and David Jugel 
(2015a: 105), for example, is that especially educational offers that were designed for so-called 
special target groups often focus on these very groups in a deficit-oriented way and thus put 
them in a worse position. From the perspective of such marginalised and often alienated target 
groups, it can be assumed that they perceive the mechanisms in educational offers as transgres-
sive modes of behaviour and representation. Since orientation courses and their teaching materi-
als are a concrete offer for the target group ‘migrants‘ , an investigation of non-participation 
mechanisms or exclusion processes with regard to this ‘special target group‘  seems obvious. In 
order to examine this assumption step-by-step and with a specific focus, a didactic instrument is 
presented below that illustrates a range of design principles and quality standards of political ed-
ucation. This instrument can also be used for the planning and didactive reflection of courses for 
German as a Second Language (DaZ; Deutsch als Zweitsprache). In the following, political educa-
tion will be presented as a field in its own right, with its design principles and quality standards, 
as elaborated in the context of the orientation course. The following two sections explain the ori-
entation course as an essential field of action for political education. 
 
3. The orientation course as a field of action in political education 
3.1 About its structures, goals, and contents 
The article by Sara Hägi-Mead (this volume) provides a broad overview of the structure, goals, 
and contents of the integration and orientation course in Germany, and makes it clear that the 
integration course goes beyond language acquisition. In this way, particularly in the orientation 
course, migrants are introduced to Germany‘s legal system, culture, and history (cf. Federal Min-
istry of Justice and Consumer Protection 2005). Central to this are questions about human and 
civil rights, as well as questions about constitutional principles, which in turn serve as a bench-
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mark for the independent evaluation of democracy and the individual positioning of the partici-
pants in society (cf. BAMF 2017: 9). In addition, the focus is on various ways of life and values of 
democracy that are considered central to constructive social coexistence. These subject areas are 
classic areas of political education, which can be described as the teaching of political and social 
learning. Political educators have above all the task of preparing learning settings in such a way 
that they express social contents and problems that require regulation and are important for cer-
tain groups (cf. Sander 2009). This also applies to disciplines and areas in which political educa-
tion plays a subordinate role, but is nonetheless relevant, e.g. in the context of DaZ. 
Political education is applied in Germany in school and extra-curricular contexts. In school con-
texts, political education is a school principle, but also a proper school subject, which is described 
differently in each federal state and possibly within the individual school types. For example, the 
subject of political education is called “community studies” in Saxony, “social studies” in Bavaria 
or “politics and economics” in Hessen. Political education can also be taught in combination with 
other subjects such as history, law, or geography, with general knowledge courses in primary 
schools, or it can play a special role in combination with project weeks. There is also extra-
curricular political education, e.g. in clubs, associations, and/or foundations. A further distinction 
must be made between political education for children, young people, and adults. As such, the 
integration or orientation course belongs to the field of extra-curricular political adult education. 
In contrast to political education for children and young people, it is a relatively young field of re-
search, for which there have been only a few studies and findings to date. Since this is particular-
ly the case with regard to teaching-learning settings in orientation courses, and with regard to 
their specific target groups, this article contributes to research in this very direction. 
It is one of the declared aims of an orientation course to generate opportunities for participation 
in society (cf. BAMF 2018: 7). The promotion of social participation is equally the main aim of po-
litical education. As the definition of inclusion previously made clear, political education commits 
itself to advocating for the participation of all human beings. But what is meant by ‘participation‘  
in the sense of political education? If political education is about empowering people, emancipa-
tion must be a declared goal of political education. This means that people are regarded as sub-
jects with agency in learning processes who do not simply adopt norms, values, and roles without 
reflection in order to adapt to existing conditions (Schmiederer 1977: 108f.). However, emancipa-
tion becomes possible only on the grounds of the ability to participate. Therefore, if participation 
is regarded as a competence for co-determination, political education must ensure that people 
develop a sense of how they can interfere in decision-making processes in various ways and 
through individual approaches (cf. MESH Collective 2014). Here, learning about participation is 
foregrounded, as well as the question to what extent one would like to or can participate. In or-
der to promote competences (or possibilities) for participation, political education supports the 
fundamental view that every human is a subject with agency to make their own decisions and to 
represent their interests. Consequently, it is necessary to take the interests, needs, and attitudes 
of people who are in the learning process as a starting point. Yet, in order for people to recognize 
their needs and interests at all on a social and political level, it is necessary that political educa-
tion first of all shows how everyone is directly and daily affected by political decisions, and how 
one‘s own life cannot be considered detached from social events (cf. ibid.).  
 
3.2 Two central participatory competences of political education  
Following the increasingly poor performance of participants in comparative student assessments, 
the conferences of education ministers of the German federal states have agreed that educa-
tional goals such as maturity, solidarity, and social participation can only be meaningfully imple-
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mented if, in the future, educational programmes aim for output and outcome control. As a re-
sult of this finding, political education has adopted competence orientation as its primary educa-
tional goal. In the future, learning outcomes in the form of skills are to be placed at the centre, as 
they have a longer-term effect on the individual. Even if there is no general agreement on compe-
tence orientation in political education, a minimum consensus was reached, the so-called GPJE 
competence model (GPJE stands for Gesellschaft für Politikdidaktik und Jugend- und Erwachsenenbild-
ung; in English: Society for Political Education and Youth and Adult Education). This model stipulates 
that in political educational teaching-learning settings above all the capacity to act and judge is to 
be imparted, which is essential for the everyday life of learning subjects. ‘Capacity to act‘  essen-
tially means the development of practical skills for participation in the political public. On that 
note, opinions, convictions and interests should be adequately represented in sound politicial 
education material in order to teach skills both in arguing as well as in finding compromise (cf. 
Weißeno 2005). This goes hand in hand with communication skills, tactical, and strategic skills, 
but also political action and civil courage. On the basis of judgment skills, political events, prob-
lems, and controversies as well as questions of economic and social development should be ana-
lysed and reflected on, taking into account rational or value-related factors (cf. ibid.). Conse-
quently, the transfer of knowledge that can be queried in the form of input control should take a 
back seat to the acquisition of the above-mentioned competences. Thus, these skills and their 
promotion should be examined in the didactic settings of orientation course materials and the 
corresponding examination questions. 
 
3.3 The Beutelsbacher Consensus 
Teachers who are active in political education – including orientation courses – have a moderat-
ing and supportive role to play. The so-called Beutelsbacher Consensus of 1976 defines relatively 
clear ideas about the design of socially and politically relevant educational processes. It states 
that learners must not be overwhelmed in their opinion-forming, that teaching topics must not 
be one-sided, but visible in their controversial and arguable structure, and that participants 
should be motivated and enabled to represent their own interests (cf. Müller 2006).2 These ideas 
correlate with the didactic principles of subject orientation and controversy. In April 2017, the 
Beutelsbacher Consensus was included as a didactic guideline in the orientation course curricu-
lum of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 
in short: BAMF) (BAMF 2017: 14). This fact underlines once again that orientation courses are pri-
marily a field of political education. The Beutelsbacher Consensus is a prime example of the need 
for reflexivity for political education (also with regard to the observance and application of di-
dactic principles), whether the chosen means and ways of a teaching-learning setting are actually 
suitable – above all when it comes to promoting participation for the adressees. 
 
3.4 The importance of orientation course materials for teachers 
As has become clear, the orientation course conveys a variety of complex politically educating 
topics. The corresponding textbooks should also be regarded as part of political education. The 
wealth of content provided by the orientation course curricula makes it necessary for teachers to 
design their teaching units in a targeted and well-founded manner. A didactic reduction is indis-
pensable, especially in view of the time frame of the orientation course. After all, the participants 
should deal with Germany‘s political order in only 100 teaching units (45 minutes each). In this 
time frame – so the claim – the two participatory competences of judgement and capacity to act 
are to be promoted. It is this task that represents a particular challenge for orientation course 
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teachers: Orientation course teachers are usually German teachers with an additional qualifica-
tion, but without sound training in the teaching of political education for adult education. In ori-
entation courses, however, teachers need such expertise that goes far beyond DaZ. Even though 
the BAMF now provides a wider range of continuing education opportunities for (German) teach-
ers of orientation courses, and political education now plays a central role in German universities, 
it is assumed that DaZ teachers will adhere closely to the orientation course materials, as they 
are faced with complex politically-formed subject areas and unfamiliar issues. After all, it is the 
textbooks that guarantee reliable implementation of the curriculum. Consequently, orientation 
course materials should not only be understood as political education for migrants, but also as a 
didactic compass for course instructors who traditionally do not come from the field of political 
education. 
 
4. Classical quality standards in political education 
4.1 The importance of didactic principles for political education 
Due to the high complexity of social issues, it is necessary to prepare mediation situations (in ad-
vance) as structured and meaningful as possible for the addressed group. In order to enable a 
conscious selection and structure of politically educational topics, and to make them didactically 
justifiable, certain quality standards must be taken into account and adhered to. They serve to 
operationalise general objectives of political education (e.g. maturity), which in turn form the 
yardstick for the creation and implementation of teaching-learning units (cf. Müller 2006). 
Following, a total of six quality standards will be presented and explained. These are the so-called 
classic didactic principles of political education: subject orientation, problem orientation, action 
orientation, controversy, exemplary learning, science orientation. By taking these principles into ac-
count, participants are offered space for an active and self-determined discussion of various po-
litical and socially relevant subjects, according to their age (cf. Besand 2018: 28). 
The consideration of these principles helps course participants to find their own ways and means 
to influence the situation they find themselves in. Against the background of the quality stand-
ards, the added value of the political education increases, which, in turn, increases the chances 
that migrant students, too, will be empowered in their arrival and social orientation in Germany, 
as they will learn to emancipate themselves. Since classic didactic principles contribute to a re-
flection on how migrants can influence their own interests and master challenges, they play a 
central role in the context of a constructive approach to taboos and the avoidance of transgres-
sions. The following section explains in detail what each of the above-mentioned principles en-
compasses. Three central questions for each principle will be summarized below, and, in the 
fourth section, applied to a selection of material from orientation courses, and used to answer 
the research question of this paper.  
 
4.2 Characterization of classic didactic principles 
Subject orientation. Subject orientation is an interactive meaning-making process involving all 
persons acting together (cf. Petrik 2014: 241). It is thus decisive to start on the level of the learn-
ing subjects in order to gain access to politicial topics. The aim here is to find out about the multi-
layered needs and situations of the addressees. In this sense, individual interests and wishes, as 
well as socialisation-related attitudes, opinions, and existing knowledge or experiences should be 
addressed or assessed in the particular teaching-learning setting (cf. Müller 2006). Such a proce-
dure contributes to the visibilisation of an individual learner identity, can ensure that people feel 
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seen, understood, and recognised in learning situations, and, finally, identify with the course con-
tent. What is important here is, among other things, access via an easy, comprehensible, every-
day language (cf. Autorengruppe Fachdidaktik 2015: 63). If the individual subjects‘  interests, 
knowledge, experiences, attitudes, and opinions are made taboo, the usefulness of political edu-
cation also remains unclear. Moreover, if there is no room for agency, or no alternatives are dis-
cussed, there will be no contribution to the improving of one‘s situation in accordance with the 
Beutelsbacher Consensus (cf. section 3.1 in this article) nor to an orientation towards participa-
tion.  
As a result of the principle of subject orientation, the following questions can be asked of any 
teaching-learning setting: 
 Are the interests, wishes, attitudes, opinions, existing knowledge, and experiences of 
the subjects assessed or addressed in the course? 
 To what extent could a topic be useful from the learners‘  perspective? 
 To what extent can emancipation be promoted? Do alternatives become clear? Does 
agency play a role in the course? 
Problem orientation. The principle of problem orientation aims to take up social problems that 
require regulation and include them in the teaching-learning setting. This also means addressing 
potential conflicts of coexistence that arise constantly, and discussing such challenging issues, to 
mitigate them, or even to transform them (cf. Goll 2014: 259). In the ideal case, the subjects ac-
quire and test competences by discussing possible courses of action and trying out modes of 
conduct. This requires an open and honest approach to social challenges, which do not simply 
exist, but are socially constructed (cf. ibid.). Being able to solve problems in terms of content and 
method underlines the emancipative character of the principle of problem orientation. 
In this sense, an approach that minimizes or ignores social conflicts and challenges can be inter-
preted as taboo. Furthermore, playing down or erasing social problems encountered by the sub-
jects, for example, represents a transgression. As agents, participants should be given the oppor-
tunity to express themselves on issues that they themselves perceive as problematic. 
As a result of the principle of problem orientation, the following questions can be asked of any 
teaching-learning setting: 
 Is a problem / a conflict / a challenge named? 
 Are competences imparted that can be used to discuss solutions and actions for 
problems in terms of content and method? 
 Can courses of action be derived from this? 
Controversy. The principle of controversy demands that everything that is considered contro-
versial in political and scientific discourses must also be presented in a multi-layered way in 
learning settings. Consequently, facts should be considered in their complexity (cf. Grammes 
2014b: 271). This demand also places high demands on the aesthetic design of educational me-
dia and materials (cf. ibid.). Consequently, a didactic setting should reflect positions as controver-
sial or different as possible, on the basis of which independent judgements can be formed, and 
discussions can take place. Teaching material should provide the opportunity to try out one‘s 
own points of view and attitudes in class alongside other opinions to systematically criticise, and 
to imagine alternatives (cf. ibid.: 269). A taboo exists when diverging opinions are concealed and 
no possibility is offered in this respect to address such opinions on a democratic basis in a safe 
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space. If conflicts and the resulting controversies are tabooed as disruptive factors, they are not 
considered to be the motor of innovation, reform, and social change (cf. ibid.: 267). 
As a result of the principle of controversy, the following questions can be asked of any teaching-
learning setting: 
 Are controversies reflected, and is a topic rendered multilayered and approached 
from different perspectives? 
 Can criticism be expressed? Are alternatives asked for? 
 Does controversy in the sense of complexity and multi-perspectivity also emerge in 
the presentation of an educational setting? 
Research orientation. Research orientation aims to deal with educational objects of political 
education in drawing on scientific findings (cf. Juchler 2014: 290). Consequently, the topics that 
are taught must be recognised in their conditionality and determinacy by science, and transmit-
ted accordingly (cf. ibid.: 285). On the one hand, the approaches and methods, through which 
course participants generate knowledge, must be scientifically justifiable for any setting of politi-
cal education. On the other hand, no factual claims that have been invalidated can be repro-
duced. Finally, terminology should be used correctly (cf. Müller 2006). For research orientation in 
political education, primarily findings and methods of the social sciences should be applied (cf. 
Autorengruppe Fachdidaktik 2015: 79). For the planning of political education, however, 
knowledge generated from psychological education must also be drawn on for the conception of 
learning arrangements. Research orientation is independent of age groups and educational back-
ground. The political education scholar Ingo Juchler (2014: 286) stipulates that research orienta-
tion, in contrast to other principles such as action orientation or exemplary learning, must be re-
spected always. In addition, research orientation requires learners in the process of knowledge 
accumulation to listen to different perspectives and orientations, and to critically deal with them 
(cf. ibid.: 289). 
As a result of the principle of research orientation, the following questions can be asked of any 
teaching-learning setting:  
 Are topics aligned with scientific findings? 
 Is the terminology used correctly? 
 Is it possible to critically (or scientifically) engage with diverse perspectives and orien-
tations? 
Exemplary learning. Due to the already discussed wide range of political education on its topics 
or content, it is necessary to focus on specific points in order to reduce their complexity (cf. Mül-
ler 2006). Exemplary learning – learning from examples and cases – is suitable for this purpose. 
Thus, the topics addressed can be presented in such a way that certain structures, rules, and cen-
tral categories can be identified and derived on the basis of illustrative examples, which in turn 
can be transferred to a large number of similar questions and contexts. In addition, in the sense 
of exemplary learning, common assumptions can be differentiated or corrected in using concrete 
examples (cf. Grammes 2014a: 249). Here, in the sense of subject and problem orientation, is-
sues should be chosen that are connected to the participants‘  experiences, such as current con-
flict situations or concrete everyday problems (cf. ibid.: 250), thus selected from current events 
and lines of conflict. In addition, personal role models and ‘strong‘  texts serve as examples of 
learning (cf. ibid.: 253). 
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If complex topics are insufficiently illustrated by individual cases and examples, and individual 
concepts and ideas are made taboo, this can be interpreted as transgressive behaviour. In spe-
cific modules, for example in the orientation course materials, care should be taken to ensure 
that exemplary learning is made possible in every teaching session. 
As a result of the principle of exemplary learning, the following questions can be asked of any 
teaching-learning setting:  
 Are complex problems explained with illustrative examples? 
 Is it possible to compare and, if necessary, correct one‘s own assumptions? 
 Are problem situations, conflicts, and persons chosen that are oriented towards the 
participants‘  life worlds? 
Action orientation. In the sense of action orientation, (socially relevant) topics should be 
framed in teaching-learning settings so that participants are given the opportunity to engage with 
them on their own and in a variety of ways. Wherever possible, the participants‘  own identifica-
tion with issues of conflict should encourage them to find concrete solutions and explanatory ap-
proaches on their own, and to discuss them with others (cf. Autorengruppe Fachdidaktik 2015: 
111). According to Reinhardt (2014: 278), the principle of action orientation combines the level of 
(trial) action with the action-distancing level of reflection, at which analyses, evaluations, alterna-
tive views of the matter can take place for the subjects. On that note, action orientation does not 
mean merely using spontaneous experiences and needs and staging mere action, but rather a 
cognitivization of the process, in the sense of planning and processing action through distancing 
and reflection (ibid.: 283). Since participants are supposed to master tasks and situations as-
signed to them with their own agency, the principle of action orientation is closely linked to me-
thodical competence (cf. Autorengruppe Fachdidaktik 2015: 162). Action orientation is thus the 
basis for self-guidance in relation to socially relevant topics and questions, and for dealing with 
them. 
As a result of the principle of action orientation, the following questions can be asked of any 
teaching-learning setting:  
 Are there possibilities for (trial) action? 
 To what extent do reflection, analyses, evaluations, alternative views, possibilities of 
distancing play a role in the course? 
 Do self-guidance and agency play a role in the offer? 
 
5. On the implementation of didactic principles in orientation course materials 
5.1 Method and data 
Subsection 5.3 will present three excerpts in exemplary fashion, which were selected randomly. 
The aim is to examine the didactic principles on the basis of these excerpts, and to explain them 
in more detail. For this purpose, the questions elaborated in section 3.2 will be tested and briefly 
answered in relation to the excerpts. Methodically, the entire analysis was based on qualitative 
content analysis according to Mayring (2016). The quality standards of political education repre-
sent deductive categories in the analysis procedure; inductive categories of analysis play no role 
in this article. 
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In accordance with the procedure described above, which will be visualised in 5.3, instances of 
taboo and transgression are assessed and explained in detail in section 6. Since only three exam-
ples are analysed in this article (a broader presentation would go beyond the scope of this arti-
cle), these results are not representative or generalisable. Yet, this evaluation is part of and draw-
ing on a larger study, which is carried out in the context of my on-going dissertation project. In 
this project, all orientation course materials currently used in Germany are analysed.3  Here, I al-
so examine to what extent the mentioned six didactic principles can be found in their breadth in 
the individual lessons and modules of the teaching materials, and what consequences this may 
have. In this context, it should be noted that it is not absolutely necessary for all didactic princi-
ples to be applied or taken into account in a single textbook task, even if it is desirable that sever-
al principles are combined in teaching-learning settings. Only the principle of research orienta-
tion is a quality standard that simply must be adhered to. Furthermore, it seems obvious and de-
sirable, above all in accordance with the Beutelsbacher Consensus, that controversy and subject 
orientation find their way into all teaching-learning settings (cf. Petrik 2014 and Grammes 2014b). 
 
5.2 Overview of orientation course materials and final test 
Before the implementation of the individual didactic principles is discussed on the basis of three 
exemplary excerpts, a brief overview is given here of all orientation materials that are currently 
approved for use in teaching in Germany, and have a character similar to that of a textbook (cf. 
BAMF 2019: 4). In total, these four course materials and textbooks are: Orientierungskurs 
(Cornelsen Verlag; Schote 2016), miteinander leben (LpB BW; Feil/Hesse 2017), 100 Stunden 
Deutschland (Klett Verlag; Butler et al. 2017), and Zur Orientierung (Hueber Verlag; Gaidosch/Müller 
2017).4 Each educational institution that offers orientation courses and corresponding tests in 
Germany can decide independently which of these four course materials to use in the classroom. 
All approved course materials contain three central modules: Politics in Democracy (35 teaching 
units), History and Responsibility (20 teaching units), and People and Society (38 teaching units). 
Similar content is taught in all course materials on these topics, although the way in which  
they are taught differs. In order to guarantee a thematically coherent insight, all the excerpts 
listed below refer to the first module Politics in Democracy of the orientation course textbooks,  
in which immigrants are informed about their rights and duties as potential future citizens  
of Germany.  
The orientation course is usually followed by the scaled final test Leben in Deutschland, which 
uses single-choice questions that must be answered in writing (cf. Hägi-Mead, this volume).5 This 
test must be passed in order to successfully complete the orientation course, as well as to obtain 
German citizenship, for which at least 17 questions have to be answered correctly. However, the 
test can be repeated any number of times. The textbooks prepare the test participants in differ-
ent ways for a total of 33 multiple-choice questions. The consequences of this for the quality 
standards of political education will be explained in the next section. 
 
5.3 Evaluation of three examples from three orientation course materials 
The following are three excerpts from three different textbooks.6 They are evaluated in a table 
below on the basis of the questions from section 4.2. 
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Excerpt 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation: Quiz: Are these statements about Germany correct? Tick the box. 
a. The head of government is called prime minister. 
b. Germany is a federal republic. 
c. The Bundestag elections take place every four years. 
d. The non-German citizens are not allowed to take part in any election. 
e. People who live in Germany must abide by the constitution. 
f. Germany is a constitutional state, i.e. the state must also abide by laws. 
g. The German constitution is called the “Basic Constitutional Law” (“Grundgesetz”). 
h. One may not publicly criticize the government. 
i. German laws prohibit people from signing protest lists. 
j. The German constitution states that one has the right to an apartment. 
k. Children have to go to school from the age of 6. 
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l. A dove is depicted on the federal coat of arms. 
m. You have to pay church taxes, no matter if you belong to a church or not. 
n. The social insurance is controlled by the state, and protects the people in a social emer-
gency. 
 
Excerpt 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation: 
In the following federal states, one may vote already starting from 16 years with the local elections: 
Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein. In Bavaria, Hessen, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony and Thuringia you have to be 18 years old. EU citizens may 
also vote in local elections, if they have been living in the town for at least three months. 
Right column: Active voting rights mean that you can vote. For example, you have to be old enough 
and have German citizenship. 
Passive voting rights mean that you can be elected yourself. 
Top row, 1st picture from left: Nabil Amin is 40 years old. He works as a machine fitter in Augsburg. 
He has been a German citizen for 14 months. 
Top row, middle picture: Saskia Heudorfer is 16 years old and a student. She attends a grammar 
school in Bremen, and is interested in politics. 
Top row, 1st picture from right: Cécile Armengaud is French. She has been studying in Germany for 
three years. Two months ago, she moved from Berlin to Regensburg. 
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Row below, 1st picture from left: Gabrijel Pavic is Croatian and 19 years old. He has lived in Kassel for 
two years, and works there as a waiter. 
Row below, middle picture: Sebastian Becker was born and raised in Heidelberg. He is German and 
17 years old. 
Row below, 1st picture from right: Hayriye Yildiz has lived in Bielefeld for over 20 years. Her children 
were born in Germany. She has German nationality. 
 
Excerpt 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation: 
1a What do you know about these parties? Collect information in the course. 
1b Read the texts and complete the information in the table. 
The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) is the oldest party in Germany, and was founded in 
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1875. It has its roots in the labour movement. Even today, the rights of workers and social justice are 
important issues for the SPD. It is also important for the party that all people have equal opportuni-
ties, for example in education and in work. www.spd.de 
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) emerged after the Sec-
ond World War. The parties represent conservative values, and see themselves as parties for 
Protestant and Catholic Christians. Social justice is also important for the CDU/CSU. The CSU exists 
only in Bavaria, but in the Bundestag, the CDU and CSU work together and form a parliamentary 
group. www.cdu.de/www.csu.de 
The Green Party was founded in 1980 in West Germany out of citizens‘  initiatives for more environ-
mental protection. In 1990, it joined forces with the civil rights movement Bündnis 90 from East Ger-
many. The party is strongly in favour of renewable energies, e.g. more energy from wind and sun, 
and more consumer protection. It is against nuclear energy. In addition, it actively strives for more 
rights of minorities. www.gruene.de 
The left originated 2007 from the left wing party PDS (party of the democratic socialism) and the 
WSAG (Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative). The PDS developed from the SED, the 
state party in the former GDR, the WSAG was created by former SPD members and trade unions. The 
Left is for democratic socialism. Among other things, it is for more social security for people without 
work or with low incomes. www.die-linke.de 
Which two parties were merged to form the Left Party in 2007? 
A) PDS and WASG 
B) CDU and SSW 
C) CSU and FDP 
D) Bündnis 90 the Greens and SPD 
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Fig. 4: Question from the orientation course test7 (Der Test, Feil/Hesse 2017: 12 [number 59]) 
Analysis questions of 
the respective didac-
tic principle 
Evaluation Excerpt 1 Evaluation Excerpt 2 Evaluation Excerpt 3 
Subject orientation    
Are the interests,  
wishes, attitudes,  
opinions, existing 
knowledge, and expe-
riences of the subjects 
assessed or addressed 
in the course? 
Interests, wishes, atti-
tudes, opinions, and 
experiences are not 
included.  
Interests, wishes, atti-
tudes, opinions, and 
experiences are not 
included.  
Interests, wishes, atti-
tudes, opinions do not 
play a role. But existing 
knowledge and experi-
ences are queried.  
To what extent could a 
topic be useful from the 
learners’ perspective? 
A transfer of know-
ledge and behaviour 
takes place, the con-
crete benefit of which 
cannot be assessed 
situation-specifically. 
If participants acquire 
German citizenship, 
they may also take 
part in elections at lo-
cal, state and federal 
level. 
Participants should be 
given an overview of 
the party landscape. 
This information could 
be important for them 
as future voters. 
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Analysis questions of 
the respective didac-
tic principle 
Evaluation Excerpt 1 Evaluation Excerpt 2 Evaluation Excerpt 3 
To what extent can 
emancipation be pro-
moted? Do alternati-
ves become clear?  
Does agency play a 
role in the course? 
Emancipation in the 
form of offered alter-
natives and participati-
on does not take place. 
Agency is at most 
tested in relation to 
the task, in which a de-
cision is to be made 
about right or wrong. 
Agency is demanded 
by the task: It should 
be decided who is (not) 
allowed to participate 
in which elections. Yet, 
what this in turn me-
ans for the partici-
pants’ lives does not 
matter. 
Agency occurs at most 
in the form of the tab-
le, which participants 
have to fill individually 
with text. However, it 
does not become clear 
what possibilities there 
are for action in every-
day life. 
Problem orientation    
Is a problem / conflict / 
challenge named? 
No problems, conflicts, 
or challenges requiring 
regulation are defined 
in this offer. 
No conflicts, problems, 
and challenges beco-
me explicitly clear. Pos-
sibly, it becomes impli-
citly (!) clear that mig-
rants from third count-
ries without German 
citizenship are 
excluded from all elec-
tions. 
No problems, conflicts, 
or challenges in need 
of regulation are defi-
ned. 
Are competences im-
parted that can be used 
to discuss solutions and 
actions for problems in 
terms of content and 
method? 
As a result, no soluti-
ons are discussed. 
In this excerpt, no 
competencies are im-
parted to discuss solu-
tions and actions for 
problems both content
-wise and methodical-
ly. 
Subsequently, no solu-
tions are discussed. 
Can courses of action 
be derived from this? 
Options for action are 
not developed. 
Options for action are 
not developed. 
Options for action are 
not developed. 
Controversy    
Are controversies 
portrayed, is a topic 
presented as multi-
layered, and approa-
ched from different per-
spectives? 
No controversies are 
depicted. Topics are 
not presented in a 
multi-layered or multi-
perspective way. 
Multiple life situations 
are used to decide 
whether the described 
person can participate 
in elections or not. 
No controversies are 
depicted. Topics are 
not presented in a 
multi-layered or multi-
perspective way. 
Can criticism be expres-
sed? Are alternatives 
asked for? 
There are no possibili-
ties for criticism. 
There are no possibili-
ties for criticism. 
There are no possibili-
ties for criticism. 
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Analysis questions of 
the respective didac-
tic  principle 
Evaluation Excerpt 1 Evaluation Excerpt 2 Evaluation Excerpt 3 
Does controversy in 
the sense of complexi-
ty and multi-
perspectivity also 
emerge in the presen-
tation of an educatio-
nal setting? 
Different persons and 
things are depicted 
that are not contro-
versial. Their adequacy 
is questionable. 
Although different pe-
ople with and without 
migration history are 
depicted, controversy 
does not play a role. 
Uncontroversially, 
different parties are 
represented. Apart 
from the party logos 
and lettering, there are 
no pictures. 
Research orientation    
Are topics aligned with 
scientific findings? 
The topic is based on 
scientific findings. Only 
the answer to d) is 
questionable. No gene-
ral statement can be 
made that all people 
without German citi-
zenship are excluded 
from elections. For 
example, people who 
have migrated to Ger-
many from the EU may 
take part in local elec-
The topic is based on 
scientific findings. 
The presentation of 
the topic is correct. 
However, the presen-
tation seems incom-
plete and too general. 
Some parties (AfD, 
NPD, FDP) are comple-
tely absent. 
Is the terminology used 
correctly? 
Terminology is used 
correctly. 
Terminology is used 
correctly. 
The used terminology 
should be explained 
more concretely so 
that it is more compre-
hensible for the 
Is it possible to criti-
cally (or scientifically) 
engage with diverse 
perspectives and ori-
entations? 
There is no possibility 
to get to know diverse 
perspectives, and to 
critically engage with 
them. 
The offer does not en-
courage a critical enga-
ging with different per-
spectives and orientati-
ons. 
There is no possibility 
to critically engage 
with different perspec-
tives and orientations 
of the parties. 
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Analysis questions of 
the respective didac-
tic principle 
Evaluation Excerpt 1 Evaluation Excerpt 2 Evaluation Excerpt 3 
Exemplary learning    
Are complex problems 
explained with  
illustrative examples? 
On the basis of indivi-
dual examples and 
excerpts, knowledge 
about democracy and 
politics is conveyed. No 
examples are given 
that would illustrate 
structures, key catego-
ries, or rules. 
Yes. Individuals who 
are cited as examples 
of illustratory partici-
pation in elections are 
used to provide infor-
mation on participati-
on in elections, which 
will allow structures 
and rules to be identifi-
ed in this regard. 
Individual excerpts 
from the text are used 
as a basis. Knowledge 
about the parties is 
conveyed. No examp-
les are cited, which are 
illustrative problems or 
key categories. 
Is it possible to compare 
and, if necessary, cor-
rect one’s own assump-
tions? 
Hardly. The scenarios 
a) to n) offer at most 
the implicit possibility 
to get to know norma-
tive assumptions of 
the authors. E.g.: Stick 
to the constitution!  
You may criticize the 
government! There is 
compulsory schooling 
for children! However, 
there can be no questi-
on of a comparison. 
Possibilities for a com-
parison of ideas and 
knowledge are implicit-
ly conveyed only by the 
task itself. Explicitly, 
however, participants 
are not asked to ex-
plain their assumpti-
ons about participation 
in (municipal) elec-
tions. 
By asking about previ-
ous knowledge and 
experiences with these 
parties, there are pos-
sibilities for exchan-
ging and comparing 
knowledge. 
Are problem situa-
tions, conflicts, and 
persons chosen that 
are oriented towards 
the participants’ life 
worlds? 
It is possible that some 
situations are sugges-
ted that have potential 
for conflict, and are 
oriented towards the 
participants’ life wor-
lds. However, this is 
not explicitly made 
clear. 
Problem situations and 
persons are chosen 
that are oriented to-
wards the participants’ 
life worlds. However, it 
is important to empha-
size this reference mo-
re clearly in the exer-
cise. 
No problem situations 
or persons are chosen 
who would orient to-
wards the participants’ 
life worlds. 
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Analysis questions of 
the respective didac-
tic principle 
Evaluation Excerpt 1 Evaluation Excerpt 2 Evaluation Excerpt 3 
Action orientation    
Are there possibilities 
for (trial) action? 
There are no possibili-
ties for (trial) action. 
In this exercise, there 
are no possibilities for 
(trial) action. However, 
in the ensuing tasks of 
the lesson, possibilities 
for social participation 
are discussed. 
There are no possibili-
ties for (trial) action. 
To what extent do re-
flection, analyses, evalu-
ations, alternative views, 
possibilities of distan-
cing play a role in the 
course? 
Reflection, analysis, 
evaluation, alternative 
views, distance possi-
bilities do not play a 
role in the learning 
offer. 
Reflection, analysis, 
evaluation, alternative 
views, distance possi-
bilities do not play a 
role in the learning 
offer. 
Reflection, analysis, 
evaluation, alternative 
views, distance possi-
bilities do not play a 
role in the learning 
offer. 
Do self-guidance and 
agency play a role in the 
offer? 
Self-guidance and 
agency with regard to 
the content of this 
exercise are not rele-
vant. 
Self-guidance and 
agency with regard to 
the content of this 
exercise are not rele-
vant. 
Self-guidance and 
agency with regard to 
the content of this 
exercise are not rele-
vant. 
6. Conclusion 
6.1 Criticism of the orientation course materials 
The three excerpts show that the individual learning opportunities in Figures 1 to 3 essentially 
represent a single didactic principle: Research orientation.8 In addition, a maximum of two fur-
ther principles is mentioned in each of the three exercises. However, these are not fully consid-
ered or implemented. In Figures 1, 2, and 3, for example, a link is made proportionally to exem-
plary learning. Moreover, Fig. 2 is more strongly oriented towards the participants’ everyday life, 
and thus tends to offer higher subject orientation. In figures 1 and 3, there is a lack primarily of 
this subject-relatedness, and thus of a minimum of individual visibilisation of the learners. Poten-
tial interests of the addressees of political education are not sufficiently assessed and addressed. 
If the principle of subject orientation were to receive more attention in the course as a whole, a 
stronger identification with the topic could possibly be achieved, and, in turn, its greater useful-
ness for the individual underlined. After all, this usefulness is a central prerequisite for the suc-
cessful transfer of knowledge and competences in teaching-learning settings (cf. Autorengruppe 
Fachdidaktik 2015: 125). 
Of course, generalizable or universally valid assessments cannot be automatically derived for an 
entire textbook or all its modules and lessons on the basis of the three exemplary exercises (Figs. 
1 to 3). However, they all strongly emphasise research orientation and knowledge transfer. In the 
comprehensive and in-depth study of the dissertation project already mentioned, it was found 
that similar mechanisms occur manifold, particularly in the three textbooks Zur Orientierung,  
Orientierungskurs, and 100 Stunden Deutschland. The analysis of further pages and of various tasks of 
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these materials points to a lack of variety and consideration of didactic principles beyond re-
search orientation and knowledge transfer. For example, specialist knowledge is not placed in a 
broader context for (or with) participants, and, therefore, does not seem suitable for this pur-
pose. In this sense, terminology remains uncommented, and is not directly linked to (current) 
events, problems, or conflict situations that may affect the everyday lives of migrants. If participa-
tion also means the chance to realize socially customary ways of life, and to bring  own 
needs and interests into society, wide-ranging and multi-perspective knowledge of those ways of 
life and practices should definitely be of greater importance in the teaching materials. So far, it 
seems that political or socially relevant topics mostly remain on an abstract level. How repetitive 
and politically narrowly defined specialist knowledge is taught becomes particularly visible in the 
catalogue of questions of the test Leben in Deutschland, which resembles the theroretical driving 
exam (cf. Fig. 4).9 In addition, many of the questions in this test use a rather specific terminology 
that most probably is not adequate for the participants’ language level (generally, medium every-
day language level B1) (Niedermüller 2013). Figure 4 only exemplarily illustrates this criticism, but 
from an inclusive political education perspective, it should be noted that, if there is to be a test at 
all, it should be more accessible linguistically without such specific terminology. 
In the orientation course textbooks Zur Orientierung, Orientierungskurs, and 100 Stunden 
Deutschland, as well as in the final test, the principle of action orientation is furthermore clearly un-
derrepresented. Thus, participation formats are only insufficiently taken up and explained (cf. 
also Kaden 2012: 63). Further, actions are not practised on a trial basis. Nor are any alternative 
courses of action for required behaviour pointed out or made available. Moreover, existing barri-
ers to participation are not sufficiently addressed and discussed. In this sense, interests, wishes, 
attitudes, opinions, and experiences play too little a role, especially in the textbooks mentioned 
above. Self-guidance and agency with regard to the content mentioned in Figures 1 to 3 are not 
relevant. The textbooks also give too little room for individual situated action. Reflections, anal-
yses, evaluations, alternative views, or possibilities of distancing are still not addressed sufficient-
ly. If (inclusive) political education particularly aims to enable people to participate more in socie-
ty, then this is one of the most significant shortcomings of orientation materials. Above all, the 
citizenship or orientation course test, as it is currently designed, can hardly be perceived as help-
ful when it comes to exerting (future) influence on society, helping to shape it, and improving 
one’s own situation. 
 
6.2 Reference to taboos and transgressive actions 
In the analyses of the sample material excerpts, a lack of subject orientation became visible, 
which goes hand in hand with a tabooing of interests, knowledge, experiences, attitudes, and 
opinions of the subjects. The worlds of experience of the addressees remain invisible. Thus, it is 
unclear whether the facts conveyed are at all useful for the learner  life worlds. Because this is 
the case, many of the topics taught in orientation course textbooks seem to serve only a systemic 
purpose of legitimation. This can mean that the learners do not even want to participate in the 
new society because they do not feel taken seriously as subjects. 
Furthermore, it was found that a controversial debate on socially relevant topics or knowledge 
does not take place to a sufficient extent. Thus, certain ways of life and behaviour are presented 
as self-evident for Germany. It seems to be taboo both in the textbooks and in the orientation 
course test to mention that, due to the pluralism prevailing in Germany, there is no particular 
form of behaviour and life practice, but that, rather, diversity and controversy are part of demo-
cratic co-existence just as the ability to endure differences.  
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A lack of action orientation contributes to the fact that people are not sufficiently prepared to 
participate in society and to help shape it. This principle reoccurs in the materials, as can be seen 
in Figure 2 and the current topic “Participation in elections” in local, state, and federal govern-
ment, but the explicit description of barriers to participation is usually taboo. Figure 2, for exam-
ple, does not make it clear that the practices of can, want to, and may vote are to be distin-
guished from each other. The fact that migrants from third countries are not allowed to vote at 
any level in Germany as long as they do not possess German citizenship may be a sensitive – be-
cause exclusionary – issue for migrants from other EU countries. Then, the fact that German citi-
zenship can only be applied for after eight years of residence in Germany may be frustrating for 
those who have lived in Germany for many years and pay taxes here, but are not allowed to vote. 
Instead, they experience exclusion and heteronomy. Consequently, existing obstacles to partici-
pation should not be made taboo, but debated with the migrants in a safe space (teaching-
learning setting). The orientation course and its materials could provide a wonderful opportunity 
to do so, and contribute to making clear that a broad spectrum of participatory formats for mi-
grants does exist. Finally, migrants should be prepared and invited to participate in the discourse 
on social rules, and on the shaping of coexistence in Germany. 
Summarising, from a political education perspective and drawing on the didactic principles, it is 
recommended that the orientation courses and their teaching materials should become even 
more strongly oriented towards courses of action for the sake of participation orientation. In or-
der for migrants to be able to have well-founded judgment and to be able to make a conscious 
and sound decision for or against participation, socially relevant problems, questions, and situa-
tions should be examined multiperspectively, highlighting current controversies. In order to suc-
cessfully consider diversity and heterogeneity in learning settings, experiences, knowledge, atti-
tudes, and needs of participants should be included. For example, a biographical and experience-
based concept is advisable so that dialogues can be established in simple language via individual 
experiences. In addition to simpler language, different approaches should be made available for 
engaging with course topics. Tasks should be included that allow for an expression of criticism of 
existing conditions while observing communicative and democratic rules. In terms of political ed-
ucation, it is particularly important that topics that could be important for the participants’ every-
day lives are not tabooed and circumvented. This requires task formats that make this possible. 
On that note, democracy should be experienced also in the orientation course itself.  
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Notes 
1 I would like to thank Melinda Hägi-Mead, who translated this article written originally in Ger-
man, and Mi-Cha Flubacher, who dedicated herself to its perfection.  
2 The need for the Beutelsbacher Consensus resulted originally from the conflict over the student 
movement at the end of the 1960s, which also turned political education into a battlefield (cf. 
Besand 2018: 28). In 1976, an expert discussion among education specialists in Beutelsbach ini-
tially contributed to the ending of any (danger of) polarisation within the political education in the 
1990s, i.e. the so-called Beutelsbacher Consensus.  
3 The doctoral thesis Politische Bildung als Einbürgerungsangebot was developed in cooperation 
between the Centre for Integration Studies and the Chair of Didactics of Political Education of the 
TU Dresden. Further information at: https://tu-dresden.de/gsw/der-bereich/profil/zentren/zfi/
organisation/nachwuchsforschungsgruppe (22.03.2019).  
4 Meanwhile, new editions of the course materials examined here have already been published, 
with minimum changes. The results of this analysis are thus still relevant.  
5 The test can also be taken without participation in the orientation course. Especially migrants 
without a German school degree, but with the wish to become German citizens are meant to take 
the test. The need to participate in an integration course thereby depends on the social status 
and the person’s migration background.  
6 This essay focuses on those course materials released by publishers with a long tradition in the 
teaching of German as a foreign and as a second language. For the approach of miteinander  
Leben (Feil/Hesse 2017), cf. Hägi-Mead, this volume. 
7 It is possible to download the complete questionnaire, e.g., at http://www.i-punkt-projekt.de/
fileadmin/i-punkt/pdf/Test_Gesamtfragenkatalog_BAMF.pdf (09.05.2019). Called Leben in 
Deutschland, the questionnaire serves also as additional material to miteinander Leben. All questions 
are attached as flash cards.  
8 Regarding Figure 3, in the vein of successful research orientation, all current parties that play a 
role in Germany and represent a range of opinions should be portrayed. E.g., the existence of 
new or smaller, as well as radical parties should not be denied or rather tabooed because parties 
such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands (NPD) could be especially important for migrants, as they do not represent their ideas, but 
want them to return to their home countries.  
9 Moreover, the list of test questions shows an imbalance between the number of lessons in the 
individual modules and the number of possible test questions. While 89 questions (around 30%) 
refer to 20 lessons, only 6,5% of the questions refer to 38 lessons on People and Society, whereas 
64% of the questions refer to 35 lessons on Politics and Democracy (cf. Hägi-Mead, this volume). 
With regard to the orientation course test, it is thus criticised that the requirements obviously pri-
marily concern (measurable) knowledge about structures and institutions. Relevant topics for de-
mocracy are tabooed, while there is no action orientation for a variety of topics on power, soci-
ety, life, as well as everyday life.  
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Abstract 
Contemporary structural racism, which has its origins in modernity, is a main problem of our so-
ciety, being often revealed through the ubiquitous anti-immigrant, sexist, homophobic and xeno-
phobic discourses, disseminated throughout social networks. These discourses and mindsets 
have been exacerbated by the influence of recent severe economic, social and political situations 
and its emerging new patterns of inequalities. In this process, online spaces have become a glob-
al platform for social and moral disengagement and harmful behaviours against the ‘other‘ , while 
digital channels have become the new outlets for the radicalisation of prejudice and hate, boost-
ed by emerging expressions of racism throughout Europe. Whilst violent communication is not 
an invention of the Internet, it is indeed a vehicle through which these destructive discourses and 
modern forms of racism are easily and globally spread.  As the most prolific users of digital tools, 
young people are at the heart of this social problem, as bystanders, perpetrators, and victims of 
online hate speech and it is by exploring how these young users live this reality, the way they ex-
perience it, perceive and denounce it, that the social impact of hate speech and emerging online 
and offline racism can be revealed. Grounded on the results of an ethnographic work, this paper 
argues the expressions of hate speech online are not isolated practices but manifestations of be-
haviours that materialise in the offline reality and vice versa. As the connection between online 
and offline realities is indissoluble, online hate speech fostered by modern racism has become an 
aggravated mirror of the current social and cultural climate. These platforms have become the 
ultimate means to spread, reproduce and legitimate racist messages and meta-messages about 
the ‘other‘ , causing dramatic suffering and damage both to individuals and to society as a whole. 
 
1. Introduction: online experiences and social context of hate speech  
Whilst the Internet is a communicative space that can have positive impacts and influences and 
has created a multitude of new opportunities for communication and information, it has also 
brought many new challenges, revolutionising different forms of social interaction, particularly 
for young people as the greatest users of digital tools. In this period of transformations, the diffi-
cult current economic, social and political situation has created the need for an outlet for the ten-
sions and increased polarisation between the various social groups and individuals in cyber-
space, often manifested in expressions of hatred based on growing levels of racism throughout 
Europe. Every type of information and discourse circulates in different forms in cyberspace – 
from imagery and symbolism to events and advertisements, alongside behaviours, ideologies 
and campaigns, many of which are purposely designed to defame individuals or groups. Through 
the analysis of different channels of virtual communication, the rise of violence and hate speech 
in online social networks in recent decades becomes evident, and particularly the rise of those 
voices that make use of racism and prejudice to intentionally offend and incite violence in social 
networks.  
Due to the magnitude of digital social problematics, research and studies related to expressions 
of hate speech on the Internet have tended to be approached from a quantitative lens, adopting 
a macro or virtual perspective, often overlooking the individuals that are on the other side of the 
screens. Also, the limited research on online hate speech in recent years has tended to address 
content, dissemination and prosecution from a legal perspective (cf. Glaser/Dixit/Green 2002; 
Waldron 2012; Foxman 2013) or in specific groups that pay particular attention to the case of  
Islamophobia in the most recent academic debates and normative political discourses (cf., e.g., 
Ekman 2015; Awan 2014). There is thus a significant gap in terms of research that addresses the 
phenomenon in relation to social networks and the Internet with a qualitative and ethnographic 
approach to expose the correlation between the experiences of young users and hate material 
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on the Internet. In other words, an approach that takes into account the motivations, actions and 
interactions of those that produce the speeches as well as the impact on those who are affected 
by them. It is crucial to know more about the principles, norms and social and cultural patterns 
that underlie the motivations of the reactions of Internet users to the content of hate in social 
networks. 
With digital technology, new challenges have emerged for the ethnographic study of cyberspace 
in terms of how practices, subjectivities and relationships are constructed in digital communica-
tion (cf. Marcus 1995). In this paper, we argue and demonstrate that research on hate speech 
must take into account the experience of the people, the way they experience it, perceive and 
denounce it. Also, we argue and show how speech online is clearly correlated with offline life. 
Whilst online written language is not neutral, nor are acts of hatred of isolated individuals, but 
rather expressions based on socially constructed valuations and perceptions on the categories of 
class, gender, origin, sexuality, racialized identities and religion. Thus, in order to offer a critical 
view of hate speech and its specific forms of discrimination, we must be able to articulate the vir-
tual reality and the offline.  
In order to do so, the paper is structured in two main parts along critical debates on hate speech. 
The first part deals with the phenomenon of hate speech in networks, from an analysis of racism 
as a structure that classifies people into categories (of sexual orientation, gender, class, origin, 
religion). This is questioning the process that rests on the axis of domination superiority and infe-
riority, of certain people, or groups, to the detriment of other people or groups. The significance 
of such social order is what cybernauts (i.e. expert users of the Internet) will eventually reproduce 
in the online space in the form of offensive language. Adopting an anthropological approach, it is 
argued that the construction of a violent and racist language is found in the classification system, 
which circulates unreservedly inside and outside the network. In this sense, the ethnographic da-
ta shows how the expressions of hate speech online are not isolated practices but manifestations 
of behaviours of users that materialize in the offline reality and vice versa. On these grounds, the 
paper argues that hate speech is not and must not be treated as individual acts, but as practices 
justified and rooted in a social hegemonic order establishing hierarchies of racialized identities, 
class, gender, origin, and sexuality. The connection between online and offline realities is indissol-
uble as hate speech relies on the way young people have grown up through a pedagogy of hier-
archies and an institutionalized form of violence. The signs and signifiers of this social order are 
eventually reproduced by netizens, as popular Internet users are commonly known, in the form 
of racism, intolerance, ethnocentricity, nationalism, discrimination and hostility towards minori-
ties and racialized groups. 
The second part of the paper discusses the analysis of the empirical findings obtained from the 
recent ethnographic study “Preventing, Redressing and Inhibiting Hate Speech in New Me-
dia” (PRISM, 2014–2016). This was a two years research involving 11 institutions located in 5 Euro-
pean countries (Italy, France, Spain, Romania and the United Kingdom, hence: UK) including re-
search institutions, civil society organisations, and an Equality Body. The aim was to explore the 
experiences of those who have been subjected to or had witnessed hate speech, looking at how 
they act, interact, and react to the experiences of racism and other forms of violence in social 
networks. The empirical data was gathered mainly from 148 in-depth interviews, of which 32 
were with lawyers, prosecutors, NGO representatives, journalists, academics and social network 
provides, and 116 with young people between 14 and 30 years old; it is the interviews with the 
young people that this contribution draws on, translated to English. Besides socio-economic, gen-
der and age representations are taken into account, the sample was selected to reflect young-
sters‘  different experiences with hate speech: While one third of young people were direct vic-
tims of hate speech, because of their origin, gender, class, sexual orientation, or religion, we will 
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focus on experiences of racist hate speech in the context of this contribution. The second third 
were young people who were part of the main ‘target groups‘  of hate speech and had experi-
enced indirect hate speech, whilst the remainder of respondents fall into the group of 
‘bystanders‘ , who had not been direct victims nor did they form part of the groups most affected 
by hate speech, but they were regular Internet users. The results demonstrate that to under-
stand hate speech we must integrate the experience of the people who have lived it in order to 
contribute critically to current debates. 
 
2. Conceptual and methodological approaches to hate speech  
2.1 Digital communication and main debates of hate speech 
The term ‘hate speech‘  is widely used in different fields and disciplines, yet its broad application 
and diversity of interpretations depends largely on the contexts of place and time. In legal terms, 
and according to the intense debate of the last decade (cf. Waldon 2012), the definition refers to 
any communication that focuses on an expression of hatred against a group of people on 
grounds of their origin, religion or sexual orientation, seeking to demean, intimidate or incite vio-
lence on grounds primarily based on racism, sexism or homophobia. This social phenomenon 
has increased exponentially, leading academia, international organisations, NGOs and monitor-
ing agencies to pay greater attention to the impacts of hate speech.  
In digital societies, social online networks have developed a capacity to influence key sections of 
the population, particularly the young. Statistically, young people (under 30) use technology more 
intensely than other age groups. In the European Union nine out of ten young people between 16 
and 19 use the Internet daily and 74% of people between 16 and 29 use their mobile phones to 
connect to their social networks (cf. Eurostat 2015). In contemporary society, digital communica-
tion increasingly supplements face-to-face relationships. Whether this is mainly due to the lack  
of time, comfort or shyness, young people prefer to interact over the internet, with social  
networks and communication tools such as WhatsApp as their main avenues for dialogue  
and communication.  
Through digital communication, young people pass on stories, share information, photos, videos, 
articles, and ideas that they express through writing and the creation of different languages and 
emojis alongside other multimedia signs and symbols, which replace the missing corporeality of 
oral conversation (cf. Rubio/Perlado 2015). Through the screen, people often feel more at ease 
expressing themselves, without the need to filter their responses or to feel responsible for their 
actions. This is a negative aspect of communication mediated by technology. Netizens are more 
likely to verbalise ideas that in other situations they would refrain from voicing for fear of being 
punished or criticised (cf. Jubany/Roiha 2017; Miro 2016; Carrillo 2015). In this sense, social net-
works are governed by choices made by users about who is seen and listened to. Yet, the limits 
of what is socially accepted have become so blurred that any comment can generate controversy, 
especially as users can attack, humiliate, disparage, discredit and antagonise persons and groups 
that do not share their ideologies or characteristics. The Internet can appear to be a battlefield 
without rules, where apparent impunity creates a medium through which violent communication, 
anger, hatred and transgressions can easily spread.  
Violent communication is not an invention of the Internet, but it is a vehicle through which this 
discourse is easily, and globally, spread. For this reason, messages and expressions of intoler-
ance, aggression, and hate are significant features of social networks as users take advantage of 
the perceived anonymity of cyberspace. However, we can also find people who practice hatred in 
networks using their real name, justified by the defence of national, cultural or religious identi-
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ties. In any case, the majority of perpetrators present their aggressions as a form of online 
‘activism‘ , made possible through the depersonalisation and anonymity produced by the web (cf. 
Jubany/Roiha 2017).  
 
2.2 Current hate speech debate trends 
Whilst historically it is the legal perspective that has been concerned with hate speech in terms of 
addressing offensive, harmful, hateful or incitement to violence (cf. Miró 2016), today it is a topic 
of interest to all social sciences. In several academic disciplines, extensive debates are taking 
place on the violence unleashed in social networks, mainly due to the amplifying effect that the 
Internet has, the seriousness and the consequences for offline reality. Furthermore, social net-
works can have the effect of amplifying the gravity and impacts caused in these interactions as 
they grow. Extensive debates have addressed the uncontrolled violence that these spaces exert 
on society (cf. Oksanen 2014).  
We can distinguish two major trends in hate speech studies. The first current trend focuses on 
the psychological effects and the direct and indirect damage caused to those affected by hate 
speech. These studies take into account the detrimental effects on the individual and group 
caused by the dissemination of hate speech. They maintain that the damage caused to victims 
and target groups tends to be long lasting and are cumulatively experienced (cf. Gelber/
McNamara 2015). In this sense, the distinction between the constitutive and consequential dam-
ages is of interest, that is, between the damage that occurs directly and immediately (in our case, 
what is written) and the damage that arises from these (or the consequences) including effects 
such as the silencing of hate speech objectives, and personal injuries, such as psychological 
suffering. The organisations that work with victims emphasise that the subjective consequences 
for victims of hate speech are felt by those who are subjected to it, their relatives, and friends 
and in terms of collective identity, alongside wider societal impacts (cf. Ibarra 2016). Furthermore, 
the effect that hate speech can generate in the environment is to normalize racist expressions, 
negative stereotypes or discriminatory practices.  
Another major trend adopted from a legal perspective focuses on rights and freedoms with a 
particular interest on the social impacts that violence can have within in the European countries. 
Studies like that of Glaser/Dixit/Green (2002), Henry (2009), Waldon (2012), Foxman/Wolf (2013) 
explore the content and dissemination of hate speech to show the relationship between prohibi-
tion-to-prosecution alongside legal restrictions and regulations. In this regard, Gelber/McNamara 
(2015) warn us of the indirect effects, including how hate speech maintains unequal relations of 
power, and its effects on the dignity of victims.  
In order to move away from dualistic accounts and focus on the contexts that give rise to online 
hate speech, we must build a multi-dimensional analytical framework to help us understand the 
motivations that incite violence. In this, we should also incorporate an intersectional perspective, 
to argue that racial construction stratifies societies and legitimizes the exercise of power in terms 
of privileges and exclusions (cf. Crenshaw 1989). The intersectional approach is particularly re-
vealing when it comes to exposing how axes of differentiation interact in the Internet. Thus, we 
understand that violence in digital communication is part of the reproduction of social systems of 
oppression: racism, patriarchy, class, ethnocentrism, and the idea that Western society is more 
developed and superior to all others. However, we also share with the perspective 
the assumption that these global hierarchies have their origin in the modern world system, a pe-
riod in which Europe stands as the ‘centre‘  of the capitalist world and other cultures as its periph-
ery (cf. Quijano 2000).  
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To address hate speech through the intersection with oppressive systems is to explore the  
ways web users internalise and reproduce a set of values and interpretations that perpetuate 
inequality.  
 
3. Hate speech: the construction of social order and the standardisation of differences 
People and groups targeted by aggressions, insults, jokes, mockery, negative commentary and 
verbal attacks online tend to be those identified with factors outside of the norm enforced by the 
homogenous group. These factors relate to unchangeable personal characteristics, such as ra-
cialized identities, which are central to an individuals‘  identity and permanent in time (cf. Ibarra 
2016). These characteristics define an individual‘s status as a member of a minority and can re-
late to the persons ritualised identity, gender, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, body, religion, 
and political affiliation.  
Discrimination along these lines is not arbitrary, but based on the reproduction of a form of 
knowledge through which the world is classified and organised (cf. Quijano 2000). This is a classi-
fication of the world as a supposedly rational and logical hierarchy of racial, religious and gender-
based oppression that emerged through modernity (cf. Espinoza 2014). Yet, these are still pre-
sent as they are internalized in people, and emerge on a daily basis through a set of values and 
interpretations that perpetuate differences. These categories function as labels through which 
people are observed and understood, consequently conditioning the way they are treated, ex-
cluded, rejected and discriminated against as inferior. It is a process grounded in the multi-
layered and intersectional processes of dominance and subordination that determines ‘us‘  ver-
sus ‘them‘ , in which the construction and denial of the ‘other‘  emerges as the ultimate expres-
sion of social control (cf. Jubany 2017b). This humiliates and excludes those who look, think or act 
differently (cf. Ibarra 2016) and leads to a behaviour learned and reproduced as social patterns 
and norms. Thus, web users who send hateful messages are doing nothing more than reproduc-
ing a particular vision of a social order, especially in instances of transgression (cf. also Haynes/
Schweppe, this volume). 
To understand and address such patterns, we must refer to their origins in modernity and mod-
ern capitalism. As de-colonial feminism debates have shown (cf. Mohanty 2003), ethno-racial, 
class and gendered oppression are born within Western modernity, and, in focusing on racism, 
we find their distinctive signs of identification and differentiation in life-style politics and practices 
of consumption, racist and prejudiced acts and behaviours. These are categories and factors that 
emerged in the period designed to mark inequality, to dehumanise and to legitimise hierarchies 
of power between people. As the age of colonisation began, stereotypes were developed that 
determined the limits of socially acceptable ‘otherness‘ . With this, racial fictions were created 
that rationalised and intellectualised the classification of the colonial population as inferior and 
inserted them into a hierarchical system of control (cf. Galceran 2016). These hierarchies drew 
lines of inferiority and superiority, which delineated how subjects would be treated and, ultimate-
ly, their perceived value and place in society. At the time, racialized identities were the key signifi-
er for the oppressors along which inequalities were marked out. Racial discourse justified the 
domination, exploitation and cultural extermination exercised by Western colonial powers. Fol-
lowing racial criteria, men were constructed as human-Europeans and non-human non-
Europeans, while women were reimagined also along a particular sex-gendered axis (cf. Garzón 
2014; Mecheril/van der Haagen-Wulff, this volume). The inferiority of non-white men and the sub-
ordination of women not only implies that racialized identities are inseparable from class and sex
-gender, but affirms the relative value and supremacy of one culture over others (cf. Chirix 2014).  
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While on the whole, racist attitudes are no longer ‘politically accepted‘  in Western societies, stere-
otypes persist and emerge in diverse ways on a daily basis (cf. Jubany 2018). These are expressed 
as fears of the other (cf. Cohen 2002); in the sexualisation and exoticised images of women (cf. 
Solomos/Collins 2010); through exploitative labour practices targeting those with or without resi-
dency papers; through the humiliation of the poor; when ethnic minorities are seen as inferior 
and through ideological intolerance and violence against sexual, ethnic, or religious diversity, 
amongst many other forms. Both in the online reality and in the virtual, scorn towards the person 
or inferior group appears in the form of gestures, sarcasm, jokes or ridicule.  
One of the distinctive features about hate crimes is that the victims are chosen because of their 
ascribed identities, so that intimidation and attacks are aimed at the wider community as well as 
the individuals. When an individual is attacked, this is an attack on other members of that com-
munity because neither the victim nor the community can, or want to, change aspects, which 
characterise them. Hate, then, implies a symbolic act not just against one person but also against 
all who share those characteristics. People and groups exposed to discrimination, violence, and 
hostility are mainly immigrants, homeless, homosexuals, Muslims, Jews, and gypsies (cf. Cabe/
Garcia 2016). From a racist subjectivity, these groups embody the negative characteristics, which 
are seen as contrary to the values of the dominant group. Dehumanization allows the person, or 
collective, to be inferiorised, attacked, excluded, discriminated against, and even killed because it 
represents the condition under which the right to kill is exercised (cf. Chrix 2014) 
While traditional forms of racism resulted from and are constitutive of colonialism, emerging 
forms of racism are linked to a crisis of modernity. Most specifically, this relates to a political and 
economic system, which fosters and consolidates a climate of racism, intolerance, xenophobia, 
and Islamophobia. The political and electoral uses of racism in bestowing political legitimacy on a 
language of fear and exclusion is used to designate those who are seen as others and, as Galo 
(2014) and Wodak (2015) argue, these consolidate or create political power. In the case of Europe, 
the defence of so-called ‘national identities‘  is mainly focused on those of immigrant origin and 
on members of the Muslim community (cf. Carrillo 2015; Miró 2016). Both these communities are 
seen to challenge the established narratives of national identity and are thus seen as a threat to 
the dominant cultures. These discourses have subjective consequences, transmitting the mes-
sage that migrants are unwelcome invaders of a homogenous space. In the face of social and la-
bour exclusion, the local population may become more disposed to affirming their ‘national iden-
tity‘ . The discourses produced during economic crises pass through the social network where 
they influence interactions and attacks against migrants. The apparent ‘threat‘  becomes the axis 
through which the non-recognition of the other and the denial of their rights is justified. Hate 
spreads online on the grounds that the ‘other‘  is made responsible for any misfortune or per-
ceived loss of privilege, which must be defended (cf. Lázaro 2014).  
The fear of the European middle classes, which feel threatened by the breakdown of the welfare 
state, is capitalized by governments to point to the ‘other‘  non-national, non-citizen, non-person, 
as being responsible for the social and economic crisis. Although the enemy is built, the fear of 
ethnic minorities is real. This is the fear of the cultural impact of foreigners: a culture of scape-
goats, of essentialism, of divide and conquer, directed towards the ‘other‘ . These are perspec-
tives that can, and have in the past, lead society in Europe to the brink of collapse (cf. Jubany 
2017). Discourses directed towards specific ‘minorities‘  or people are justified either by the de-
fence of national, ethnic, religious identity; or in relation to the assumed identities of groups 
through LGBT-phobia and other forms of sex-gendered prejudice (cf. Galo 2014). In any case, a 
hierarchical and political interpretation that does not recognise the other as an equal, and thus 
seeks to deny them their rights.  
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As a heterogeneous Europe continues to develop, cultural differences become a springboard for 
a more dynamic and fluid society, yet racism, homophobia and other forms of discrimination and 
hate are growing and finding new impact platforms. Amongst these, hate speech has become the 
ultimate means to spread, reproduce and legitimate destructive messages and meta-messages 
about the ‘other‘ . The suffering and damage that these discourses cause, both to individuals and 
to the whole society, is dramatic, as will be exposed in the subsequent sections. 
 
4. Between online and offline reality  
For young people offline and online worlds are interconnected and form part of their everyday 
relationships, although they interpret the boundaries and interrelatedness of the two worlds in 
different ways. On the one hand, they perceive social networks as an extension of their everyday 
life, where online and offline worlds are a continuum and both contexts are assumed to behave 
in the same way. They use the Internet to interact with people they know or are familiar with, 
outside of the web. Whilst not all participants of the ethnography experienced hate speech 
online, all of them had been witnesses to it. This increases the normalisation of the phenomenon 
as for young people, social networks are seen as a tool to communicate with friends (cf. Boyd 
2014), to browse and follow pages reflecting their values and interests, as one participant ex-
plains: 
Firstly, I use it to entertain myself and secondly to socialise, to see what others are publishing, send 
messages to friends to see what‘s happening in their lives. (English, 23, United Kingdom, UK-YP8) 
On the other hand, and simultaneously, most young people create online “characters”, which al-
low them to act in a completely different way in the digital sphere – often described as an alter 
ego to which they attribute specific characteristics. This virtual self gives users a sense of anonymity 
and they are thus more inclined to express themselves with total freedom online, expressing that 
“[i]t‘s as if there were a wall between me and them, and because of this they feel free to say what 
they want” (Woman, 27, Italy, IT-YP3). Behind a screen, young people perceive that it is easier to 
express one‘s opinions more aggressively than in real life and expressions of hate speech are 
more widely accepted than expressions of hate in face-to-face contexts.  
However, the conceptualisation of hate speech by young people is confused. While there is a 
clear understanding of an over-presence of hate speech in the digital domain, there is also a lack 
of familiarity with the wider discourses about it. The majority of youngsters have never received 
information about hate speech at school or through any other formal channel, nor were they 
able to recall any organised campaigns against hate speech online (cf. for a critical examination 
of civic education in Germany Hägi-Mead, this volume, Rind-Menzel, this volume). Nevertheless, 
they have intuitive ideas about the concept, which they associate with contempt, rejection and 
cyber bullying and most are aware that the concept of hate speech entails a discourse on racism 
linked to harmful behaviour, threats and insults. Another difficulty for the young people to con-
ceptualise hate speech is connected to the different forms hate speech takes depending on the 
specific channels used. On Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, hate speech may be articulated in 
many ways: as part of normal conversation; in comments and likes on news articles and images; 
and in jokes and replies to posts by other users. 
 
4.1 Target groups and bystanders 
Whilst all youngsters interviewed have witnessed or experienced hate speech or racism on the 
social network, users of Facebook, especially those in the UK, had seen messages of hate on  
Virtual Platforms, Real Racism 
88  
 
images and in the titles of news headlines, particularly directed towards Jewish, Muslim and black 
communities and/or individuals. This changes depending on the closer context of the users. For 
instance, in Romania a further target of these attacks are the Roma community, with youngsters 
from Romania accordingly reporting on “comments against gypsies and Roma. There was so 
much hate in those comments” (Woman, 20, Romania, RO-YP27). The perception of what is hate 
speech also depends on the background of the young person. Young people of a migrant origin 
and ethnic minorities tell diverse stories in which they have been subjected to attacks, directly 
related to their migrant identities: 
When he posted, “all this because of the bougnouls1”, and so on. I told him not to mix everything up – 
that Muslim doesn‘t mean terrorist and that not all Muslims are terrorists. He said, “Shut up 
bougnoul, you should burn right now!” (Man, 23, France, FR-YP6) 
When the post of a person in the networks is attacked, it generates different reactions, some of 
which can generate an increase of the attack and in the offensive speech of the people who at-
tack or humiliate. In the previous case, for instance, after the original poster was confronted for 
making racist or Islamophobic comments the perpetrator resorted to personal attacks on other 
users. Thus, when an individual, who has written insulting or derogatory comments about people 
or groups, is confronted, he*she usually reacts aggressively and abusively:  
I recently saw the profile of a girl who said she wanted to meet [new] people, but not Arabs, blacks or 
any foreigners. Only people from her country. When I read it my heart ached and I said to her, “you 
should leave because nobody loves you either” and she responded “go back to your shitty black 
country” (Man, 20, Spain, ES-YP1). 
These types of encounters are very common in online communication. In taking an active stance 
against hate speech, the respondents are seen as targets and they receive further personalised 
abuse. Others do not wish to fall into polarised debates on discourse and violence between those 
who defend themselves and those who attack from an ethnocentric perspective. As a result, us-
ers of social networks often remain passive when confronted with hostile comments to avoid be-
coming targeted themselves.  
The participants in the study are part of a generation that increasingly consumes digital tools and 
communicates through visual messages. Image-centred blogging platforms like Instagram or 
Tumblr are hugely popular and, as such, create a common medium through which hate speech 
spreads. Through images, often in the form of memes2, negative stereotypes based on racism 
and prejudice are shared and spread widely, with images becoming a major articulation of hate 
speech: 
The photo was of a woman on the bus wearing a burka and she had a plastic bag with her…on the 
bag it said, “boom”. But it was a photo in the metro or something like that and the phrase said 
“You‘re dying of fear, right?” (Woman, 23, Spain, YP-11) 
These images are so common that they tend to be normalised and, in turn, discrimination and 
racism are also normalised with the images presented as jokes, sometimes without users consid-
ering that they can be offensive or can lead to further disputes in the comments. Even when im-
ages are not meant to offend, they often lead to racist comments and discussions on social me-
dia influencing individual and collective behaviour (cf. Bajt 2014). Furthermore, these discourses 
and narratives are shared through private messages on WhatsApp, Snapchat and closed groups 
on Facebook beyond the public gaze, contributing to further normalisation of the actions and be-
liefs of the users.  
A further critical element in the spread of hate speech is the context of specific situations, or 
‘triggering events‘ , like terrorist attacks. This can be seen in the follow up to any major attack in 
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Europe. For instance, following the attack on the editorial office of Charlie Hebdo in Paris in 2016, 
young French and Spanish Facebook users in particular described a wave of negative reactions 
and an increase in hate speech against Muslims. This act generated polarized debates on social 
networks and youngsters explained that “Facebook the day after was a fight to the death be-
tween ‘ Je suis Charlie‘  and ‘ Je ne suis Charlie‘ , and it was like Boom!” (Man, 25, Spain, ES-YP13). 
However, at the same time the Internet became flooded by racist and hate speech comments 
related to the same event: 
The same stuff as always, “it‘s always the Arabs”, “it‘s always the Muslims”, “we shouldn‘t let them in”, 
and these banal but horrible phrases. They always hated us but this time you heard it ten times  
louder (Woman, 22, France, FR-YP2). 
While the impacts of these discourses spread into the offline worlds, the voices of those who 
called for limits to be placed on the freedom of speech tended to be ignored. In the case of Char-
lie Hebdo, the collective opposition and rhetoric against the terrorist threat left no space for nu-
anced debate and further contributed to the spread of intolerance, reactive racism and Islam-
ophobia. This was expressed by heads of state and governments all over the world in their sup-
posed defence of freedom of speech (cf. Carrillo 2015). These so-called ‘triggering events‘  are, 
however, more a pretext than an explanation for the expression of hate speech. This is clearly 
seen when they are linked to other happenings that have nothing to do with violence like sport 
and cultural events. The World Cup or beauty contests are often a platform for the spread of hate 
speech on social networks: 
About sports they make comments, racist comments about the players, or the people from the club…
Racism above all though…it was on Instagram, can I say it? They say words like “n****r and paki” a lot 
(Woman, 16, UK, UK-YP14). 
In these contexts, different racialized identities are frequently the target of discriminatory practic-
es and comments that circulate throughout the network. These derogatory slurs are constructed 
on characteristics of identification and aim to dehumanise and humiliate others (cf. Chirix 2014). 
Elevation and denigration are all accomplished through meaningful symbols and communicative 
acts in which saying it is doing it. As MacKinnon  points out, “Segregation cannot happen without 
someone saying ‘get out‘  or ‘you don‘t belong here‘  at some point” and therefore certain words 
are “not seen as saying anything (although they do) but as doing something” (1993: 13). In this 
sense, as Butler argues, the oppressive language of hate speech is not a mere representation of 
an odious idea, as “language acquires its own violent force” and as “the threat begins the perfor-
mance of that which is threaten to perform” (1997: 10). This is emphasised by the fact that social 
networks are composed of connections and links between users and unknown people. A user 
does not necessarily need to be a ‘friend‘  to see the wall of another user where he*she can post 
racist comments, depending on the privacy settings. Although young people are aware that not 
everyone shares these beliefs, they sometimes reflect on their roles in normalising this type of 
communication as they admit to laughing at and sharing racist jokes and memes in private be-
cause “[f]or example, in smaller groups amongst friends there are always racist jokes because we 
are amongst friends. I don‘t know, in some way you become an accomplice of those who laugh  
at inappropriate things. And there are racist, sexist and homophobic comments” (Man, 25, Spain, 
ES-YP13). 
 
4.2 The subjective impact of hate speech 
The research findings show a tendency to normalise racist and homophobic messages that circu-
late on the Internet. This tolerance is often justified because a joke is found to be funny or in  
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defence of free speech. However, this can change when someone is directly offended by a com-
ment or post: 
About my nationality, they said we were coffeemakers, indios, and how could people possibly vote 
for me. They said that we did not have food to eat, that we don‘t have social networks, and that we 
were the worst. (Woman, 23, Spain, ES-YP6) 
This young woman had participated in an online competition to be featured on the façade of a 
shopping centre, where the winner would be chosen based on the amount of likes they received 
on a photo shared on Facebook. The woman, whose family originated from Colombia, became a 
target for abuse after she had asked friends and family members in her network to vote for her. 
This caused other contestants to accuse her of fraud as they said the votes arrived at the last mi-
nute. However, the attacks did not focus on the alleged fraud but began to racialize and insult 
her country of origin, as she explains above. As this case illustrates and has been reinforced by 
many other statements, anybody can accuse an individual or a group of something on the Inter-
net without pretext, illustrating how unverified information can go on to encourage further 
abuse. Also it is clear that messages and opinions voiced online become transcendent and have a 
significant emotional impact on targets:  
I was scared and even had to see a doctor because all the things I was reading online were driving 
me crazy. I didn‘t leave any comments but as I didn‘t reply that hurt me in another way because I 
didn‘t express how I felt. (Woman, 23, Spain, ES-YP-6) 
Naming the emotional impact, caused by the offensive language, represented a challenge for the 
young aspiring model, especially when it is shown in written form. To the girl, processing the at-
tack took a while, which her body registered in the form of physical and emotional damage. 
When young people are unaware of the pain that racism causes, they assume and reproduce the 
imposed discourse. This is especially found in the context of Islamophobia. Many young Muslims 
describe daily encounters of Islamophobia online. The reification of discourse becomes a part of 
everyday life that is accepted. In order to counter these negative stereotypes, some prefer to 
avoid identifying with the target group as this young woman explains: “Today I don‘t want to be, 
or consider myself Muslim or Moroccan…so, frankly when I hear these things I really cannot re-
late to the social group they are addressing” (Woman, 21, Italy, IT-YP8). When confronted with 
aggression, some people become paralysed because, as members of certain collectives, they 
have been conditioned along modernist lines of inferiority/superiority. They, as this woman from 
Italy, accept that racism and prejudices are part of the society they live in and as a response re-
fuse to identify with them. This illustrates how personal experiences of hate speech can lead to 
partial or total renunciation of religious or cultural identity (cf. Gelber/McNamara 2015). Despite 
this, it remains a phenomenon rarely discussed in academic or public debates. 
 
5. Users‘  response to hate speech 
In terms of responses of users confronted with messages of hate speech, the findings displayed 
four main trends: passivity, detachment, reporting, and counter-narratives. The first and most 
common response is passivity. Hate speech is perceived by most users as a normalised aspect of 
digital communication and thus an aspect that just has to be assumed and ‘ ignored‘ . This does 
not mean that users will agree with the content of hate speech, but rather that they tend to re-
frain from intervening in any form because they consider it pointless. This often comes from ex-
periences where young users have previously engaged with comments, which have incited fur-
ther hatred, or where they have reported abuse to system administrators on social networks with 
no results. In addition, as has been pointed out, some users fear the reactions of others and are 
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scared to become actively involved in the conflict as they state that “[s]ometimes I feel annoyed 
because it‘s not fair and I feel I have to say something, but I‘m scared of other peoples‘  reactions 
and how they might see me as a ‘problem person‘” (Man, 17, Romania, RO-YP28). The impact of 
passive outsiders in cybernetic aggressions is more pervasive than in real life, as there may be 
large numbers who observe offensive and hateful content (cf. Macháčková et al. 2015), but re-
frain from intervening or supporting the victim.  
The second most common reaction is for users to detach from hate speech. In digital terms this 
relates to ‘unfriend‘ , block, or unlike groups or pages that share and spread abusive content.  
Although not the most common response, some users believe that to suppress or block is more 
efficient than reporting content to network administrators – which they believe to be useless. 
However, this form of response is not effective in combatting hate speech nor racism as any chal-
lenges to these narratives remain invisible.  
A further, less common response is to use the network‘s reporting mechanisms. While most of 
the participants knew how to report pages, messages or content on Facebook, they stated that 
they did not use these mechanisms as they felt they were useless. All interviewees who had 
made complaints to Facebook coincide that this platform did not take any action, but just in-
formed them that the highlighted content did not violate community standards – a factor seen by 
victims and other users as very disturbing and discouraging. The inaction of the media platform 
encourages users to refrain from making formal complaints and reinforces the normalisation of 
hate speech amongst young people. This includes more politically minded young users who be-
lieve that reporting does not make sense. The offensive language is so normalised within the 
population that not only the young people who have been directly attacked in the network avoid 
making a complaint, but also the witnesses of the attack, who do nothing to stop the hate speech 
or censor the attacker. Several sources indicate that between 60% and 90% of hate crimes, both 
for racism and for sexual discrimination, are not reported; e.g., a report by the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights states that an average of 82% of people from minority groups who 
have been victims of discrimination have not reported the fact (cf. FRA 2009).  
The least common response is to develop counter-narratives contrasting the arguments based 
on hate and intimidation. Those who engage in online debate try to do so with an open mind and 
believe that to listen and gently challenge others is a fruitful way to combat hate speech. Others 
choose to express themselves through liking the comments they agree with, without getting di-
rectly involved. However, the majority of users prefer not to engage in discussions that incite 
hate speech online. A common reason for abstaining is to avoid drawing attention to ‘trolls‘3, 
who comment just to attract attention. In general terms, online discussions are quick to blow up 
and young users prefer to talk face-to-face about offensive posts if they come from someone 
they know, whilst others have given up because they feel it is pointless: “My position is I‘m not 
going to talk to them because we think differently. They position themselves on their side and I‘m 
on the other and there is no real dialogue” (Woman, 30, Spain, ES-YP10). 
Finally, it is significant that no participant had gone to the police to report hate speech online. 
While some youngsters have had the chance to make a complaint, they did not always trust the 
police, or they felt that what they had witnessed was not serious enough to merit making a com-
plaint. While some young people are aware that there are other means to report hate speech, 
such as through NGOs and independent monitors, only one participant in the whole research 
had made a complaint through these mechanisms, but without outcome. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
Whilst the experience of young people with hate speech in social networks is nowadays perva-
sive, as argued and evidenced, the way this discourses are lived and suffered, and the responses 
to these experiences vary enormously. Even when it is a common situation for young people, 
things like remembering the exact phrases of hatred used are more common among target 
groups or direct victims, whereas viewers tend to remember only who was targeted or the con-
text. Groups that, according to the users, receive more attacks usually coincide with the reference 
groups in each country identified as suffering the most from racism. This indicates a certain level 
of awareness and knowledge among young people of the existence of this, yet also a high degree 
of forbearance in front of it by bystanders, reinforcing the premise that hate speech online and 
offline are directly related. 
Still, there is little familiarity with such discourses about the concept and the legal, institutional or 
academic terms with which hate speech is defined. Despite this awareness of racism and its 
widespread rejection, young Internet users tend to perceive hate messages and offensive com-
ments as a standard phenomenon and an inevitable part of the Internet. To confront the chal-
lenge of racism in Europe, we must thus place a more intense focus on the digital world, on the 
one hand, and on rights and freedoms, on the other. In order for these concepts to work howev-
er, we must link virtual realities to the offline world. Furthermore, it is time to take the impact se-
riously that consolidated hegemonic identities have on the diverse experiences of those living in 
societies divided by these social hierarchies. 
Web users appear to be aware of the consequences of online violence, but almost no one takes 
responsibility for confronting or making a complaint about racism or hate speech online. Further-
more, many are disillusioned about taking responsibility, as they believe there is no real interest 
to counter hate speech, as current political conditions rather have contributed to increasing rac-
ism. This phenomenon is worsened by the attitude of the main social networks, which prefer to 
ignore the effects of hate speech on their platforms, especially in political contexts. This lack of 
action is grounded also on a strong normalisation of hate and racism, as much in the real world 
as in the virtual. If young people understand that racism and hate are an inevitable part of the 
Internet, it is because they subjectively reproduce the axis of differentiation informed by the 
modernist categorisations of the social world that are internalised in society. 
The impact of this new face of the expression of racism and hate across Europe is enormous and 
only through analysing the internalisation of a set of dominant values can we understand that, 
while young web users largely reject racism (at least publicly, whilst they still make jokes in pri-
vate), in their virtual practices many of them are paralysed and accept its normalisation. The sig-
nificance of this normalisation is even greater when we take into account that it entails a virtual 
phenomenon of legitimation of racism through prejudices, stigma, dehumanisation and defama-
tion, creating a spiral of silence against hatred. Western societies display high levels of symbolic 
racism, which condition young people to believe it is easier to be accepted and valued if they as-
similate rather than actively and openly embody themselves as the ‘other‘ . 
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Notes 
1 This is a derogatory term used for Arabs in France.  
2 A meme is typically a humoristic image usually accompanied with text, which in some cases may 
portray negative stereotypes.  
3 Online, a ‘troll‘  is someone who intentionally tries to start arguments or upset people online 
either by attacking them, posting offensive material or by taking over message boards by going 
‘off-topic‘ .  
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Abstract 
Hate crime can be understood in multiple ways – in terms of the individual offender‘s psycholo-
gy, in terms of cultural prejudices, in terms of territoriality (cf. Perry 2009). In this chapter, we ex-
amine lived experiences of expressive hate crime (cf. Herek 1992) through the lens of transgres-
sion, to draw out implications for our understanding of targeted violence as street-level imposi-
tion of a hegemonic acceptability, and consequently suitability for inclusion in the body politic. 
Drawing on original interviews and secondary survey data, and influenced by Perry‘s (2001) trea-
tise on hate crime as a site of identity performance, we show that expressive hate crime involves 
the policing of victims‘  perceived transgression of hierarchically defined boundaries, which privi-
lege the offender and their imagined community. Drawing on victim narratives, we evidence that 
hate crime consequently attacks victims‘  sense of belonging, as well as their personal safety and 
security. The in terrorem effect of hate crime (cf. Perry and Alvi 2012) disseminates that message 
of rejection to the wider identity community to which the victim belongs. The hate crime act rein-
forces the privileging of the offenders‘  criteria for inclusion in the body politic. We conclude by 
arguing that the response of the State and wider society to hate crime victimisation is an im-
portant factor in whether the offender‘s evaluation of the targeted identity group as transgres-
sive is accepted or rejected. 
 
1. Introduction 
A hate crime is a criminal offence, which is motivated by, or involves the demonstration of, the 
offender‘s prejudice against or hatred towards the victim based on their personal characteristics, 
or what sociologists would consider aspects of their social identity (cf. OSCE/ODIHR 2009). The 
crimes committed are most commonly assault, harassment, criminal damage, public order 
offences, sexual offences and theft and fraud offences. Victims are most often from racialized, 
ethnic and religious minorities; the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and Intersex 
(LGBTQI) community, and people with disabilities. 
So, while hate speech is about expressing prejudice verbally, textually or graphically, hate crime 
happens when an individual acts out that expression of prejudice on another person (cf. Haynes 
et al. 2015). Offenders enact their prejudice against the victim‘s identity on their property, on 
their personal space and on their bodies. Victims are threatened, caused to fear for their safety, 
and sexually or physically assaulted. 
Those who are subjected to hate crime are victimised twice – first by the criminal act itself and 
secondly by the harm inflicted in the targeting of their identity. That targeting – often also aggres-
sively verbalised to the victim in the course of an assault, or marked on their home or property in 
spray paint – tells the person that the offender‘s actions towards them are informed by their 
identity. Hate crime is understood as a message crime, not just in the moment of the act, but also 
in its aftermath. It serves as a warning – that the victim is marked as a target – by their skin col-
our, by their religious dress, by their disability, by their sexuality, by their gender or its expression 
– and that, as such, they remain at risk (cf. EUFRA 2012). 
The stress associated with that risk helps us to understand why those who have experienced 
hate offences report a wider range of negative psychological impacts, which also last longer, than 
victims of similar offences who were not targeted because of the identity community with which 
they are associated. Victims of hate crime are more likely to report emotional distress, and report 
higher levels of depression, anxiety or panic attacks, fear, feelings of vulnerability and loss of con-
fidence (cf. BCS [British Crime Survey] 2009 onwards). 
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Of over 500 respondents in Wales, who were self-identified victims of hate crime (cf. Williams and 
Tregidga 2013) one in seven reported having had suicidal thoughts as a consequence of their vic-
timisation. 
In addition to its emotional and psychological harms, hate crime also elicits behavioural changes 
in its victims, shaping how they live their lives in very consequential ways. Victims report avoiding 
places they have previously frequented; restricting their use of, and their transit through, public 
space; avoiding public transport; seeing friends less often; retreating from local community life; 
and even attempting to conceal the identity for which they were targeted (cf. Williams/Tregidga 
2013; Walters and Patterson 2015).  
It is not just the direct victim who is affected however; each crime creates waves of victims: begin-
ning with the person or family directly attacked and extending out to the community, which 
shares the characteristic for which they were targeted. That community is effectively placed on 
notice that they too are at risk. Commonly targeted communities have spoken to the authors of 
an expectation of violence and a normalisation of hate crime victimisation. 
So every time there is a new incident it feeds into this expectation that that is what can and does 
happen to trans people and then you know feeds into fears of people going places and doing things. 
Because they expect that this is going to happen to them. And when you expect that something is 
going to happen to you, when it does it‘s obviously horrific but it doesn‘t perhaps have the same im-
pact as it would to somebody who didn‘t expect it. Cos somebody who doesn‘t expect it would then 
go ‘Absolutely that‘s unacceptable and I shouldn‘t have had to deal with that‘  and all of that and then 
you know you go into that process. Whereas I think for a lot of trans people and there are exceptions 
of course but for a lot of trans people ‘Ah well it was just a matter of time really‘ . And that‘s totally 
unacceptable. (Broden Giambrone, TENI cf. Haynes/Schweppe/Carr/Carmody/Enright 2015: 33) 
This ripple effect, or in terrorem effect1, as it is known (cf. Perry/Alvi 2012), produces behavioural 
changes in community members that reflect those of direct victims. 
The purpose of this chapter is to deepen our understanding, developed through interdisciplinary 
research at the intersections of sociological and legal scholarship framework, of the social as-
pects of hate crime by applying the lens of transgression to the message that victims perceive 
and receive in the experience of hate crime victimisation. We understand transgression, in this 
context, to mean non-conformity to dominant perceptions of acceptable ways of acting, or – as 
we shall show – being: Transgression can be understood as the exceeding a limit which may be 
physical, racial, aesthetic, sexual, national, legal, and/or moral (cf. Jenks 2003). In this chapter, we 
engage directly with first-hand accounts of hate crime victimisation occurring in Ireland. We ar-
gue that the selection of victims and their targeting on the basis of immutable personal charac-
teristics serves to highlight the criminal sanctioning of transgression – and the communication of 
the victim‘s position as external to the in-group (cf. Perry 2001).  
 
2. Structural and individual approaches to understanding hate crime 
The concept of hate crime has been denigrated by some as encouraging an individualised under-
standing of bias-related hostility, placing the blame on individual offenders and consequently re-
lieving society of responsibility for the culture from which such acts emerge. Goldberg (1995), for 
example, critiqued the construct as responsibilising individual psychology for manifestations of 
structural racism. In the context of Northern Ireland, Robbie McVeigh (2017) has suggested that a 
focus on addressing hate crimes committed by individuals may be used to distract from state 
sponsored violence.  
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However, the construct of hate crime does not inherently privilege either individual or structural 
approaches to the phenomenon. Hate crime can be understood in multiple ways – in terms of 
the individual offender‘s psychology, in terms of cultural prejudices, in terms of territoriality (cf. 
Perry 2009) (that is, a sense of ownership over or claim to place).  
Within the field of hate studies, the construct of hate crime is for the most part carefully bounda-
ried. It excludes hatred directed towards the individual as an individual; it is reserved for use 
where the object of hate is, in fact, not the person per se, but their (perceived) group identity. We 
can be even more particular here, in that, although some policy makers and scholars have sought 
to apply the construct to a more amorphous range of group identities (cf. Bakalis 2017), there 
exists agreement within the field of hate studies and among related practitioners and policy mak-
ers that the concept of hate crime is used specifically to refer to the targeting of victims on the 
basis of identities related to their personal characteristics, and these are most commonly speci-
fied as their gender, gender identity and expression, ethnicity, skin colour, religion, disability and 
sexual orientation. 
The social aspect of hate crime is emphasised, if not particularly well theorised (cf. Perry 2017) in 
the field of hate studies. It is accepted that the communities who are targeted on the basis of 
their personal characteristics reflect very clearly the forms of prejudice, which dominate in con-
temporary culture. Barbara Perry (2001), whose works are a touchstone within the hate studies 
field, operates a sociological understanding of the ‘hate‘  to which the term hate crime refers: 
[…] acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed toward already stigmatized and marginalized 
groups. As such, it is a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious hi-
erarchies that characterize a given social order. It is intended to simultaneously recreate the threat-
ened (real or imagined) hegemony of the perpetrator‘s group, and the “appropriate” subordinate 
identity of the victim‘s group. It is a means of marking both the Self and the Other in such a way as to 
re-establish their “proper” relative positions, as given and reproduced by broader ideologies and pat-
terns of social and political inequality. (2001: 10) 
This chapter seeks to contribute to our understanding of the social aspects of hate crime, via an 
analysis of transgression as a theme in narratives of hate crime encounters. 
 
3. Data sources 
The authors of this chapter are the co-directors of the Hate and Hostility Research Group (HHRG) 
at the University of Limerick, the only research group in Ireland dedicated to the study of hate 
crime. The HHRG, which is affiliated to the International Network for Hate Studies, was set up in 
2012 to initiate scholarship in the area of hate and hostility studies in Ireland from an interdisci-
plinary perspective. The group emphasises cross-sectoral engagement and works in cooperation 
with community, civic, and government partners. The HHRG has conducted research in partner-
ship with the Transgender Equality Network Ireland, European Network Against Racism Ireland 
and the Gay and Lesbian Equality Network Ireland. 
Since 2012, the HHRG has completed four funded, two pro bono, and one unfunded research 
project examining the phenomenon of hate crime in Ireland. Each of these projects has required 
analysis of quantitative or qualitative data relating to hate crimes occurring in Ireland. This chap-
ter draws on narratives of hate crime offences gathered and published by the authors and their 
research partners throughout this period to theorise the nature of hate crime offences via the 
lens of transgression. The narratives in question relate to the experiences of the Irish trans com-
munity, but also to the experiences of racialized and religious minorities and, to a lesser extent 
given the data available, to the experiences of LGB persons. The data relates to the Irish case, but 
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the authors assert the transferability of the findings. The chapter draws on published literature in 
the field of hate studies, i.e. the field of scholarship, which focuses specifically on understanding 
and addressing hate incidents to contextualise their relevance and their significance. The data is 
derived from three main projects, Out of the Shadows, The Life Cycle of a Hate Crime , and STAD: 
Stop Transphobia and Discrimination 2014–2016:  
Out of the Shadows was a 2014/15 research project funded by the Irish Council for Civil Liberties. The 
project, which was the first in Ireland to examine the phenomenon of hate crime from a cross 
community perspective, involved over 70 interviews including with community organisations, le-
gal professionals, police and probation officers. As part of this research, the HHRG interviewed 
ten victims of hate crime and two family members of victims with intellectual/developmental dis-
abilities. The 12 narratives discussed in this chapter include the experiences of people with physi-
cal disabilities; people with intellectual and developmental disabilities; members of ethnic 
(including Traveller), racialized and religious minorities; lesbian and gay persons; transgender and 
gender fluid persons; and one person from an alternative subculture. 
In May 2015, the HHRG was awarded a funding grant from the European Union Directorate–
General Justice under its Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme. The grant was made to support 
projects to prevent and combat racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance, and the pro-
ject itself seeks to determine best practices for preventing hate crime. Entitled The Life Cycle of a 
Hate Crime, the project examines the application of criminal laws and sentencing provisions for hate 
crime across five EU jurisdictions, capturing best practice in the tools utilised to combat hate 
crime across Europe in relation to both the strategies of legal intervention and the implementa-
tion of these rules. By engaging with both actors in the criminal justice system and victims and 
perpetrators of hate crime, we show how each participating jurisdiction manages the prosecution 
of hate crime at key stages of the criminal process: (1) Proof Requirements and Making the Deci-
sion to Prosecute; (2) Court Procedure and Rules of Evidence; and (3) Sentencing. The project 
partners include long-term collaborators of the HHRG, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and the 
University of Sussex, as well as In Iustitia from the Czech Republic, the Latvian Centre for Human Rights 
and Umeå Universitet from Sweden. As part of this project, the HHRG conducted interviews with 
19 victims of hate crime.2 In this project, most interviewees spoke about being targeted on the 
basis of their skin colour, but others described encounters in which they were targeted on the 
basis of their ethnicity, their sexual orientation, religion, and gender identity. 
In all cases, self-identified victims of hate crime were recruited through the advertisement of the 
research objectives and criteria for inclusion through channels likely to reach suitable partici-
pants, requesting people who meet the criteria to volunteer to take part in the study. We adver-
tised through civil society organisations who advocate for and/or support groups who commonly 
experience hate crime and through key influencers in commonly targeted communities. We 
sought participation from individuals across a range of identity groups and did not operate a 
quota. Data were subject to thematic analysis.  
This chapter also draws on narratives of hate crime submitted by the trans community in Ireland 
to STAD (Gaelige for ‘Stop‘ ), the Transgender Equality Network Ireland ‘s third party hate crime re-
porting mechanism for transphobic hate incidents, which the HHRG analysed and reported on 
with that organisation for the period 2014–2016. Across the three year period to which this analy-
sis relates, a total of 46 reports were submitted to STAD. Most provided a detailed narrative ac-
count of the hate crime to which the respondent was subject. The respondents identified the 
grounds on which they were targeted as including gender identity, gender expression and sexual 
orientation. Respondents who perceived sexual orientation to be a factor identified variously as 
gay, bisexual, straight, queer and asexual. 
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Across the three projects, the most common types of crime to which victims have been subject 
are public order offences, criminal damage, assault, harassment, and among the trans communi-
ty, sexual assault. In respect to narratives drawn from interviews it is worth noting that we spoke 
with each participating victim for between one and two and a half hours. In that time, victims fre-
quently recounted to us that they have been subject to multiple hate crimes. The 12 research 
participants with whom we interacted for the purposes of Out of the Shadows alone detailed a 
total of 18 hate crimes in the course of the fieldwork. The 17 victims whose data is analysed in 
the Lifecycle of a Hate Crime project each discussed between one and three reported hate 
crimes. In total, the participants discussed 26 hate crimes. In the case of both projects, more inci-
dents were referred to in the course of the interviews but there was not time to delve into every 
experience of bias-involved victimisation. In respect of each interviewee, we have tended, there-
fore, to focus on those crimes which victims themselves regard as the most significant. These ca-
veats speak to many victims‘  experience of abuse as an aspect of everyday life. The common-
place nature of bias-related hostility, including hate crime, was one of the many worrying fea-
tures of the interview findings, as was the degree to which many of the interviewees had normal-
ised their experiences of hate.  
 
4. Narrative themes in Irish hate crime discourse 
The theme of transgression manifests in our narratives of hate crime encounters in a number of 
ways. It arises in respect to the discourses the offender draws on in constructing the victim as an 
object of their hate. It arises in the resources upon which the offender draws to justify their ac-
tions. And it arises in respect to the role which onlookers are allocated in the encounter.  
 
4.1 The victim as an object of hate 
Ahmed asserts that “violence against others is one way in which the other‘s identity is fixed or 
sealed; the other is forced to embody a particular identity by and for the perpetrator of the 
crime, and that force involves harm or injury” (2001: 351). Certainly, the narratives, which we ana-
lysed, evidence this fixing of identity. In the hate crime encounter, victims who are multifaceted 
individuals, with complex personal identities in which multiple group memberships intersect, are 
reduced to a singular characteristic, the selection determined by the offender. The narratives that 
we examined reference the reduction of victims to their skin colour, their ethnicity, their religion, 
their sexual orientation, their gender identity or expression and their disability, the latter being 
the least well represented in our sample.  
Victims across all grounds cite the use of pejorative terms to refer to the identity targeted: 
[T]hey kept calling me a “tran*y”, a “fa**ot”, and a “d*ke bitch”3 as they beat me up. (STAD 2017: 8) 
[W]hat impacted me the most – they said […] “You are a fucking ch*nk” and to me, I was just taken 
aback, … but I am really angry as well so I retaliated, so I was just like you know pretty much like, 
“Fuck you, what are you doing?” […] [A]nd so one of them spat at me and it just got in my hair. 
(Haynes et al. 2015: 19) 
I heard “Kill f*gs. As much as you can”. (Interviewee, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime) 
Other discursive devices through which the offender constructs these singular identities as hate-
ful reflect prejudicial discourses and also have transnational as well as local currency (cf. Haynes 
et al. 2006). A small minority of individuals who are targeted because they are racialized as Black 
relate encounters in which they are described as animals or children. Much more common, and 
also deployed against white ethnic minorities, is the label of welfare fraud or ‘sponger‘ , abusing 
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the country‘s system of social protection, and the instruction directed to ethnic and racialized mi-
norities alike to leave Ireland and return to their ‘own‘  country: 
[Y]ou should go back to where you come from, to the jungle you‘re coming from. (Interviewee, Lifecy-
cle of a Hate Crime) 
He did say that I‘m a ni**er and I don‘t belong there. I must leave and go back to my country. 
(Interviewee, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime). 
[G]o back to your country you shit Romanian gypsies. (Interviewee, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime) 
Ahmed argues that 
[w]hat it so significant in hate stories is precisely the way in which they imagine a subject that is un-
der threat by imagined others whose proximity threatens, not only to take something away from the 
subject (jobs, security, wealth and so on), but to take the place of the subject. […] It is this perceived 
threat that makes the hate reasonable rather than prejudicial: “it is not a hate motivated by un-
grounded reasoning. (2001: 346) 
Ahmed (ibid.) asserts, too, that the identities to which ‘hate‘  becomes stuck – using her terminol-
ogy – may also be perceived as hateful because they are constructed as threatening imagined 
‘pure bodies‘ . In a minority of narratives relayed by Black men, but also in the experiences of 
trans women, this notion of threatened impurity – particularly associated with sexual deviance 
and promiscuity – is present. The discourse is familiar in the Irish context. As long ago as 2001, 
Meade described Ireland as a country, which regards difference and dissent as equally poisonous 
to the corporeal body of the nation. People who are subject to transphobic attacks also cite being 
labelled as mentally ill: “I was told that transgender people are ‘crazy and unpredictable‘  and 
that‘s why he wanted to hurt me” (STAD 2017: 28). 
People who are targeted on the basis of Islamophobia cite being publicly labelled as terrorists 
and are forcibly removed of their religious clothing: 
[T]hey were laughing and they were name calling Osama Bin Laden [...] I [told] them please be quiet 
and don‘t disturb me and even before I can say that one of the guys actually grabbed me from be-
hind [...] he pulled my turban like this from [the] back as I was driving and we were on a [...] dual car-
riageway. (Haynes et al. 2015: 19) 
“[Y]ou fucking Muslim, you fucking terrorist, wait until I rip that thing off of your heads.” (Interviewee, 
Lifecycle of a Hate Crime) 
This latter group includes people who are not Muslim, but who are nonetheless targeted as such 
because of an offender‘s misperception (cf. Haynes et al. 2015). For the period of the encounter, 
the offender forces them to take on the burden of Islamophobia and in its after-math they live 
with the risk that being perceived as Muslim can entail. 
 
4.2 Transgression as embodied 
These devices produce the victim as an object of the encounter. They reduce them to the role of 
signifier of the group identity, which the offender seeks to target. During the deployment of these 
discursive devices, the victim is forced to embody the social identity which the offender ascribes 
to them (cf. Ahmed 2001), even when it is not an aspect of their multifaceted group member-
ships. The physical and emotional violence, which hate crime entails (cf. Iganski 2008), is en-
twined with classificatory violence (cf. Tyler 2013). The offender imposes a singular identity upon 
the victim, as a result of which their body – Black, trans, disabled, veiled – is made the objective 
representation of the identity which is the target of the offender‘s ire. As a Sikh victim of Islam-
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ophobia stated, “before you even can say something people ascribe your identity” (Haynes et al. 
2015: 21). 
Beyond these largely identity-specific discourses however, we want to draw your attention to a 
more transcendent theme that we perceive in the hate crime narratives which we have analysed 
– one which is apparent across a wider range of targeted identities. This theme relates to the 
offender‘s policing not just of these forcibly assigned categories of identity, but of the categorical 
boundaries, which hierarchically order bodies, and indeed identities, and to that transgression as 
an attribute to which hate ‘sticks‘ . 
The discourses, which are deployed as weapons during hate crime encounters frequently, prob-
lematise not only the essentialised identity against which the offender has expressed prejudice, 
but also the boundary crossing activities associated with the presence of that identity within the 
community and its territory. Denials of legitimate claims to resources, and intimate relationships, 
are founded in a rejection of the incursion of the migrant into the corporeal body of the nation, 
into the categories of citizen, local, neighbour, family. The pathologisation of non-conforming 
sexual and gender identities is founded in a defence of the privilege conferred by heteronorma-
tivity and cisnormativity. 
From this perspective, the victim represents not just the embodiment of a threatening identity, 
but the embodiment of a threatening transgression of the categorical boundaries – the conceptu-
al borders – that distinguish us and make possible our hierarchical ordering.  
 
4.3 Relationship to the community 
Most of hate crime encounters we analysed were very public in nature. This is not unusual as Mi-
chael (2017) notes that a high proportion of reported racist hate incidents in Ireland for example 
are described as occurring in public spaces.4 In the narratives, which are the subject of her analy-
sis, crimes were often committed in front of, with the support of, or with the participation of by-
standers. It is evident from the narratives that offenders did not anticipate resistance either from 
their own companions or from bystanders. Indeed, Lucy Michael (ibid.), writing about racist inci-
dents in Ireland, asserts that there is a performative aspect to the commission of racist incidents 
in public places and that offenders ‘play‘  to what they perceive as a supportive audience: 
This is marked by shouting and continued harassment in public spaces, often escalating as the per-
petrator attracts the attention and intervention of others. Attention is loudly called to the blackness 
of someone‘s appearance and this serves as a means of identifying a wider audience of support or 
tolerance for further forms of abuse. (ibid.: 283) 
In our own research, both victims and legal professionals have mentioned instances of offenders 
continuing to aggressively communicate their bias motivations, or to simply express their preju-
dice, not only in the presence of ordinary bystanders, but after police have arrived at the scene of 
a crime: 
[W]hen the guard [police, note from the author] came he repeated those statements, […] he said we 
don‘t want this Black, let them go back to their fucking country where they come from. (Interviewee, 
Lifecycle of a Hate Crime) 
Whether actively seeking public support for their acts, or operating without expectation of re-
sistance, this sense of impunity supports the proposal that offenders perceive that they are de-
fending a shared and socially acceptable order. This assertion is further supported by the ap-
pearance of the pronoun ‘we‘  in statements attributed to offenders, including those who were to 
all intents and purposes acting independently of others. 
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In the narratives, which we analysed, it was not unusual for victims to report that offenders re-
ferred to themselves in the plural, i.e. as acting on or with the support of a collective: 
Interviewee: We don‘t want you here. Next time you come here, we‘re going to break your head […]
Interviewer: When he says “we”, who is he referring to? 
Interviewee: The general public. (Interviewee, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime) 
[H]e said “Behave child, behave. Because we‘re going to throw you away”. (Interviewee, Lifecycle of a 
Hate Crime) 
In the above examples relating to the experience of Black immigrants at the hand of white 
offenders, the “passion of these negative attachments to others is re-defined simultaneously as a 
positive attachment to the imagined subjects brought together through the capitalization of the 
signifier, ‘White‘” (Ahmed 2001: 345). In defending what they perceive as the victim‘s corporeal 
transgression of an agreed order, the hate crime offender assumes the support of those  
whose interests are served by the maintenance of that order – an imagined, but also very real, 
privileged ‘we‘ . 
 
4.4 Constructions of the victim as transgressive  
In depicting themselves as defending a collective against the transgressive intrusion of ‘others‘ , 
offenders construct their own identity as adhering to the criteria for inclusion in that community, 
and the identity, which they have ascribed to the victim, as external to the collective. 
This self-defined status as a member of the in-group also gives them grounds for assuming the 
authority to defend its classificatory borders. Their actions in this respect manifest in two main 
ways in our data. First, through the policing of the physical presence of ‘the other‘  within the  
territory of the collective. This form of policing is common where the interaction between offend-
er and victim begins with the intense expression of aggression by the offender, which turn is 
more common where the minority identity can be ascertained or presumed on the basis of visual 
difference. The veiled Muslim women, the lesbian couple holding hands, the woman whose as-
signed gender and gender expression are perceived as incongruous – difference on display 
threatens the hegemonic order: 
[W]e kept walking ahead and the next thing they turned around and came back and one guy came 
over to [other victim, note from the author] and said “I wouldn‘t hit a girl but sure you‘re not a girl”. 
[…] [T]hen one guy shoved into me and then I shoved him back and all of a sudden he was just 
punching and shoving us to the ground. (Haynes et al. 2015: 18) 
[He said that] we should be hung to save children from seeing us; that we were sick and would die 
from AIDS soon anyway. (STAD 2017: 23) 
The second form involves policing the behaviour of minority group members within the territory. 
This form of policing was particularly evident in hate crime encounters which followed the for-
mation of what Walters (2014) refers to as temporary relationships, i.e. where the initial interac-
tion between the offender and victim begins not with an aggressive overture but as a result of a 
transactional relationship, for example where either the victim or the offender is providing goods 
or services to the other. In the scenario below, the demonstration of hate follows a refusal on the 
part of the victim to provide a service: 
Last time I was driving and someone flagged me. And then I looked at the person through my win-
dow and asked “Good night. Where are you going?” He said, “[place name]”. I said, “No, I‘m not going 
to [place name]” – by then he was holding a screwdriver […] the screw driver punched my car. [He 
said] “Fucking n****r”. (Haynes et al. 2015: 20) 
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In our analysis, this type of policing behaviour was characterised by escalation on the part of the 
offender in response to assertive or agentic behaviour on the part of the victim. The presence of 
the minority group is tolerated, but transgression of their perceived position in the hierarchical 
order, from which the offender benefits, is not. Particularly prevalent among Black male partici-
pants, the minority member who challenges a refusal of entry, who declines a transaction or who 
refuses to accept a disadvantageous deal, becomes the victim of an assault in which their trans-
gression of the ascribed ‘status‘  is a key feature: 
I didn‘t hear them coming. Just at that wall we walked past, […] they just came up behind me and 
whack on the back of the head. Now I‘ve been punched in the head before and it‘s gonna hurt him 
more than it hurts me which is the only comfort I took from it – but […] he just thumped me on the 
back of the head and [said] “fucking fa**ot”. (ibid.) 
I was approached by two men, both in their late 20‘s, they asked me “are you a boy or a girl” and be-
fore I could answer him, he proceeded to grope my chest and say “definitely a girl”, I wear a binder 
every day to hide my chest and pass as male, but this incident has made me extremely dysphoric, if I 
wasn‘t dysphoric enough already. (STAD 2017: 28) 
In the course of transphobic crimes, offenders often communicate their “intention to verbally and 
physically interrogate the victim‘s gender identity to figure out where they fit into the offender‘s 
binary understanding of gender” (Haynes/Schweppe 2017: 117). The offender‘s aggressive rejec-
tion of the trans person‘s outward expression of their gender is also inherently a demand to con-
form to essentialist and binary understandings of gender. Both forms of policing overlap in the 
case of the Black Irish citizen whose experience of a hate motivated assault seems to have been 
prompted both by his claim to the category of citizen and his refusal to accept the offender‘s de-
nial of that status: 
“I‘ve told you I‘m an Irish [citizen, note from the author] and that‘s it, you can‘t change it.” […] I said 
“Look please can we just forget about this topic?” […] [H]e give me slap […] My eye was all swollen up. 
(Interviewee, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime) 
 
4.5 Impacts on the victim 
The negative emotional and behavioural effects of hate crime detailed in the introduction to this 
chapter are reflected both in our analysis of STAD 2014–2016 and in the narratives gathered by 
the HHRG through victim interviews.  
Respondents most commonly talked about being afraid, scared or anxious in the aftermath of 
their victimisation. That fear impacts upon their capacity to display differences that transgress 
the hegemonic order: 
The incidents float around in my head all the time, causing anxiety and panic attacks, I wake up at 
night and this is going around in my head, I should be able to go about my day to day business in 
peace. (STAD 2017: 8) 
I am also more afraid to go outside as I have been threatened to be beat up – not to my face. (ibid.) 
The behavioural effects in evidence in STAD and the interview data mirror those cited by Walters 
and Patterson (2015) where many participants alter their behaviour to enhance their sense of 
security and reduce the risk of repeated victimisation. For some victims, these behavioural re-
sponses to their victimisation have limited their lives in meaningful ways: 
I have had to postpone my education, go to a regular therapist, and have trouble going outside or 
even leaving my bedroom/bed. I am getting better, but apparently I am suffering from PTSD as told 
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by my therapist. I feel like I live under a constant threat, and I have trouble sexually or intimately en-
gaging with a potential partner. (STAD 2017: 30) 
The amount of name calling, verbal abuse and insulting comments caused me to relapse and be-
come unwell. I was hospitalised due to intense stress and isolation. (ibid.) 
HHRG interview data also indicates that victims targeted in or near their homes often feel com-
pelled to move away. In one case, a person became homeless rather than remain at a location in 
which they had been repeatedly abused.  
The All-Wales Hate Crime Project found that almost one fifth (18 per cent) of their respondents at-
tempted to conceal the identity for which they had been targeted in the aftermath of victimisa-
tion, increasing to one third among victims of homophobic and transphobic crimes. Williams and 
Tregidga (2013: 205) found that trans respondents were most likely to say that they had tried to 
conceal their trans/gender identity to reduce the risk of becoming victims of hate crime. Re-
spondents reporting to STAD also report changes to their confidence in expressing their gender 
identity: 
I felt […] ashamed of myself […] [m]y sense of identity has been hugely affected. I was deeply dis-
tressed and desperately wanted to somehow not be transgender anymore as it brought so much 
daily criticism. (STAD 2017: 30) 
I was very shaken up. My anxiety to be myself out in public has risen significantly because I‘m afraid 
it will happen again. (ibid.: 8)  
But victims targeted on other grounds also practiced concealment. For example, one member of 
a religious minority discussed friends shaving off their facial hair to reduce the risk of re-
victimisation. Another interviewee noted that some people avoid wearing religious dress for the 
same reason. A third asserted that gay and lesbian couples avoid holding hands in public. A 
fourth interviewee who was targeted because of her racialized identity discussed keeping her 
face concealed in public so that she would not be the target of hostility: 
[I]t‘s kind of sad admitting this but I usually go around face down like looking at the ground when I 
am walking. Sometimes it is hard when you make eye contact with people you almost feel as if they 
are going to say something to you and sometimes they do say something and you are like “Well what 
did I expect?” […] [Y]ou kind of stop doing things just to avoid any sort of interaction and I am sure 
that I am not the only one to do it […] after that incident I still very much had that feeling of you know 
keep a low profile. (Haynes et al. 2015: 25) 
This type of conformity under threat, this forcible denial of one‘s authentic self is expressed elo-
quently by this interviewee as a manifestation of oppression: 
I‘m just trapped in my own culture. Not trapped in my body, because I know who I am and I‘m very 
comfortable in who I am. I love my body. […] But I‘m very, very guarded and very scared and I‘m 
trapped in my own culture. (ibid.: 29) 
Hate crime can therefore be understood as a relatively effective means of repressing its victims. 
Full and equal participation in community life becomes stunted for many of those who experi-
ence the violent targeting of their identity. Juang describes violence as “the best means by which 
we have been warded off from attempting to make rights claims or pointing out unjust inequali-
ties” (2006: 714). We understand hate crime, and societal failures in addressing it, as part of a 
larger pattern of oppression. Hate crime targets people‘s expression of their fundamental self-
hood and, in doing so, it attacks their authentic participation in the community, both as private 
individuals and (if they choose) as advocates for their community, and is in both instances an ob-
stacle to achieving equality.  
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These behavioural responses also support the conclusion that victims do receive the message of 
hate crime as a message regarding their position in respect to the collective. The hate crime en-
counter is not experienced as one of anomaly, but as a sign of the generalised risks involved in 
displaying difference, of challenging the hegemonic order through one‘s difference.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Viewing hate crime encounters through the lens of transgression deepens our understanding of 
the relationship between the commission of hate crimes by individuals and the existing social 
order. Offenders‘  expressions of hate can be understood as a defence of and demand for the 
retention of the status quo. The verbalisations of hostility, which accompany their actions, speak 
to a rejection of the display of difference, which might undermine the stability of the existing or-
der. Their demands are for homogeneity – not just of people, but of ways of being, ways of doing. 
They target those whose presence as equal participants in the community threatens existing hi-
erarchies of privilege. 
Although the targets of hate crimes are often lone individuals, the intended audience is far larger, 
incorporating both the identity community to which the victim belongs, and the imagined homog-
enous geographic community, which the offender seeks to defend. The message of hate crime is 
one of unbelonging, but also a reinforcing of the existing hierarchy and the bases on which privi-
lege is distributed within the society. 
The stability of the existing hierarchy aids the offender in legitimating their actions. Our quietude 
regarding the inequitable position of targeted minorities feeds their perception of the social ac-
ceptability of the status quo. Those communities who are violently targeted by hate crime offend-
ers are also the communities who experience identity-based discrimination from employers and 
providers of goods and services, and micro-aggressions directed at their identity from their fellow 
citizens. The violence that manifests as hate crime does not occur as part of a vacuum; it is the 
extreme end of a continuum of hostility.  
The significance of these conclusions lies in the breadth of response indicated. Individual pathol-
ogy implies response at the level of the individual. The fault lies not with society, but with the de-
viant peculiarities of an individual mind. When we understand hate crime as part of a continuum 
of hostility directed towards those who challenge the existing social order, we must claim the 
offenders as our own. Individuals are culpable for their own actions, but when those actions are 
legitimated by a social order which we all participate in and maintain (and which many of us ben-
efit directly from) we are all responsible.  
In this context too, the State‘s reaction to hate crime is understood not as a response to the 
anomalous victimisation of some members of minoritised communities by pathological individ-
uals, but as a response to the structural vulnerability to violence created by inequality. The onus 
on the State then is to address the needs of victims of hate crime, not just as crime victims, but as 
identity communities disadvantaged by the prevailing social order.  
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Notes 
1 The terrorising effect of hate crime which goes beyond the individual to generate fear and  
anxiety among the broader community of which the victim is part.  
2 Two of those interviews were excluded, one because of a lack of data relevant to the subject 
matter of the research; and the other for ethical reasons.  
3 Heterosexist slurs.  
4 We note that this pattern may simply reflect the existence of additional obstacles to reporting 
hate crimes occurring in the private sphere and recognise the dangers of uncritically associating 
hate crime with the public sphere only.  
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